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FRAUD BY FRIGHT: WHITE COLLAR CRIME
BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERSt
PAMELA H. Bucyt
Fraud by health care providers is one of the most deleterious of all
white collar crimes. It is also one of the most difficult to prosecute. In
her Article, Professor Bucy compares fraud by health care providers with
other types of white collar crime and analyzes the theories offraud his-
torically used to prosecute health care providers. She concludes that the
strongest theory--prosecution for providing unnecessary or substandard
health care-is the theory that has been used the least. Professor Bucy
suggests ways for prosecutors to use this theory more often and more
effectively in order to combat a problem that ravishes human dignity
and personal health as well as the national pocketbook
"I will apply measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability
and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice."
Portion of Oath of Hippocrates, Sixth Century B.C.- First Century
A.D.; currently administered by many medical schools to graduating
medical students.1
"[I c]ould make a million dollars out of the suckers ......
Statement of owner/operator of cancer clinics regarding cancer
patients.2
I knew "if sufficient testing was not done the clinic would not be profita-
ble." I ordered tests that were "not medically necessary .... I prostituted my
medical license."
Statement of physician testifying as government witness.
3
"It [is] fantastic that on some of these patients [I] only saw them once but
[I] was submitting bills and reports reflecting numerous visits and treatments."
Statement of physician.4
0 Copyright 1989 Pamela H. Bucy. All rights reserved.
t One court in finding defendant, a physician, guilty of mail fraud stated: "defendant, with
the intent of fraudulent deception, meant to frighten the supposed patient into parting with his
money." United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A. 1975, Austin Col-
lege; J.D. 1978, Washington University School of Law; Assistant United States Attorney, E.D. Mo.,
Criminal Division, 1980-1987; Coordinator, Health Care Task Force, E.D. Mo. 1985-1987. The
author expresses her appreciation to Dean Nathaniel Hansford for his support and encouragement;
to the University of Alabama Research Grants Committee for its support; to her colleagues Wythe
Holt and Kenneth C. Randall for their editorial suggestions; to Angela Aderholt, Melissa Kessler,
Donna Knotts, Christopher Gerety, and Nick Whitehead for their research assistance, and to Hugh
Chavern, M.D., M.P.H. and R. Pat Bucy, M.D., Ph.D for their help and insight.
1. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1731 (1978).
2. Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 540 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695 (1941).
3. United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1986).
4. United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 76 (5th Cir. 1973).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Despite his altruistic admonition to physicians, Hippocrates was not naive.
He also counseled new physicians that whatever houses they may visit, they
should "come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all.., mischief." A
little Hippocratic realism may be appropriate. While the vast majority of health
care providers6 are exemplary professionals, some are not. We cannot afford to
ignore this fact. The cost to the public of the fraud, waste, and abuse by health
care providers in the United States is an estimated $45 billion per year. 7 While
criminal fraud does not account for this entire amount, criminal fraud by health
care providers is a serious problem and diverts scarce health care resources.8
Moreover, because fraudulent health care providers are often incompetent
health care providers, 9 the harm suffered at their hands may be more than
monetary.
A recent emphasis on fraud in health care by policy makers, law enforce-
5. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 1, at 1731.
6. Health care providers include medical physicians, osteopathic physicians, chiropractors,
podiatrists, nurses, physical and respiratory therapists, hospitals, emergicare centers, nursing homes,
home nursing associations, and durable medical equipment companies.
This Article does not address fraud by recipients or potential recipients of health care services
as reflected in cases such as United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.) (insured attempted to
defraud insurance company by misrepresenting facts surrounding automobile accident), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 911 (1982); United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1976) (insured failed to dis-
close that he had multiple insurance policies when he applied for another policy); United States v.
Pope, 415 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1969) (insured falsified physician statements that he submitted to insur-
ance company in support of claim), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950 (1970).
7. In 1986 $458.2 billion was spent on health care expenditures in the United States, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1988, at 86 (108th ed. 1988) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1988]. Many commentators fa-
miliar with medical fraud estimate that ten percent of our health care costs are caused by fraud. See,
e.g., Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before
Senate Comm. on Finance] (statement of Oliver B. Revell, Assistant Director, Chief of Criminal
Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation); Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health & Long-Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1980) [hereinafter Medicaid and Medicare Fraud: Hearing Before House Comm.
on Aging] (opening statement of Chairman Claude Pepper); Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Pt.
5, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 534 (1976) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5] (statement of Frank E. Moss, D., Utah); House Select Comm. on
Aging, 97th Cong., 2nd Sesm, Medicaid Fraud: A Case History in the Failure of State Enforcement
III (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter Medicaid Fraud Case History]. But see Oversight of HHS In-
spector General's Effort to Combat Fraud, Waste and Abuse: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance and Senate Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1981) [hereinafter Over-
sight]. In a 1977 report the Health and Human Services Inspector General estimated losses between
$5.5 to $6.5 billion to Medicare and Medicaid that were attributable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Id.
With health care expenditures in 1977 at $169.9 billion, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1988, supra, at 86,
this estimate represents approximately three to four percent of total expenditures. This estimate,
however, covers only fraud, waste, and abuse in governmental programs; it does not encompass
fraud, waste, and abuse in private industry. See Oversight, supra, at 136.
8. Oversight, supra note 7, at 133.
9. See, eg., Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on
Finance, Pt. 5, supra note 7, at 525 ("[There is] rampant fraud, abuse and maladministration in the
Medicaid program and a pattern of reprehensible exploitation of the sick and poor not to mention
the taxpayer who is paying the bill.") (statement by Senator Charles H. Percy); Medicare & Medi-
caid Frauds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care of the Senate Special Comm. on
Aging, Pt 6, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 686-87 (1976) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 6] (statements of Nancy Kurke, M.D., staff physician at a
Medicaid clinic); see infra text accompanying notes 537-57.
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ment officials, and private industry1° has had dramatic ramifications for many in
the health care industry. Nevertheless, the academic literature has virtually ig-
nored this area of the law.1 l As one seasoned health care fraud investigator
stated "[Y]ou have to have guts .... There is no body of law or procedure and
you are.., going out in an area relatively unexplored."' 12 A legal synthesis and
10. Beginning in the 1970s, numerous congressional committees actively investigated fraud in
health care. The Senate Committee on Aging alone held over fifty such hearings. Medicaid Fraud
Case History, supra note 7, at 8-9, 14-15 nn.l-8. In response to testimony and evidence consistently
indicating that the health care industry was "fraught with fraud," id. at III (remarks of Chairman
Claude Pepper), Congress created an office in 1976 within the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) vested solely with the responsibility to conduct a coordinated attack on fraud by
health care providers. Pub. L. No. 94-505, 90 Stat. 2429 (1976). In 1972, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1986,
and 1987 Congress passed and signed into law anti-health-care fraud and abuse bills. The 1972 Act
established criminal penalties for certain types of fraud by health care providers and gave the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly HEW) authority to suspend Medi-
care payments to providers found to have abused the program. Pub. L. No. 94-603, § 1632, 86 Stat.
1329, 1478 (1972). The 1977 act strengthened the criminal sanctions for Medicare and Medicaid
program violations and provided federal funds to the states to establish and operate Medicaid fraud
detection units. Pub. L. No. 95-142, §§ 1877, 1909, 91 Stat. 1175, 1180-81 (1977). The Omnibus
Budget Reconcilation Act of 1980 extended the federal funding for state Medicaid fraud detection
units to expanded categories of providers who could be excluded from the Medicare program if
found to abuse the program. Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1753-1788 (1982)). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 authorized the imposition
of a civil monetary penalty up to $2,000 for fraudulent Medicare and Medicaid claims and prohib-
ited providers convicted of filing fraudulent Medicare and Medicaid claims from filing future Medi-
care claims for reimbursement. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 created civil penalties for certain physician incentive payment plans and
clarified the basis on which convicted providers may be excluded from Medicare. Pub. L. 99-509,
§ 9313, 100 Stat. 1874, 2003 (1986). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 created civil
penalties for providers who fail to provide necessary services for patients. Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 4014, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-61 to -62 (1987). The Department of Justice designated prosecution of
fraudulent health care providers as one of its top priorities in the Carter administration, Fraud and
Racketeering in Medicare and Medicaid: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978) [hereinafter Fraud and Racketeering] (testimony of United States Attorney
General Griffin B. Bell), and reaffirmed this commitment in the Reagan administration. White Col-
lar Crime (E.F Hutton): Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Pt. 3, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1986) [hereinafter White Collar Crime, Pt. 3] (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Numerous states have also begun
aggressively to pursue fraudulent health care providers, through both criminal and civil actions. As
of September 1986, 38 states had formed investigative units that focus solely on fraud in Medicaid
programs. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FACT SHEET FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES, COMM ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MEDICAID: RESULTS OF CERTIFIED FRAUD
CONTROL UNITS, H.R. Doc. No. 87-12FS, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1987). Private insurance com-
panies have established fraud detection units staffed with experienced fraud investigators. These
units have recovered millions of dollars in fraudulently obtained reimbursement through such tactics
as lawsuits against fraudulent providers, recoupment of payments obtained by fraud, and subscriber
hot lines. Medical Benefits, MED. ECON. D., May 15, 1987, at 3. Private insurance companies have
joined with the government to establish a computerized network to pool data on claims filed by
health care providers. According to its founders, this network was created because of "the rising
concern about those [providers] who fabricate diagnoses, misuse billing codes and use other ploys to
increase the payments they or their patients receive from insurance companies and Government
programs." N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1987, at B20, col. 3.
11. For example, none of the following symposia on legal issues in health care addresses fraud
by providers: 17 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 293 (1986-87); 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
1 (1988); Special Health Law Issue, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Special Issue: Health Law, 25 Hous-
TON L. REV. 471 (1988); Special Symposium: Market-Oriented Approaches to Achieving Health Pol-
icy Goals, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981). In the Health Care Symposium sponsored by the Kentucky
Law Journal, 75 Ky. L.J. 439 (1986-87), one student Comment out of seven Articles and Comments
addressed this issue.
12. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care
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overview is imperative.
This Article examines fraud by health care providers. Part I traces eco-
nomic and social development of the American health care profession; an under-
standing of this development is crucial to a thorough analysis of the commission,
detection, and prosecution of fraud by health care providers.1 3 The most rele-
vant economic development in this century has been an evolution of the mecha-
nisms by which health care providers are reimbursed. In the twentieth century,
third-party fee-for-service reimbursement has expanded. Fueled by concerns
over escalating costs, however, critics have attacked this reimbursement mecha-
nism and the remainder of the twentieth century will likely be consumed by
efforts to modify and replace it. The major social development that character-
izes twentieth century medicine, and which affects the prosecution of fraudulent
providers, has been a change in the public's attitude toward health. Skepticism
in the early twentieth century was replaced by an almost blind faith that money
can buy good health; a distrustful disdain for physicians and hospitals was sup-
planted by reverent deference to these individuals and institutions. This blind
faith and deference may be on the wane, however, as cost-conscious Americans
raise the question: Are we getting our money's worth for our health dollars?
Part II discusses the general characteristics of fraud by health care provid-
ers as compared with other white collar crimes. Like all white collar crimes,
fraud by health care providers is difficult to investigate and prove and therefore
it is essential to develop a "theory of the case" that is built upon certain analyti-
cal steps. Also, like other white collar crimes, fraud by health care providers
can be pursued civilly. Because of this the theoretical and practical problems
encountered by the criminal prosecutor and the civil plaintiff will be similar.
Moreover, the existence of civil remedies complicates the exercise of prosecu-
tional discretion and can affect the criminal trial. Although it shares these fea-
tures with other white collar crimes, the prosecution of fraud by health care
providers is unique because it is affected by certain features idiosyncratic to the
health care industry; the ambiguous and emotional nature of medicine, the def-
erence to physicians, the complex regulatory scheme that engulfs the health care
industry, and the small dollar amount involved in the typical health care
transaction.
Part III discusses the theories under which health care provider fraud his-
torically has been prosecuted. This discussion is based upon an analysis of re-
ported federal and state prosecutions of health care providers and upon review
of hundreds of unreported prosecutions. 14 Despite the large number of possible
and the Subcomm. on Health of the Elderly of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1975) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1] (testimony of Paul M. Allen, Chief Deputy Director, Michigan Dept. of
Social Services).
13. By far the most significant twentieth century developments in medicine are the scientific
advances that have provided control over many diseases. J. BORDLEY & A. HARVEY, Two CENTU-
RIES OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 751, 753-56 (1976). This Article does not attempt to discuss these
developments. They are noted only to the extent that they have affected the socioeconomic develop-
ment of health care, which in turn has influenced fraudulent behavior by providers.
14. The unreported cases reviewed include grand jury investigations conducted and cases tried
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prosecuting sovereignties, the various statutory authorities charged, and the
many types of providers prosecuted, health care fraud prosecutors have relied on
a limited number of theories. This Article identifies and describes these theories,
assesses their relative effectiveness, and describes the type of evidence needed to
prove each theory. One of the more significant differences among these theories
is who they identify as the victim of the fraud. Most of the theories identify the
insurer, which paid for the services, as the victim of the fraud. Only one theory,
which has limited applicability, has consistently identified the patient as a victim
of a provider's fraud. Part III explains why it is important to identify and prove
that patients are victims of a provider's fraud and how to do so.
Part IV addresses the future. The dramatic socioeconomic upheaval that
the health care industry is experiencing will affect fraud by providers. Some of
the theories of fraud discussed in Part III will cease to exist, others will continue
in old and new ways. Part IV suggests what these changes will be and what they
mean for future criminal and civil actions.
I. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
The economic structure of the health care industry is unlike that of any
other industry in the American economy because it is peculiarly immune to mar-
ket forces.' 5 When market forces dominate, suppliers of goods or services profit
by obtaining and using resources efficiently and pricing their product below
competitors. 16 For market forces to perform optimally, consumers must be suf-
ficiently well informed to decide what goods or services they wish to purchase. 17
by the author during seven years of service as an Assistant United States Attorney, and review of
congressional hearings and government publications. Particularly helpful in discussing specific in-
stances of fraud were the semiannual reports to Congress by the Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of the Inspector General and the transcripts of the following congressional hearings:
Program Fraud Civil Penalties Act of 1983: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1983) [hereinafter Program Fraud]; Fraudulent Medical and
Insurance Promotions: Cleveland, Ohio: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term
Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1982) [hereinafter Fraudulent
Medical and Insurance Promotions]; Oversight, supra note 7, at 5; Fraud and Racketeering, supra
note 10, at 41-44; Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on
Aging, Pt. 9, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1105-31 (1977) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Pt. 9]; Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Pt. 8, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 822-60 (1977) [hereinafter
Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Pt. 8]; Medi-
care and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Pt. 7, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 760-64, 787 (1976) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate
Special Comm. on Aging, Pt. 7]; Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1, supra note 12, at 16, 22-24, 58-128; Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Pt. 2, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 255-61 (1975).
15. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, AM. ECON. REV. 941
(1963); Clark, The Question of Costs, in MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (E. Oatman ed.
1978) (statement of John J. O'Connell, a vice-president of Bethlehem Steel).
16. E. GINZBURG, LIMITS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: THE SEARCH FOR REALISM 45
(1977).
17. See Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Compe-
1989]
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According to traditional economic theory, when market forces are able to func-
tion in an optimal setting, increasing the supply of goods or services decreases
the price and, conversely, increasing the price of goods or services decreases the
demand.18 In the health care industry, however, these laws of supply and de-
mand have not worked. As the supply of health care services has increased so
has the price and, despite increasing prices, the demand for health care services
has not decreased but has escalated tremendously.1 9
This aberrational economic behavior is due to several factors. First, the
commodity at issue is health, not widgets, and the consumer's appetite for better
health, unlike its appetite for widgets, is apparently insatiable. 20
A second reason suggested for this aberrational economic behavior is that
consumers are rarely well informed about medicine and when it comes to their
own or their family's health are unwilling to make judgments about what is or is
not a necessary expenditure. 21 Thus, consumers abdicate their decisionmaking
authority to the provider of health care services.22 This provider is usually a
physician who will determine whether health services are necessary.23 Because
in the health care industry the provider of services historically has profited as
demand increases, there has been no monetary incentive for the provider to con-
trol demand. 24
By far the most significant reason the health care industry fails to comply
with the market forces is the third-party payer reimbursement mechanism. 25
Under this mechanism a third-party to the provider-patient relationship, namely
tition What the Doctor Ordered?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849, 902 (1981); see also P. STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 23 (1982) (stressing the independence of buyers and
sellers in an optimally efficient market).
18. Feldstein, The High Cost of Hospitals and What to Do About It, 48 PUB. INTEREST 40, 43-
44 (1977).
19. Friedman & Rakoff, Health, Health Costs and Public Policy, in TOWARD A NATIONAL
HEALTH POLICY 11 (1977).
20. "[The elemental fact is that medical care is about living and dying, something considered
by many to be of a rather different character from the purchase of tomatoes." Vladeck, The Market
vs Regulation: The Case For Regulation, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 209, 211 (1981). The
"commodity" sought from a physician is information that is unlike commodities in the competitive
market model. The demand for medical services is irregular and unpredictable. Arrow, supra note
15, at 948-49.
21. Arrow, supra note 15, at 951.
22. Medicare in Florida: Looking to the Future: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on
Aging, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983) [hereinafter Medicare in Florida] (statement of Hyman Ruch-
lis, Health Action Comm., Florida Consumers Federation); Clark, supra note 15, at 40.
23. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34
VAND. L. REV. 965, 967 (1981).
24. Helms, Towards an Understanding of the Health Delivery Concept, in HEALTH CARE DE-
LIVERY SYSTEMS IN NORTH AMERICA: THE CHANGING CONCEPTS 48 (J. Murray ed. 1976).
25. See The Health Care Cost Containment Act: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1984) [hereinafter Health Care Cost Containment Act] (statement
of Charles F. Rule, United States Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Depart-
ment of Justice); THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, RISING
HEALTH COSTS: PUBLIC & PRIVATE RESPONSES 8 (quoting former Congressman David Stockman)
(" '[T]hird party insurance that pays for health and hospital care for most Americans is the heart of
the system and is particularly perverse because it encourages people to behave in non-economic
ways.' "); R. FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS 168 (1986); Arrow, supra note 15, at 962;
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 17, at 856-57; Feldstein, supra note 18, at 43; Friedman & Rakof,
supra note 19, at 12-13; Helms, supra note 24, at 48.
[Vol. 67
HEALTH CARE FRAUD
an insurance company, pays for health care services. This third-party reim-
bursement mechanism "affect[s] the behavior of the demanders and suppliers in
medical markets."' 26 Because "individual consumers tend not to worry about
the true cost of the resources they are using... [and]... physicians and hospi-
tals assume that their expenses will be covered by the third-party payers ....
when a third-party is paying the bill, the other two parties have weak incentives
to be concerned about cost."' 2 7
Compounding this effect on cost is the fee-for-service method of calculating
payment that has been perpetuated by third-party payers. 28 This method of cal-
culating reimbursement pays the provider per service and reimburses the pro-
vider based upon the provider's cost. Under this method, the more services
performed and the greater the cost that the provider can justify, the more the
provider is reimbursed. 29
These characteristics, the nature of the health commodity, the common def-
erence to health care providers, and the third-party payer fee-for-service reim-
bursement mechanism, render the health care industry immune to market
forces. They also directly affect fraud by health care providers. All three char-
acteristics developed in the twentieth century.
B. Historical Development
In nineteenth century America most medical care was rendered at home by
lay persons. 30 Physicians had little, if any, formal training,31 and there were
virtually no professional licensing requirements. 32 Crude medical techniques
such as bloodletting and leeches were the dominant methods of medicine and
had little therapeutic value. 33 Because this was the extent of medical profes-
sional knowledge and training, most people thought that "professional knowl-
edge and training were unneeded in treating most diseases."'34 Demand for
26. Helms, supra note 24, at 48.
27. Helms, supra note 24, at 48.
28. Health Care Cost Containment Act, supra note 25, at 75 (statement of Joseph H. Reese of
the Health Insurance Association of America); Bovbjerg, supra note 23, at 970.
29. Medicare in Florida, supra note 22, at 18 (statement of Hyman Ruchlis, Health Action
Comm., Florida Consumers Federation); Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation To As-
sure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REV. 525, 526 (May, 1988); Bovbjerg, supra note 23, at
970.
30. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 22, 31. Starr's book is an exceptional work on the history of
American medicine.
31. C. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S HOSPITAL SYSTEM
18 (1987); P. STARR, supra note 17, at 43, 48-49. Rosenberg's work is a fascinating account of the
evolution of the hospital as an institution.
32. J. DUFFY, THE HEALERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 291-94 (1979); P. STARR,
supra note 17, at 44, 53.
33. See J. HALLER, AMERICAN MEDICINE IN TRANSITION, 1840-1910, at 236-66 (presenting
the history of bloodletting as a medical treatment and giving detailed description of techniques em-
ployed); C. ROSENBERG, supra note 31, at 55 (referring to the "costly" leeches used to draw blood),
at 74 (the physician could assure he was "acting in the imitation of nature ... [because] 'blood-
letting and blisters find their archetypes in spontaneous hemorrhage.' ") (quoting Address by E.
Haskins, Tennesse Medical Society (1887)); P. STARR, supra note 17, at 34.
34. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 33.
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medical services was low and most physicians earned a meager living,3 5 gener-
ally supplemented by a second occupation. Most often the second occupation
was farming or operating a drug store, although "[o]ne historian records a doc-
tor who, 'not satisfied with his practice, robbed stagecoaches on the side', ...
was captured in 1855 and sent to prison." 36 During this time the demand for
hospitals was also low. Because of their rudimentary knowledge of or apprecia-
tion for hygiene, hospitals were unsanitary and dangerous places. Few people
went to hospitals if they had a choice. As Paul Starr explained: "Hospitals were
regarded with dread and rightly so. They were dangerous places; when sick,
people were safer at home. The few who became patients went into hospitals
because ... [they] were unlucky enough to fall sick without family, friends or
servants to care for them." 37
The nineteenth century health care industry was more susceptible to mar-
ket forces than the health care industry of today because the recipient of the
health care services, the patient, paid for those services and thus regulated their
demand and price. A market controlled by the patient was disadvantageous for
physicians and hospitals for two reasons: the demand for their services was min-
imal, and patients were unable to pay their bills. The lack of demand stemmed
from American attitudes and the cost of health services. The self-reliance that
developed from frontier living, 38 along with the lack of respect for the health
care profession and its claimed expertise, provided little incentive to seek a
health care professional's services. Substantial financial disincentives also ex-
isted, including the direct cost of seeking health care services, such as the doctor
or hospital bill, and the indirect costs of transportation and time lost from
work.39 Thus, at the point when market forces affected health care, the patient
had philosophical and financial incentives not to use professional health care
services. During this period providers had substantial problems collecting bad
debts. 40 The patients, being solely responsible for the payment of any health
care services they received, were often unable to pay for these services. If char-
ity did not cover the bill, it was not paid.
The early twentieth century saw profound changes in medicine. Improved
hospital hygiene and the advent of antiseptic surgery made hospitals safer.41
Industrialization separated the work place from the home, which made care for
the sick at home more difficult.42 Urbanization, paved roads, and the emergence
of automobiles made transportation to the health care provider less onerous. 43
35. J. DUFFY, supra note 32, at 297; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 60.
36. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 65 (quoting H. SOMERS, DocTORS, PATIENTS AND HEALTH
INSURANCE 548 (1961)).
37. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 72; see also C. ROSENBERG, supra note 31, at 15-16 (explicit
and detailed explanation of why people preferred not go to hospitals).
38. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 66.
39. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 66.
40. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 63.
41. C. ROSENBERG, supra note 31, at 144-48; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 75.
42. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 74.
43. J. BORDLEY & A. HARVEY, supra note 13, at 105; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 68-70.
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Antibiotics," improved diagnostic skills and therapeutic competence,45 the es-
tablishment of medical schools, 4 6 and licensing of physicians47 improved public
perception of the ability, skills, and prestige of physicians. By 1934 the average
net earnings of physicians was four times the average earnings of gainfully em-
ployed workers, and medicine ranked as the most prestigious occupation in
America.4 8 Increased demand for medical services and increased costs of those
services led to support for health insurance. Its proponents argued "that [insur-
ance] would make more predictable and manageable the uncertain and some-
times devastating costs of medical care to individuals." 49 The first health
insurance was introduced in the late 1800s. It was sponsored by individual em-
ployers, labor unions, fraternal orders, and consumer groups50 and consisted of
a contract with physicians who were paid a set amount to treat plan members.
These plans were not successful because the medical profession opposed them,51
they were unavailable to the general public,5 2 and the employer or plan origina-
tor controlled the choice of provider. 53 Because they were concerned about los-
ing their professional autonomy, physicians resisted health insurance even
though unpaid bills led to some economic instability.54
The 1929 Depression persuaded most people (including physicians) to sup-
port health insurance. Collection of bad debts had become a major problem for
physicians during the Depression. People paid their bills to department stores,
grocery stores, landlords, and dentists before they paid their doctor bills. Sixty-
six percent of physician bills were not paid in 1933.55 In addition, the demand
for health care services decreased dramatically during the Depression. 56 Pa-
tients saw health insurance as a way to obtain needed health services. Physi-
cians saw health insurance as a way to stimulate use of health care services as
well as to help patients pay their bills.57 Thus, private health insurance was
developed.
The dominant form of health insurance was third-party indemnity. 58 Pa-
tients could see any physician they wished and stay in any hospital their physi-
cian chose. Their expenses, or a portion of their expenses, were covered by a
44. E. ACKERKNECHT, SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICINE 228-29 (1968); P. STARR, supra note 17,
at 232; Brockbank & Brockbank, Pneumonia, in THE HISTORY AND CONQUEST OF COMMON Dis-
EASES 96-97 (W. Belt ed. 1954).
45. E. ACKERKNECHT, supra note 44, at 229-30, 236-37; C. ROSENBERG, supra note 31, at 288-
89; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 142.
46. J. DUFFY, supra note 32, at 262-70; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 122-23.
47. R. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE IN THE UNITED STATES 8-9 (1969); P. STARR,
supra note 17, at 104-12, 127.
48. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 143.
49. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 258.
50. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 12.
51. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 12; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 205-06.
52. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 12.
53. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 12; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 202.
54. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 336.
55. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 270.
56. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 13; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 295.
57. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 272.
58. See P. STARR, supra note 17, at 300, 331.
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health insurer which was a third-party to the patient-provider relationship. The
growth of third-party insurance was facilitated by the passage of special enabling
statutes that allowed health and hospital insurance an exemption from the usual
reserve requirement for insurance, 59 by court decisions that restricted the efforts
of the American Medical Association to squash those health insurance plans of
which it did not approve 60 and by the emergence of health insurance as the
major issue in collective bargaining and an established benefit of employment. 61
As health insurance developed, it utilized the fee-for-service method of deter-
mining the amount due to the provider.
In 1929, 3.5% of America's Gross National Product (GNP) went to health
care expenditures. 62 By 1960, 5.3% of America's GNP went to health care ex-
penditures. 63 Clearly the expansion of health insurance "increased the share of
national income going to health care and stabilized the financing of the whole
industry." 64 There were concerns, however, over the inequitable distribution of
health care that resulted from insurance. The elderly, unemployed, self-em-
ployed, and low-paid workers were left without health insurance. 65 In response
to these concerns Medicare and Medicaid were signed into law in 1965.66 Both
programs further perpetuated the third-party payer reimbursement mechanism
and the fee-for-service method of determining the amount of reimbursement.
Under Medicare and Medicaid, hospitals were paid for each service rendered
according to the "reasonable" cost of service rather than to a schedule of negoti-
ated rates. 67 Physicians' fees were based upon "customary" charges for each
service rendered. 68 It has been suggested that these restrictions have been easily
manipulated to favor the health care industry because hospitals and physicians
are motivated to increase their costs and charges each year merely to generate
higher Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. 69 The structure of these pro-
grams also introduced a third characteristic of twentieth century health care
reimbursement: the assignment of claims. By agreeing to assignment a provider
agrees to accept as payment in full whatever Medicare pays on the services that
Medicare covers fully.70 While the provider can, in some assignment cases, still
59. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 17; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 297.
60. See, eg., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 536 (1943) (affirming
restraint of trade convictions of American Medical Association for its efforts to prevent patronage of
group heath insurance plan).
61. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 22; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 310-11, 313.
62. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, PART I at
74 (1975).
63. Id.
64. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 334.
65. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 53; P. STARR, supra note 17, at 333.
66. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (1965). Medicare is codified in various sections of Title 42
of the United States Code, primarily at § 1395-139511. Medicaid is also codified in various sections
of Title 42, primarily at §§ 1396-1396p.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b)(1) (1982).
68. Id.
69. Fraudulent Medical and Insurance Promotion, supra note 14, at 74 (statement of Ohio At-
torney General William J. Brown); Bovbjerg, supra note 23, at 970.
70. 53 Fed. Reg. 20, 924.55 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 424.55(b)(2)(i) (1987)).
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collect a minimal amount from the patient,7 1 a provider who is submitting
fraudulent claims will not attempt to collect from the patient and thereby ex-
clude her from the billing process.
Medicare, as amended since 1965, provides coverage for some of the health
care expenses for the elderly, the disabled, and for persons suffering from end-
stage renal disease.72 Federally funded and operated, Medicaid was designed to
provide health care coverage for the financially needy.73 It is funded from fed-
eral and state funds. Each state devises its own Medicaid program within broad,
federally mandated parameters, resulting in complex programs. There are fifty-
six74 separate Medicaid programs, each with "different rules, eligibility require-
ments, schedules of benefits, and administrative structures. '75 The federal and
state governments do not administer Medicare and Medicaid directly; they con-
tract with insurance companies that receive, evaluate, and pay claims from gov-
ernment funds.
7 6
Medicare and Medicaid have expanded tremendously. The third-party fee-
for-service reimbursement mechanism quickly proved to be "the central mecha-
nism of medical inflation."'77 There was no way within this reimbursement sys-
tem to control the growth of the health care industry and the expenditures
required to keep it functioning. For example, in fiscal 1967, its first full calendar
year of operation, Medicare covered 20 million Americans and paid $4.5 billion
in benefits. By 1985 Medicare covered 30 million Americans and paid $70 bil-
lion in benefits. 78
Health care economists have offered many different suggestions for alleviat-
ing the cost problem. Despite their different suggested remedies, it is generally
agreed that the third-party reimbursement mechanism 79 and fee-for-service
method of computing reimbursement are at fault.80 One general approach advo-
cated to reduce the escalation of costs is to return health care to a more competi-
tive model which relies on market forces.81 The proponents of this view favor
reimbursement mechanisms that provide incentives to the patient and the pro-
vider to control costs. Another approach advocates greater governmental regu-
lation. The proponents of this view believe that relying on market forces will not
correct the problem of escalating costs and will encourage inequitable and un-
71. Id. at 924.56 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 424.55(b)(2)(ii) (1987)).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1982).
73. See id. § 1396 (1982).
74. There is a Medicaid Program in each of the 50 states except Arizona, and in the District of
Columbia. Under different regulations there are programs in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, and the American Virgin Islands. D. SAWYERS, THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
DATA BOOK, 1983, at 2-3.
75. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 110.
76. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 375.
77. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 385.
78. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 69.
79. See supra note 25.
80. See supra notes 28-29.
81. Helms, supra note 24, at 2; Roseblatt, Health Care, Markets and Democratic Values, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1069-70 (1981) (excellent summary of themes basic to "market" approaches).
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wise allocation of health care resources.8 2 Thus far, most of the proposals im-
plemented to address the cost issue reflect an attempt to return to market forces.
This effort has been carried forth on two fronts; an attempt to apply market
pressure to providers through "diagnosis related groups" (DRGs) and capita-
tion,8 3 and an attempt to put market pressure on patients through higher copay-
ments and deductibles.
The Social Security Act Amendments passed by Congress in 198384 are a
prime example of the attempt to put market pressure on providers. These
amendments introduced DRGs.85 Under DRG reimbursement, illnesses are as-
signed to groups, based upon the "estimated relative cost of hospital resources
used with respect to discharges classified within each group."'8 6 The federal gov-
ernment (the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS)) defined 467 different diagnostic
categories and established a formula for reimbursing each hospital a set amount
depending on the diagnostic category of the patient's illness.8 7 DRGs reflect a
new approach to reimbursement.8 8 Whereas fee-for-service operates retrospec-
tivly, by reimbursing a provider after it has rendered the service, the DRGs
constitute a prospective payment system (PPS) that informs the provider of the
reimbursement for the service prior to the rendering of the service.8 9 The incen-
tive to control costs is obvious: if the provider treats a patient for less than the
amount it receives as reimbursement, it makes money, but if the provider treats
the patient for more than the amount it receives as reimbursement; it loses
money.90 It appears that DRGs are effective in controlling health care costs,
and other third-party insurers have instituted similar prospective payment
systems.9 1
"Capitation" plans also aim to curb health care costs by putting economic
82. See, eg., R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 194; Record, Medical Politics and Medical Prices: The
Relation Between Who Decides and How Much It Costs, in TOWARD A NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY
71, 105-06 (1977).
83. Furrow, The Ethics of Cost-Containment: Bureaucratic Medicine and the Doctor as Patient-
Advocate, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 187, 190 (1988) (capitation is a method of
health care service in which the health care provider is paid for a set time period and the member!
patient will be treated as often as necessary during that period).
84. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65, 77.
85. Id.
86. 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(b) (1987).
87. Hospital Prospective Payment System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6 (1983).
88. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 87, 88; Newcomer, Wood & Sankar, Medicare Prospective Pay-
ment: Anticipated Effect on Hospitals, Other Community Agencies and Families, 10 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 275, 275 (1985).
89. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 87.
90. Proposals to Modify Medicare's Physician Payment System: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1986).
91. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESS. COMM'N MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 86 (1987); Health Care Cost Containment Act, supra note 25, at
107 (discussing recent finding from a Rand Study "confirming that HMOs [health maintenance
organizations] significantly reduce the costs of delivering medical care. The calculated expenditure
rate was about 25% less in the HMO than for the fee-for-service group receiving free care. Further,
hospitalization rates for HMO enrollees were 40% below the fee-for-service group.") (statement by
Robert B. Helms, Acting Assistant Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services).
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pressure on providers. These plans reimburse prospectively: prior to the render-
ing of any service, the provider is informed how much it will be reimbursed.
92
Unlike DRG's, however, a capitation method of reimbursement pays per patient
enrolled in the plan rather than per service rendered. Thus, a provider is paid a
set amount for providing a capitation plan member with all health services nec-
essary during a set time period, usually one year.93 If the provider treats a mem-
ber for less than the fee, it makes money; if it does not, it loses money. 94 Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are the prevalent type of capitation plans.
The HMO is distinguishable from other health care insurance plans that utilize
prospective payment. Rather than third-party insurance paying the HMO to
treat its members, the typical HMO members make the prepayment them-
selves. 95 Because HMO members are both the recipients of and the payers for
the services, HMOs also bring market pressures to bear on patients.96 Because
HMOs take years to develop and require major infusions of capital, the Health
Maintenance Organization Resources Act of 197397 was passed, and has been
amended, to faciltate the growth of HMOs.98 This statute provides financial
assistance to developing HMOs99 and requires employers to offer an HMO op-
tion as one of its health care benefits.1° After a slow start, the number of
HMOs has grown dramatically. In 1971 there were 33 HMOs with 3.6 million
subscribers. 101 By 1987 there were 663 HMOs with 28.8 million subscribers. 102
In addition to implementing prospective reimbursement mechanism
through DRGs and capitation plans, some of those who favor a return to a
system controlled by market forces advocate charging patients larger copay-
ments and deductibles.' 0 3 This, it is argued, will provide patients with an incen-
tive not to overutilize health care services thus keeping health care costs
down.' 4 These larger copayments and deductibles have been implemented by
public and many private insurance programs.
92. Furrow, supra note 83, at 190 ("The capitation principle means that payment is determined
in advance for each subscriber to the HMO, and the HMO will lose money if its costs per patient
exceed the amount they have calculated.").
93. Furrow, supra note 83, at 190.
94. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE-ISSUE RAISED BY FLOR-
IDA HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION DEMONSTRATIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1986).
95. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 136; Record, supra note 82, at 101.
96. Brown, Competiton and Health Cost Containment: Cautions and Conjectures, 59 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND QUARTERLY HEALTH AND SOCIETY 145, 146 (1981).
97. Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982)).
98. See Record, supra note 82, at 100.
99. 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.110-.137 (1987).
100. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 400-01.
101. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 137.
102. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 2 & 17, col. 2 (although HMOs have been increasing at
a rate of 20% annually, enrollment in these plans rose less than 1% between July 1 and Sept. 30,
1987. This was the smallest increase since 1970. It is not yet clear whether this is a seasonal fluke or
the beginning of a move away from HMOs).
103. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 17, at 894; Feldstein, supra note 18, at 52. This ap-
proach has been criticized for influencing only the low cost discretionary expenses. See Marmor,
Boyer & Greenberg, Medical Care & Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1003, 1013 (1981).
104. See J. MEYER, HEALTH CARE COST INCREASES 11-12 (1979).
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The social structure of medicine is also changing as the number of providers
increases. Between 1970 and 1986 the number of medical physicians increased
by 66.1%, the number of osteopathic physicians increased by 90% and the
number of podiatrists increased by 54.9%. 10 Cost containment measures have
discouraged use of expensive acute care facilities,10 6 and encouraged expansion
of less expensive facilities and providers such as nursing homes, home health
agencies, and durable medical companies.' 0 7 More health care providers than
ever now operate in the corporate form.10 8 Corporations are purchasing hospi-
tals and nursing homes, almost all of which traditionally have been owned by
small groups of individuals.' 0 9 Between 1976 and 1981 ownership of hospitals
by corporations increased 68%.110
The managers and administrators of these corporations are a new cadre of
health care professionals who are shifting the focus in health care services to
profitability."' Humana, Inc., one of the most successful and fastest growing
corporate owners of hospitals, has been noted for its "pugnacious management"
style and "profit-mongering." 2 Humana prefers the more lucrative, privately
insured patients to the patients insured by government programs.113 One com-
mentator has explained: "[w]hen a Humana hospital has empty beds, Medicare
and Medicaid patients are better than cold sheets."' "14
As a result of these changes medicine is becoming more of a business than a
105. BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, UNITED STATES DEPARARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, SIXTH REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF
HEALTH PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES table 2-1 (1988) (publication number HRS-P-OD-88-
1). The final report of the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee
(GMENAC), released September 1980, concluded that in 1990 the U.S. would have 70,000 physi-
cians more than needed. Ginzberg, Brann, Hiestand & Ostow, The Expanding Physician Supply and
Health Policy: The Clouded Outlook, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 508, 511 (1981).
106. "Between 1980 and 1983, 73 urban hospitals and 47 rural facilities closed their doors ....
[S]ince the start of prospective payment, those figures have risen to 128 and 116, respectively-an
increase approaching 200 percent." McCarthy, DRGs Five Years Later, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED,
1683, 1684 (1988) (citing unpublished data). "From fiscal year 1983 through 1987, hospitals re-
duced the number of full-time equivalent staff members by nearly 114,000. During the same period,
they removed more than 45,000 beds from service." Id.
107. [F]rom 1977 to 1982 there has been an annual increase of 8.5% in the number of
Medicare-certified home health agencies; this increase was especially rapid between 1980
and 1982, when Medicare-certified proprietary agencies increased 241 percent .... Indus-
try forecasts are for a 13 to 20 percent annual increase in home health services through
1990.
Newcomer, Wood & Sankar, supra note 88, at 278; see, e.g., Johnson, Regulatory Theory and Pro.
spective Risk Assessment in the Limitation of Scope of Practice, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 447, 447 (1983);
Schramm & Gabel, Prospective Payment: Some Retrospective Observations, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1681, 1682 (1988).
108. Younger physicians are more willing to work for a corporate health care provider. Whereas
almost all physicians with more than 30 years experience are self-employed, this is true for only 60%
of those in practice five years or less. L. HARRIS & AssoCS., MEDICAL PRACTICE IN THE 1980'S:
PHYSICIANS LOOK AT THEIR CHANGING PROFESSION 21 (1981); Goldsmith, The U.S. Health Care
System in the Year 2000, 256 J. A.M.A. 3371, 3372 (1986).
109. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 428.
110. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 430.
111. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 447-48.
112. Kinkead, Humana's Hard-Sell Hospitals, FORTUNE, Nov. 17, 1980, at 68-69.
113. Id. at 70, 76.
114. Id. at 70.
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profession, with the danger that commercialism will compromise professional-
ism. 115 Paul Starr has explained this process:
The rise of a corporate ethos in medical care is already one of the
most significant consequences of the changing structure of medical
care .... Everywhere one sees the growth of a kind of marketing
mentality in health care .... The organizational culture of medicine
used to be dominated by the ideals of professionalism and volunteer-
ism, which softened the underlying acquisitive activity. The restraint
exercised by those ideals now grows weaker. The "health center" of
one era is the "profit center" of the next.1 16
C. Conclusion
The major economic change in the health care industry derives from the
proliferation of insurance. During the early twentieth century, in the absence of
health insurance, patients or charity paid the bills. The Depression motivated
patients and health care professionals to seek and support health insurance. Pri-
vate insurance grew and in 1965 public insurance for the elderly and financially
needy was established. These insurance programs utilized third-party, fee-for-
service reimbursement. By the 1980s serious concerns over costs developed and
new forms of reimbursement, the prospective payment system, and higher
copayments and deductibles, were introduced to control spiraling health care
costs.
The twentieth century saw growing respect for health care providers. This
respect was due to many factors; urbanization, effective lobbying by the Ameri-
can Medical Association, high professional standards by most providers, in-
creased competence by providers in fighting disease, and easy access to providers
due to insurance. Dramatic sociological changes are currently underway.
Health care is becoming a business and is being inundated with large numbers of
new providers. The effect these changes will have on the public's respect for
providers remains to be seen. As Parts II, III and IV discuss, all of these socio-
economic factors have had, and will likely continue to have, a significant impact
on the prosecution of fraudulent health care providers.
115. McCormick, The Cost Factor in Health Care, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
161, 166 (1988). McCormick noted:
an increasing independence from the values that make health care a human service, one
altruistically conceived and delivered .... Iflactors [such as] depersonalization, market-
driven system ... mean that physicians are enormously preoccupied with forces peripheral
to and distinctive from holistic human care. One fears that the result of this will be the
gradual transformation of medicine from a profession to a business.
Id.; see, e.g., Medicare in Florida, supra note 22, at 17 (statement of Hyman Ruchlis, Health Action
Committee, Florida Consumers Federation); Ginzberg, The Monetarization of Medical Care, 310
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162 (1984); Goldsmith, supra note 108 at 3374; Jost, supra note 29, at 511);
Newcomer, Wood & Sankar, supra note 88, at 276; Relman, Practicing Medicine in the New Business
Climate, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1150, 1150-51 (1987); Relman, The New Medical Industrial Com-
plex, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 963, 963 (1980).
116. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 448.
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II. THE FEATURES OF FRAUD By HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
A. Fraud by Health Care Providers is White Collar Crime
The term "white collar crime" was introduced by Edwin Sutherland in
1939.117 Prior to the introduction of this concept, theories of criminal behavior
focused on personal and social pathologies. As a result, criminal justice scholars
emphasized "poverty [and] other social conditions and personal traits which are
assumed to be associated with poverty" as the causes of crime.' 18 Sutherland's
definition of white collar crime also focused on the criminal actor. According to
Sutherland, white collar crime was "crime committed by a person of respectabil-
ity and high social status in the course of his occupation." 1 9 This definition has
been criticized as overly restrictive because it fails to encompass all actors who
commit white collar crimes and because it fails to focus on the conduct that
constitutes white collar crime. 120 Most other attempts to define white collar
crime have focused on the conduct constituting the crime. The following defini-
tion has been heralded as more inclusive and workable: "White collar violations
... involve the use of a violator's position of significant power, influence or trust
in the legitimate order .. for the purpose of illegal gain, or to commit an illegal
act for personal or organizational gain."' 12
To date the actors generally recognized as typical white collar criminals are
corrupt bank officers, taxpayers, public officials, securities brokers, and general
business persons. Health care providers are rarely included in such lists.' 22
This failure to recognize health care providers as potential white collar criminals
is surprising. Clearly, fraud by health care providers fits either an "actor" or
"conduct" definition of white collar crime. When a health care provider obtains
reimbursement by misrepresenting what health care services were provided, the
provider has used its position of trust as a professional to obtain an illegal gain.
The failure to recognize fraud by health care providers as a significant sub-
specialty of white collar crime is also surprising given the estimated pervasive-
ness of the fraud and the increased efforts to stop it. Convictions of health care
providers increased by almost 234% between 1979 and 1986.123 By comparison,
117. Geis & Goff introduction to E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNEXPUR-
GATED VERSION at ix (1983).
118. E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 117, at 5.
119. E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 117, at 7.
120. A. REISS & A. BIDERMAN, DATA SOURCES ON WHITE-COLLAR LAW BREAKING 39-45
(1980); Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, in CRIME AT THE
ToP 44-45 (1978).
121. A. REISS & A. BIDERMAN, supra note 120, at 4; cf Edelhertz, supra note 118, at 44.
122. See, e.g., White Collar Crime: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Pt. 1,
99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 27 (1986) [hereinafter White Collar Crime] (testimony of United States Deputy
Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen); id. at 102 (testimony of Professor Stanton Wheeler, Yale Law
School); M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 95-96 (1980); J. CONKLIN, ILLEGAL BUT
NOT CRIMINAL 3, 5, 15 (1977); Edelhertz, supra note 120, at 49-50. But see J. CONKLIN, supra, at
44; see, e.g., A. BEQUAI, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH CENTURY CRISIS 12, 65 (1978).
123. Unpublished data compiled by the office of the Inspector General, Department of Health
and Human Services, indicates that in 1979 there were 179 convictions of health care providers and
suppliers. In fiscal year ending September 1986 there were 598 such convictions. Letter from Judith
Holtz, Director of Public Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector
[Vol. 67
1989] HEALTH CARE FRAUD
during this same approximate time period, bank embezzlement convictions in-
creased 12%,124 income tax fraud convictions increased 79%,125 and mail fraud
convictions increased 41%.126 The efforts to stop fraud by health care providers
have not been limited to the criminal arena. Between 1983 and 1987 federal and
state governments increased civil collections of money obtained by fraudulent
health care providers by almost 700%.127
Fraud by health care providers shares three essential features of all white
collar offenses: first, it has a hybrid criminal/civil nature; second, it is difficult to
investigate and prove; and third, successful prosecution necessitates a careful
development of a theory of the case that accomplishes certain goals.
B. The Hybrid Nature of White Collar Crime
White collar crime has a hybrid criminal/civil nature. 128 White collar
crime can generally be pursued civilly by a private litigant who is a victim of the
crime as well as criminally. Unlike street crime, white collar crime arises out of
activities subject to heavy regulation and sanction and thus gives rise to an op-
portunity for civil litigation under the regulatory provisions. 129 Forums are al-
ready in place to police these regulations and impose these sanctions. For
example, a criminal banking fraud may activate civil enforcement by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, or state agencies such as the Division
General (undated) (available at University of Alabama School of Law Library). These convictions
are only those obtained through investigative efforts of Department of Health and Human Services
[HHS] and state Medicaid fraud units and do not include convictions obtained through efforts of
other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Postal Inspection Service, or local sher-
iffs' departments.
124. In fiscal year ending June 30, 1979, 757 defendants convicted of bank embezzlement were
sentenced. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REP. No. SD-SB-8
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1980 434 table 5.24 (1981) [hereinafter BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICs-1980]. In fiscal year ending June 30, 1986, 850 defendants convicted of
bank embezzlement were sentenced. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REP.
No. NCJ-105287 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1987 442 table 5.22 (1988)
[hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS-1987].
125. In fiscal year ending June 30, 1979, 690 defendants convicted of income tax fraud were
sentenced. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATiSTICs-1980, supra note 122, at 434 table 5.24. In fiscal year
ending June 30, 1986, 1,237 defendants convicted of income tax fraud were sentenced. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS-1987, supra note 122, at 442 table 5.22.
126. In fiscal year ending June 20, 1979, 1,116 defendants convicted of postal fraud were sen-
tenced. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICs-1980, supra note 124, at 434 table 5.24. In fiscal year
ending June 30, 1986, 1,575 defendants convicted of postal fraud were sentenced. BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS-1987, supra note 124, at 442 table 5.22.
127. In 1983 HHS collected $1,474,100 in civil monetary penalties for fraudulent Medicare and
Medicaid claims. In 1987 it collected $11,678,921 in civil monetary penalties for fraudulent Medi-
care and Medicaid claims. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, APRIL 1, 1987-SEPTEMBER 30,
1987 at 40. These figures do not include fraudulently obtained overpayments recuperated by govern-
ment and private insurance programs.
128. Scholars Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Albert D. Biderman suggest that in the area of fraud
"[t]here is little justification ... for distinguishing between civil and criminal on grounds of culpabil-
ity or seriousness of sanctions," because the only real differences are in the "standards and proce-
dures by which violations are determined and sanctions imposed." A. REISS & A. BIDERMAN, supra
note 120, at 2.
129. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 29.
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of Finance or the Division of Consumer Affairs. Civil remedies are also a viable
option for victims of white collar crimes because, unlike the typical street crimi-
nal who is judgment-proof, the white collar criminal often has the resources to
pay a civil judgment.
The fact that viable civil and administrative avenues of redress exist for the
victim of a white collar crime is significant because the civil plaintiff and the
criminal prosecutor will encounter many of the same legal and practical hurdles
in proving their case of fraud. Guile and concealment are at the heart of fraud;
therefore, proof of fraud will almost always be by circumstantial evidence, re-
gardless of the criminal or civil nature of the forum. 130 Proof of a high degree of
culpability-namely, proof that an actor perpetrated fraud intentionally or with
reckless disregard for the truth-is required not only in the criminal forum,' 3 '
but in the civil forum when punitive damages are sought.' 32 On the other hand,
while proof of reliance upon the false information is required to prove fraud in a
civil case, 133 it is generally not required to prove fraud in a criminal case. 134 In
short, despite some differences, the analysis of theories of fraud by health care
providers in Part III will be as applicable for the civil plaintiffs as for the crimi-
nal prosecutor.
The existence of civil remedies for victims of white collar crime is also sig-
nificant because it affects the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.' 35
Prosecutorial and judicial resources are limited, and expending these resources
to pursue one case necessarily means other cases will never be investigated or
prosecuted. As a gatekeeper to these resources, the prosecutor should consider
several factors in deciding whether to pursue a particular case when criminal
intent is present. One factor is the availability of civil remedies for victims. 136
130. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriquez, 812 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1987) (criminal); United
States v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771, 780 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Towers, 775 F.2d
184, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (same); Clear Creek, Inc. v. Royal Am. Corp. (In re Int'l. Resorts Inc.), 46
Bankr. 405, 413 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (civil); In re Porter, 37 Bankr. 56, 63 (E.D. Va. 1984) (same).
131. See, eg., United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 821-22 (1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1217 (1985); 1 E. DEVITr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 14.01.
132. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robbins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1239 (Kan. 1987) (punitive damages
awarded to punish wrongdoer for "malicious, vindictive, or willful and wanton invasion of another's
rights").
133. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ditmore, 729 F.2d 1, 4 (st Cir. 1984); Stowell v. Ted
S. Finkil Inv. Serv., 641 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1981); United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108,
1120 (5th Cir. 1980); Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1230.
134. Reliance is not an element of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see, e.g., United States v,
Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); United States
v. Goldberg, 455 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972). Nor is reliance an
element of the most frequently used false statement statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982); see, e.g.,
United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 1116, 1121 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985);
Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1963).
135. H. EDELHERTZ & C. ROGOVIN, A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CONTAINING WHITE-COL-
LAR CRIME 4 (1980).
136. Cf Rakoff, The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Business Fraud Prosecutions,
in CORRIGIBLE CORPORATIONS AND UNRULY LAW 177-78 (1985) (explaining policy of the Man-
hattan District Attorney's Office not to prosecute business fraud cases already subject to civil litiga-
tion because the criminal case might be used as a weapon in the civil litigation and because of the
need to preserve scarce prosecutorial resources. The author questions whether this policy deters
criminal wrongdoing).
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In many instances prosecutorial resources are better used to prosecute the case
that involves many victims, none of whom are cognizant of civil remedies, or
capable of pursuing civil remedies on their own, than the case that involves only
one or a few victims who are capable of pursuing civil remedies. In addition to
affecting the prosecutor's initial decision whether to pursue or decline prosecu-
tion, the existence of civil remedies may continue to influence a prosecutor's
judgment as to how best to try the criminal case. 137 The prosecutor may pur-
posely choose a theory of the case that maximizes the recovery for the victims
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 13 8 or simply increases the vic-
tims' chances for success in private civil lawsuits by means of collateral estop-
pel13 9 or public disclosure of evidence at trial.
An exceptionally large number and variety of civil remedies are available to
pursue the fraudulent health care provider: malpractice lawsuits brought by pa-
tients based upon fraud; 14° tort and breach of contract lawsuits brought by in-
surance companies based upon fraud; 14 1 administrative actions brought by the
United States Postal Service to enjoin fraudulent schemes being conducted
through the U.S. mails;' 42 suspension of payments by Medicare fiscal in-
termediaries to recover amounts previously paid to a provider and later deter-
mined to have been fraudulently obtained by the provider; 143 civil lawsuits by
the federal government under the False Claims Act to collect damages caused by
a defendant's fraud; 44 administrative actions brought by the Department of
Health and Human Services under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law to recover
damages caused by a provider's fraud 145 or to recollect payments already made
137. The civil litigant cannot, of course, use the grand jury process for the civil lawsuit. United
States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983); United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 427
(1983).
138. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982); see
18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982) ("The court, when sentencing a defendant [convicted of all title 18
offenses and certain title 49 offenses] may order... that the defendant make restitution to any victim
of the offense.").
139. See, e.g., United States v. Diamond, 657 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United
States v. Zulli, 418 F. Supp. 252, 254 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
140. See, e.g., Vidrine v. Enger, 752 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1984); Duncan v. Leeds, 742 F.2d 989
(6th Cir. 1984); Moses v. Miller, 268 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1954); Krestich v. Stefanez, 243 Wis. 1, 9
N.W.2d 130 (Wis. 1943).
141. See, e.g, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Adler, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67, 907
(S.D.N.Y.) (plaintiff sought damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18
U.S.C § 1961 (1982) for physician's fraud, court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment);
Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
class action brought under RICO by former patients of an osteopathic physician, who alleged they
were harmed by defendant's fraudulent provision of medical services).
142. 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1982); see, eg., Peak Laboratory v. United States Postal Service, 556
F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1977); United States Health Club, Inc. v. Major, 292 F.2d 665 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 896 (1961); Owen Laboratories, Inc. v. Schroeder, 284 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1960);
Schere v. Christenberry, 179 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
143. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.370-.876 (1987); see, e.g., Klein v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1985);
Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935
(1976); Szekely v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 517 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1975); Neurological Assocs. v.
Bowen, 658 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Krebsbach v. Heckler, 617 F. Supp. 548 (D. Neb. 1985);
Barsh v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 434 F. Supp. 755 (D.S.C. 1977).
144. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1986); see, e.g., United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); United States v. Zulli, 418 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1982 & Supp. VI 1986); see, e.g., Chapman v. United States Dep't of
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to a provider and later determined to be fraudulent;' 46 qui tam civil lawsuits by
state governments under the False Claims Act to collect damages caused by a
provider's fraud; 14 7 civil actions brought by a state in its own capacity to recover
damages because of a provider's fraud; 148 qui tam civil actions brought by pri-
vate individuals pursuant to the False Claims Act to recover damages caused by
a provider's fraud;149 administrative actions by the Department of Health and
Human Services to terminate providers from participation in the Medicare pro-
gram for improperly provided Medicare services; 150 administrative actions by
states to terminate providers from the Medicaid program because of a provider's
fraud; 15 1 and administrative actions by State Boards of Registration to revoke a
provider's professional license because of fraud by the provider.'5 2
The licensing requirements for health care professionals provide some of
these civil remedies, but licensing requirements are common to many fields.
What truly distinguishes the health care industry, and accounts for this plethora
of civil remedies, is the existence of the federal and state governments as third-
party insurers. Because of their unique bill-paying role, the federal and state
governments become the direct financial victims of even the smallest fraud.
Thus, when a provider misrepresents the nature of the services provided to one
patient, even if the amount at issue is only a few dollars, the federal government
is the financial victim if the patient was covered by Medicare. Both the federal
and state governments are financial victims if the patient is covered by Medicaid.
When a governmental agency is the financial victim, it arguably is more
appropriate to forgo prosecution and allow the victim to pursue civil or adminis-
trative options. After all, there is only one victim, the government, and that
victim can bring civil suit. Moreover, it is possible to coordinate civil and crimi-
nal actions so that if the decision is made to drop the criminal action it is with
the assurance that a civil action will proceed.' 53
Health & Human Servs., 821 F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1987); Mayers v. United States Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 806 F.2d 995, 997 (lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 82 (1987);
Grifflon v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 146, (5th Cir. 1986).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Kass, 740 F.2d 1493 (lth Cir. 1984) (contract theory); United
States v. Diaz, 740 F.2d 1491 (1lth Cir. 1984) (same).
147. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care
Center, Inc., 797 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100
(7th Cir. 1984); United States ex rel. Fahner v. Alaska, 591 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
148. See, eg., Oklahoma v. Children's Shelter, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (com-
plaint alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982) (RICO)); In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 444
A.2d 1107 (1982) (applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17(e) (West 1976)); State v. Estate of Frankel,
65 A.D.2d 788, 410 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
149. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (1982); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Davis v. Long's Drugs, Inc., 411
F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
150. 42 C.F.R. § 1004 (1987); see, e.g., Papendick v. Bowen, 658 F. Supp. 1425 (W.D. Wis.
1987).
151. See, eg., Lang v. Berger, 427 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Medical Servs. Admin. v.
Duke, 378 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1979); In re Kaplan, 178 N.J. Super. 487, 429 A.2d 590 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1981); Eisenberg v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 86 Pa. Commw. 358, 485 A.2d
511 (1984), modified, 512 Pa. 181, 516 A.2d 333 (1986).
152. See, eg., Feldstein v. Board of Registration, 387 Mass. 339, 439 N.E.2d 824 (1982); Kaplan
v. Department of Registration & Educ., 46 I11. App. 3d 968, 361 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
153. But see supra note 137 (prosecutor cannot use the grand jury process to aid in a related civil
lawsuit).
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While it may be appropriate to decline criminal prosecution in favor of civil
redress if the federal or a state government is the financial victim of the fraud,
the fact that patients are also the victims of fraudulent health care providers may
weigh in favor of criminal prosecution. When a number of patients are victims
of a fraudulent and incompetent health care provider, it may be difficult for
them to organize independently and develop an appropriately inclusive cause of
action. These patients will rarely have the medical expertise to determine that a
fraud has occurred or the resources to investigate the fraud. Even though the
damage sustained due to incompetent medical care may be emotionally or even
physically wrenching, recovery for the patient's individual financial loss could
well be minimal. When this is true, these individuals will not have the financial
incentive to seek civil redress. As long as fraudulent and incompetent providers
are allowed to practice, more patients will fall victim to their fraud and incom-
petence. Because a criminal conviction will often ensure that a provider will lose
its professional license, 154 a criminal prosecution may be the best vehicle to pre-
vent the convicted provider from jeopardizing future patients.
C. The Difficulty of Investigating and Proving White Collar Crime
White collar crimes, in general, are difficult to investigate and prove.15 5
White collar crime is rarely self-evident. 156 Victims of assaults know immedi-
ately when they have been assaulted, but victims of fraud may never know they
have been defrauded.15 7 This failure to realize that one has been defrauded is
due, in part, to the fact that the perpetrator is usually in a position of trust with
the victim.15 8 Because of this relationship, a fraud victim has no reason to sus-
pect criminal activity, even when circumstances occur that would otherwise
make the victim suspicious.
The patient-physician relationship epitomizes such trust. 159 "Often in pain,
fearful of death, the sick have a special thirst for reassurance and vulnerability to
belief."' 160 As one Blue Cross official said, "Americans canonize doctors."'16 1 A
154. See, eg., Emory v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1984);
Bockman v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 304 F.2d 359, 360 (8th Cir. 1962); Rosen v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973),
aff'd, 419 U.S. 1098 (1974) (when the underlying criminal statute was found unconstitutional, physi-
cian's license was restored); Katz v. Alabama State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 351 So. 2d 890, 891
(Ala. 1977).
155. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 27 (testimony of United States Deputy Attorney
General D. Lowell Jensen); M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 122, at 95; J. CONKLIN, supra
note 122, at 17-18 (1977); P. FINN & A. HOFFMAN, PROSECUTION OF ECONOMIC CRIME 4 (1976); J.
GARDINER & T. LYMAN, THE FRAUD CONTROL GAME 87 (1984).
156. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 27 (testimony of United States Deputy Attorney
General D. Lowell Jensen); P. FINN & A. HOFFMAN, supra note 155, at 4.
157. A. BEQUAI, supra note 122, at 13; E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 117, at 232; Edelhertz,
supra note 120, at 51.
158. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 27 (testimony of United States Deputy Attorney
General D. Lowell Jensen).
159. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 15, at 965; Mechanic, Some Dilemmas in Health Care Policy, 59
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 1, 4 (1981) ("Feeling highly dependent on such relationships, the
typical patient has a strong need to see [his own physician] as an ally."); Marmor, Boyer & Green-
berg, supra note 103, at 1003.
160. P. STARR, supra note 17, at 5.
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recent Gallup poll reveals that Americans respect physicians more than any
other occupation.162 This deference, a twentieth century phenomenon, can have
a very real effect on any attempt to prove fraud. One sees it in the attitudes of
jurors and courts. For example, a New York appellate court reversed the con-
viction of a physician because it did not believe a wealthy physician would de-
fraud the government, saying
Perhaps the most questionable [part of the Government's case] is
the realism of a theory that a doctor, specializing in obstetrics and
gynecology who ... had a practice so extensive that he delivered more
babies than any other doctor in the hospital with which he was affili-
ated, who during the years in question ... billed Medicaid for over
$100,000 a year ... he would steal a few hundred dollars .... 163
The ambiguous nature of medicine perpetuates this deference. Unlike
banking, securities, taxation, or, to some extent, labor relations, where legally
appropriate behavior is carefully and precisely delineated, appropriate behavior
in the practice of medicine is unclear and subjective.164 History has shown that
a medical procedure seen today as fraudulent quackery may be recognized as an
important cure in the future. 165
In some instances the prosecutor may find that this deference is a blessing
in disguise. For example, in State v Carr 166 the prosecutor was allowed to intro-
duce "graphic evidence regarding the defendant's sexual relationships with
[some of his patients], the suicidal tendencies and deaths of these women, and
the explicit descriptions of [their] deteriorating physical condition. ' 167
Although not relevant to the offenses charged, the court held that this evidence
was "particularly important ... because of the medical issues involved and the
deference and respect which would ordinarily be given to a physician's opin-
ion."' 68 Similarly, in United States v. Johnson 169 physician-defendant was
charged with understating her income to the Internal Revenue Service by
$120,000 but claimed that her "inadvertent mistake" occurred because she was
an "altruistic healer of the sick, whose concerns lay elsewhere than attending to
her financial interests and resulting legal responsibilities."' 170 In response, the
government was allowed to introduce a study of the defendant's billings for
Medicaid services which revealed that she billed four times as many services per
patient than did any other Virginia doctor.'
7
'
161. Clark, supra note 15, at 40.
162. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1976, at 32, col. 7.
163. People v. Alizadeh, 87 A.D.2d 418, 428, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
164. R. FEIN, supra note 25, at 131; J. GARDINER & T. LYMAN, supra note 155, at 87 (1984);
Donabedian, The Quality of Medical Care, in MEDICINE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 85-86 (1972);
Friedman & Rakoff, supra note 19, at 3-4.
165. See, e.g., West v. United States, 68 F.2d 96, 98 (10th Cir. 1933).
166. 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853 (1981).
167. Id. at 772, 626 P.2d at 309.
168. Id. at 767, 626 P.2d at 304.
169. 634 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1980).
170. Id. at 736.
171. Id. at 736-37.
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In addition to the unsuspecting naivete of victims, the fact that the crime is
usually hidden in voluminous documentary materials also makes white collar
crime difficult to investigate and prove. 172 It is often necessary to follow a
lengthy paper trail simply to discover what occurred. This paper trail is espe-
cially arduous in the health care field because of complex and rapidly changing
regulations. As one expert noted, "The billing process itself, and the paperwork
necessary to monitor numerous and complex third-party insurance contracts-
with varying co-insurance, deductibles, and maximum benefit schedules and
with widely varying coverage and criteria for major medical payments-bog-
gle[s] the mind .... [I]t assuredly confuses both patients and their doctors." 173
While many white collar crimes involve complex statutes and regulations,
the complexity of regulations in the health care industry is exacerbated by sev-
eral facts unique to this industry. Health care regulations change more often
than those in most fields.174 In addition, a single provider usually deals simulta-
neously with multiple third-party providers and is subject to the varied and often
inconsistent rules and regulations promulgated by each. Because of the third-
party reimbursement mechanism, all providers must utilize these voluminous,
changing, inconsistent rules and regulations to obtain reimbursement for per-
forming even a minor procedure. To prove even the smallest fraud involves
tracking hundreds of such regulations.
The complexity of the regulations gives rise to a credible defense by other-
wise intelligent, informed professionals that they simply did not understand or
were unaware of essential regulations that govern their day-to-day transac-
tions.17 5 Such ignorance of the law is uniformly recognized as a defense to spe-
cific intent crimes, 176 a category including many fraud offenses. 177 Such a
defense was successful in People v. Alizadeh.17 8 The New York appellate court
reversed the conviction of Dr. Alizadeh for submitting fraudulent bills for ob-
stetric services, finding that the bills were not the result of criminal fraud but
"represented an honest error in judgment in interpreting an unfamiliar billing
system."' 179 More often, however, this defense has not been successful. For ex-
172. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 27 (testimony of United States Deputy Attorney
General D. Lowell Jensen).
173. Mechanic, supra note 159, at 7-8.
174. Because of the complexity of the Medicare and Medicaid programs and the attempt by all
insurers, public and private, to address the problem of rising costs, the regulations governing health
care have been changing rapidly. For example, between 1980 and 1987, Congress enacted more than
30 laws governing just the Medicare program. Roper, Balancing Efficiency and Quality-Toward
Market-Based Health Care, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 169, 171 (1988).
175. J. GARDINER & T. LYMAN, supra note 155, at 106. For examples of defendants who assert
that they merely misunderstood applicable regulations and are not guilty of criminal fraud, see
United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 779
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645, 649 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Schil-
lei, 545 F.2d 519, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1977).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542, 545 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
936 (1980); United States v. Perlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d Cir. 1978).
178. 87 A.D.2d 418, 431, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
179. Id. at 430, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
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ample, in United States v. Collins,180 although the government's evidence
showed that the applicable regulations and forms were "in chaos" and "techni-
cal and confusing,"' 181 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
still found sufficient evidence to convict a nursing home operator, holding the
applicable forms were sufficient to put the defendant on notice as to the informa-
tion requested. 82
It is not surprising that the reported cases reveal little success with this
"confusion defense" because these cases reflect only instances in which a grand
jury has found probable cause or instances where a petit jury has found proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to establish that the offense occurred. In short, the
reported cases have already excluded most occasions where such a defense is
applicable and credible. The real impact of the complex rules and regulations is
felt when cases are declined for prosecution because of the complex regulatory
structure. Testimony before congressional committees reviewing fraud by
health care providers has repeatedly emphasized that the complexity of the ap-
plicable rules and regulations makes fraudulent health care providers extremely
difficult to prosecute and accounts for many decisions not to prosecute.' 8 3
Another reason white collar crime is difficult to investigate and prove is
that it is often "hidden within an organization."' 8 4 This makes it difficult to find
out what went on and particularly difficult to find evidence of a defendant's
intent.18 5 In the health care field, fraud occurs when false bills are submitted for
reimbursement by the provider to the third-party payer. This billing process
usually involves a number of people apart from the provider, such as a recep-
tionist, billing clerk, nurse, or computer billing service. Once the claim reaches
the provider it is again processed by multiple individuals and computer services.
To hold the provider responsible for the false statements in the bills requires a
step-by-step analysis of the billing process and proof that the provider personally
knew false information was included in the bills finally submitted. 186
A review of the reported cases indicated that like the "confusion defense," a
defense that places the blame on others in the organization had little chance of
success. The Eleventh Circuit's treatment in United States v. Hilliard 187 is a
typical judicial reaction to such a claim. The appellant, a nursing home adminis-
trator, argued that her conviction for submitting false claims should be reversed
because it was her codefendant who actually submitted the false Medicare
180. 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1979).
181. Id. at 168.
182. Id.
183. Fraudulent Medical and Insurance Promotions, supra note 14, at 67 (statement of Ohio
Attorney General William J. Brown); Oversight, supra note 7, at 4 (introduction).
184. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 103 (testimony of Professor Stanton Wheeler, Yale
Law School).
185. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 103 (testimony of Professor Stanton Wheeler, Yale
Law School).
186. Medicare & Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1,
supra note 12, at 21 (statement of Paul M. Allen, Chief Deputy Director, Michigan Department. of
Social Services).
187. 752 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1985).
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claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit summarily
dismissed this argument and affirmed the conviction on the ground that there
was evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find appellant was aware of and
participated in the scheme to defraud Medicare. 188 Like the other difficulties in
proving fraud by health care providers, the impact of the organizational struc-
ture is felt in the decision not to prosecute certain cases. Richard Kusserow, the
chief federal law enforcement officer charged with prosecuting fraudulent health
care providers, stated that:
Particularly with the health-care practitioners, we find that the most
standard defense they come up with is the fact that they are healers
and not businessmen [and] they will lay it off on their clerical staffs and
say that they were really too busy dealing the medical problems to pay
much attention to the business side. 189
A last factor complicating proof that a health care provider has committed
fraud is unique among white collar crimes. Often each criminal transaction by a
health care provider involves a de minimis amount of money.190 Felony prose-
cutions have been reported where the losses resulting from the fraud were as
small as $882.21,191 $2,156.60,192 and $809.00.193 The amount of money per
fraudulent transaction is small because the standard billing process in the health
care industry requires an itemization of each service or each component of a
service. Such itemization is perpetuated, in part, by the fee-for-service method
of calculating reimbursement that necessitates incremental billing. As a result of
this billing practice, each false claim submitted by a provider may involve only a
few cents of fraud. The prosecutor must plead and prove many such fraudulent
transactions to reach a large aggregate loss.
Generally, these smaller amounts reflect only the tip of the iceberg of the
dollar loss actually caused by a provider's fraud. 194 However the evidence that
the amount at issue is only the "tip of the iceberg" may never get to the jury.
When it does not, the de minimis character of the fraudulent transaction ad-
versely affects the prosecution of fraudulent providers for even when presented
with overwhelming evidence of intentional fraud, the de minimis amount of loss
makes it difficult for a jury to convict.
To overcome the problem caused by the de minimis dollar loss in a single
188. Id. at 581; see also United States v. Blazewiez, 459 F.2d 442, 443 (6th Cir. 1972) (in af-
firming the conviction of a physician for submitting false claims to Medicare, the court noted that
"[a]pparently the jury rejected the defense that [the physician] did not authorize the filing of the
claims. ... ); United States v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 1980) (in affirming the
conviction of an attorney for submitting false insurance claims, court noted that attorney's defense at
trial, which was rejected by the jury, was that his clients' physician falsified the claims without the
attorney's knowledge).
189. Program Fraud, supra note 14, at 7 (testimony of Hon. Richard P. Kusserow).
190. Oversight, supra note 7, at 117 (statement of Donald P. Zerendow, Chief, Massachusetts
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit).
191. See United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987).
192. United States v. Matanky, 482 F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039
(1973).
193. State v. Page, 32 N.C. App. 478, 480, 232 S.E.2d 460, 461 (1977).
194. Matanky, 482 F.2d at 1324 n.3.
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transaction, the investigation must expand to include hundreds of false claims
submitted by a provider. In addition to increasing the dollar amount of the
fraud, expanding the case may also benefit the prosecution by revealing a more
extensive pattern of fraud by the provider. Expanding the case to include addi-
tional de minimis transactions, however, is often as difficult as expanding the
investigation of other white collar crimes to include multi-million dollar
transactions. 195
Although certain features of white collar crime by health care providers
make these crimes difficult to investigate, other features of health care provider
fraud may assist the prosecutor in proving such fraud. One feature is a type of
evidence which is uniquely available in the health care industry because of the
presence and resources of the third-party payer. Known as a "peer group analy-
sis," this evidence results from comparing the billing history of the defendant
provider to peer providers. 196 A large computerized data base with information
on many providers is necessary for a credible comparison, and third-party pay-
ers maintain such data bases. An aberrational service history on the part of one
provider, when compared to that of its peer providers, can help target fraudulent
providers for further investigation. Such a comparison also can be potent trial
evidence. 197
In United States v. Russo '9 8 two osteopathic physicians were convicted for
misrepresenting the type of service they allegedly provided to patients. 199 The
parties introduced a peer group comparison conducted by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield in an analysis of its data base. The comparison demonstrated that of the
claims for the five procedures at issue filed by 10,000 physicians in the same
geographical area, the two defendants submitted twenty-eight percent of the
total claims.2° ° The court found this evidence relevant to the charges that the
defendants misrepresented the services for which they claimed
reimbursement. 20 1
A second feature unique to fraud by health care providers that may make
these prosecutions, if not less complex, at least more likely to succeed is the
presence of patients as victims of the fraud. The victim of many white collar
crimes-often a corporation, conglomerate, governmental entity, or business
195. Oversight, supra note 7, at 116 (statement of Donald P. Zerendow, Chief, Massachusetts,
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit) ("Once a provider sets up his pattern, he does it routinely and to the
extent of thousands of dollars, but the problems of proof relating to hundreds and thousands of
invoices is sometimes enormous, complex and very difficult."); Program Fraud, supra note 14, at 36
(testimony of Paul McGrath, United States Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department
of Justice) ("[T]he biggest litigation burden on us now is the smaller case. The reason is that it may
cost us, in terms of our resources, in terms of auditors and other costs of litigation, as much to put
together a $50,000 fraud case as a $5 million fraud case,...").
196. United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027
(1985).
197. Id. at 188-89. But see People v. Louie, 158 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 45, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247,
260-61 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984) (conviction reversed; court found peer comparison evi-
dence insufficient to convict physician).
198. 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973).
199. Id. at 1232.
200. Id. at 1234-36.
201. Id. at 1243.
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person-is often perceived by the public or a jury as just as greedy and ruthless
as the defendant. In short, the victim of many white collar crimes does not
engender much sympathy. By comparison, all too often the victim of the fraud-
ulent health care provider is not only the third-party payer that lost money, but
also the patient who, by definition, is ill, perhaps old, and who received inade-
quate, incompetent, or unnecessary medical services.20 2 By incorporating the
patient as a victim into the theory of the case, it is possible to overcome many of
the the problems otherwise presented in prosecutions of health care providers
while also demonstrating a more accurate protrayal of the harm caused by the
provider's fraud.
D. Conclusion: Developing A Theory of the Case
A number of features of white collar crime distinguish it from street crime.
The fact that white collar crime can be pursued civilly affects the prosecutor's
initial decision whether to proceed criminally and may affect the manner in
which the criminal case is tried. White collar crime is difficult to investigate and
prove. It is not self-evident, is usually perpetrated by someone in a position of
trust, involves tracing multiple transactions through voluminous documents and
complex regulations, and requires piercing an organizational structure to deter-
mine an individual's culpability.
Fraud by health care providers shares these features of other white collar
crimes. It also exhibits unique features. One such feature is the small amount of
money involved in the single fraudulent health care transaction. This character-
istic makes prosecution even more difficult. Two other features, the unique evi-
dence available because of the resources of the third-party payer, and the
victimization of patients by a fraudulent provider, potentially aid in the prosecu-
tion of fraudulent health care providers.
To overcome the difficulties in prosecuting health care providers while capi-
talizing on the strengths of such cases, the prosecutor should carefully craft the
theory of the case. Devising an optimal theory of the case requires deciphering
the facts, re-assembling the facts in a comprehensible manner, and determining
whether the resulting scenario is a criminal offense under applicable statutes.
20 3
Ideally the theory of the case, while maximizing clarity and jury appeal, will also
allow integration of available and especially powerful evidence and minimize the
impact of potential defenses. Any one factual situation lends itself to multiple
potential theories and any one theory usually can be charged as an offense under
202. See infra text accompanying notes 502-73 (discussing provision of unnecessary or substan-
dard medical care as fraudulent).
203. White Collar Crime, supra note 122, at 27 (testimony of United States Deputy Attorney
General D. Lowell Jensen); id at 192 (testimony of Kenneth E. Carlson) ("With a white collar crime
it is often hard to tell whether a particular action is a crime."). For examples of cases in which
courts discuss a party's "theory" of the case, see United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185, 188-89
(1984) (court determines whether the evidence was sufficient to support conviction under both of the
federal government's theories of guilt); United States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772, 775 (10th Cir. 1984);
State v. Sword, 713 P.2d 432, 434 (Haw. 1986) (conviction set aside because government failed to
prove the elements of the theory charged).
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a variety of criminal statutes. Part III discusses the theories used historically to
prosecute fraudulent health care providers.
III. THEORIES OF FRAUD BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
The analysis in this part of the Article rests on a comprehensive search 204
of all officially reported 20 5 opinions of prosecutions20 6 of health care provid-
ers.20 7 The first reported successful prosecution of a health care provider was of
204. The following computer searches were used:
I. Westlaw (yielded 14,496 cases)
A. Search I
1. Data Bases: All Feds (1945-Present), All Feds (1789-1945), Allstates, A.G.,
CJ-TP.
2. Search Command: The following topic numbers were inserted at the (*) in the
search command; [*] and Fraud! and physician dentist osteopath optometrist
podiatrist hospital "nursing home" pharmacist clinic and medicare medicaid
patient:
(a) constitutional law (92); (b) criminal law (110); (c) conspiracy (91); (d) com-
merce (83); (e) drugs and Narcotics (138); (f) forgery (181); (g) fraud (184); (h)
hospitals (204); (i) indictment and information (210); (j) physicians and surgeons
(299); (k) post office (306); (1) social security and public welfare (356); (m) poi-
sons (304)
B. Search 2 (yielded 2252 cases)
1. Data Bases: Allstates
2. Search Command: Physician therapist chiro! osteo! optometrist dentist hospital
"nursing home" clinic pharmacist nurs! podiatrist and kickback or remuneratl
II. Lexis (yielded 802 cases)
A. Libraries: Gen Fed, States
B. File: Courts, Omni
C. Search Command: The following statutory sections were inserted at the * of the
following search command; [*] and Fraud! and physician or dentist or osteopath
or optometrist or podiatrist or hospital or nursing home or pharmacist or clinic
and medicare or medicaid or patient:
1. 18 PRE/5 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 286, 287, 371, 641, 1001, 1341, 1343,
1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 2341, 4241.
2. 21 PRE/5 841, 842, 843, 848, 351, 352, 353.
3. 26 PRE/5 3793, 7201, 7206.
4. 42 PRE/5 408, 1395, 1396.
205. "Officially reported" cases refers to all cases published in the West Publishing Company
reporters. Although West Publishing Company is privately owned, it has received the official, and
unofficial, approval of federal and state courts. See Vestal, A Survey of Federal District Court Opin-
ions: West Publishing Company Reports, 20 Sw. L.J. 63, 76-77 (1966). While the methodology and
resulting statistics include only reported cases, the discussion portion of this Article will also refer to
unreported cases.
206. For purposes of this search a "prosecution" is the filing of charges by indictment or infor-
mation. Therefore opinions dealing with issues raised in pretrial motions are included as are all
opinions addressing issues raised after conviction. Reported opinions dealing with issues raised in
cases at the grand jury investigation stage have not been included.
Prosecutions of health care providers charged with health care fraud are the only prosecutions
included. Thus, health care providers charged with street crimes, tax fraud, perjury or other such
offenses are not included.
207. These cases represent only a sample of all prosecutions of health care providers. This sam-
ple does not include reported cases that may be outside the search methodology discussed above.
Also, by definition, it does not include unreported prosecutions such as unpublished opinions. This
limitation should primarily affect cases decided after 1971 because the movement toward limited
publication of judicial opinions began after a report issued by the Federal Judicial Center in 1971.
Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 478
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a physician in Philadelphia in 1915.208 Between 1908 and 1988, 301 prosecu-
tions of health care providers have been reported. Sixty-three percent of these
prosecutions occurred in federal courts under thirty different statutes. Mail
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), was the most widely used federal statute, fol-
lowed by false statement, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1982). RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations), 18
U.S.C § 1961-68 (1982), a prosecutor's powerhouse, was used surprisingly little,
in only four cases. Thirty-seven percent of the total reported prosecutions oc-
curred in state courts under twenty different types of statutes. Four states domi-
nated the prosecutions with fifty percent of all state prosecutions occurring in
New York, California, Michigan, and New Jersey. Almost half of the states
(twenty-two) reported no prosecutions of health care providers. The most com-
monly prosecuted state offenses were controlled substance offenses, Medicaid
fraud, larceny, and conspiracy.
Of the reported prosecutions, twenty-six percent resulted in reversal of at
least part of a conviction. The most common reason for reversal was trial errors
by the prosecutor (thirty-six percent of reversals). The next most common rea-
son for reversal was insufficiency of the evidence (twenty-eight percent of
reversals).
Twenty different types of providers were prosecuted as defendants, but
three types accounted for most (sixty-seven percent) of the convictions: forty-
seven percent of the defendants were physicians, ten percent were pharmacists,
and ten percent were nursing homes or nursing home employees. Corporate
defendants were named in six percent of the prosecutions. This is a surprisingly
low number of corporate defendants given the fact that many of the individual
defendants operated their fraud through health care corporations.
The sentence given to the convicted provider was disclosed in thirty-seven
percent (one hundred and fourteen) of the reported cases. In fifty percent of
these instances restitution or fines or both were ordered. The largest amount of
restitution ordered was $686,349.00. A physician in Puerto Rico, convicted for
submitting false cost reports, received this distinction, along with twenty years
imprisonment. 20 9 In seventy-four percent of the cases where the sentence was
disclosed, the court ordered some period of incarceration. The sentences ranged
(1988). This sample also does not include indicted health care providers who pled guilty or were
acquitted.
These factors may skew this sample toward inclusion of especially complex cases. Unpublished
opinions generally do not discuss complex legal issues. Reynolds & Richman, The Non-precedential
Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the US. Court of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1167, 1176 (1978); Vestal, Reported Opinions in the Federal District Courts: Analysis and Sug-
gestions, 52 IOWA L. REV. 379, 392-94 (1966). Also, because defendants are unlikely to plead guilty
when there are complex legal issues or when the evidence of guilt is unclear, the cases in the sample
collected for this Article may be biased toward more complex prosecutions. On the other hand, to
the extent acquittals are more likely to occur when the government's proof is inadequate or suffers
other problems, the cases in this sample may fail to disclose some of the complexities and subtleties
in prosecuting health care providers.
208. United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
209. United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 231 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1086 (1986).
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from one day to twenty-five years.2 10 The average term of imprisonment was
fifty-four months. This compares to a current average sentence for bank robbers
of 164.6 months, 2 11 for car thieves of 55 months 2 12 and for distributors of con-
trolled substances of 81.2 months. 213
While the above statistics are interesting, this Article will address an obser-
vation that is based upon an in-depth analysis of these opinions. This observa-
tion is three-fold. First, despite the large number of prosecuting jurisdictions,
the variety of providers as defendants, and the diversity of statutory violations
charged, all reported prosecutions of health care providers utilize a limited
number of theories of fraud. The second observation is that the theory which is
the most strategically advantageous for the prosecution has been used the least.
The third observation is that the frequency of prosecutions increased dramati-
cally when the government became a third-party payer through the Medicare
and Medicaid programs.
Table 1 identifies the theories of fraud used historically to prosecute health
care providers and notes the frequency with which each theory has been used:
Table 1 Utilization of Fraud Theories
Rx by Fraud2
14
Services not Provided1 5
Misrep. Services216
Auto Accident Scam217
Quackery21 8
False Cost Report21 9
Illegal Remunerations" 2
Unnec. Services"
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Percent of All Reported Cases22
210. See United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381, 1384 (5th Cir. 1979) (one year sentence for
doctor's secretary, modified to require one day incarceration plus probation), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
966 (1980); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1482 n.8 (6th Cir. 1986) (twenty-five years and a
two year special parole term).
211. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REP. No. SD-SB-8
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1986 at 444 table 5.23 (1987).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Listed in reverse chronological order: United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir.
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Table 2 demonstrates the chronological distribution of the reported
prosecutions.
Table 2 Reported Prosecutions of Health Care Providers
120-
110-
100-
90- Beginning of
Medicare and
80- Medicaid, 1966
70--1
U
o 60--
a 50
z v
1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s thru
1988
Decade
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987); United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Blanton, 730 F.2d 1424 (1 th Cir. 1984); State v. Sway, 15 Ohio St. 3d 112, 472 N.E.2d 1065 (1984);
United States v. Leichtling, 684 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983); United
States v. Voorhies, 663 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982); United States v.
Goldstein, 695 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Carnes v. State, 406
So. 2d 523 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853 (1981); United States v. Seelig, 622
F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hill, 589
F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979); United States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978); United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 857 (1978); Commonwealth v. West, 261 Pa. Super. 246, 396 A.2d 380 (1978); State v.
Best, 292 N.C. 294, 233 S.E.2d 544 (1977); United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977);
People v. Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604, 251 N.W.2d 314 (1977), aff'd, 405 Mich. 570, 275 N.W.2d 484
(1979); Commonwealth v. Shelhorse, 252 Pa. Super. 475, 381 A.2d 1305 (1977); Haney v. State, 544
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); State v. Vaccaro, 142 N.J. Super. 167, 361 A.2d 47 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 518, 366 A.2d 674 (1976); United States v. Elizey, 527 F.2d
1306 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); McLean v. State, 527 S.W.2d 76
(Tenn. 1975); United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1975); People v. Downes, 394 Mich.
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17, 228 N.W.2d 212 (1975); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Green, 511
F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); State v. Lawrence, 264 S.C. 3, 212 S.E.2d 52
(1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1025 (1975); State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974), aff'd, 345 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1977); People v. Kurland, 33 Cal. App. 3d 197, 117 Cal. Rptr. 216
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974); United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Badia,
490 F.2d 296 (Ist Cir. 1973); United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 955 (1974); United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bartee, 479
F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); State v. Jacobs, 18 Ariz. App, 471,
503 P.2d 826 (1972); State v. Gilmore, 76 Wash. 2d 293, 456 P.2d 344 (1969); White v. United
States, 399 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1968); State v. Webb, 261 Iowa 1151, 156 N.W.2d 299 (1968); State v.
Bridges, 398 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966); People v. Meyer, 216 Cal. App. 2d 618, 31 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Lawrence, 198 Cal. App. 2d 54, 18 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 938 (1958);
People v. Nunn, 46 Cal. 2d 460,'296 P.2d 813, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 883 (1956); Neill v. United
States, 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955); McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956); People v. Greenwood, 139 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Co. Ct.), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 926,
132 N.E.2d 308 (1955); People v. Braddock, 41 Cal. 2d 794, 264 P.2d 521 (1953), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 837 (1954); United States v. Tammasello, 160 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1947); Wesson v. United States,
164 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1947); Devine v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 179, 206 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App.
1947); United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v. Abdallah, 149
F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); Mitchell v. United States, 143 F.2d 953 (10th
Cir. 1944); United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 761 (1944);
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir.
1941); Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1939); Heller v. United States, 104 F.2d 446
(4th Cir. 1939); Smith v. State, 214 Ind. 169, 13 N.E.2d 562, (1938); Towbin v. United States, 93
F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1938); United States v. Anthony, 15 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Du Vail v.
United States, 82 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1936); People v. Guagliata, 362 Ill. 427, 200 N.E. 169, cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 667 (1936); MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935); Strader v.
United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934); Bush v. United States, 16 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1927);
Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104 (1926); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925); Aiton v.
United States, 3 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1925); Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923);
United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); Barbot v. United States, 273 F. 919 (4th Cir. 1921);
Harris v. United States, 273 F. 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646 (1921); Hoyt v. United
States, 273 F. 792 (2d Cir. 1921); Oliver v. United States, 267 F. 544 (C.C.A.W. Va. 1920); 3n Fuey
Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920); Rothman v. United States, 270 F. 31 (2d Cir. 1920);
Trader v. United States, 260 F. 923 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 555 (1919); Thompson v. United
States, 258 F. 196 (C.C.A. Mo.), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 553 (1919); Melanson v. United States, 256 F.
783 (C.C.A. Tex. 1919); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); Webb v. United States, 249
U.S. 96 (1919); United States v. Joseph Fleming & Son Co., 251 F. 932 (D. Pa. 1918); Thurston v.
United States, 241 F. 335 (1917).
215. Listed in reverse chronological order: State v. Cargille, 507 So. 2d 1254 (La. Ct. App.
1987); United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986); Com-
monwealth v. Wu, 343 Pa. Super. 108, 494 A.2d 7 (1985); United States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp.
1322 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985); People v. Blasquez, 165 Cal. App. 3d 408, 211
Cal. Rptr. 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772 (10th Cir.
1984); Worthington v. United States, 726 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir.) (direct appeal at 698 F.2d 820 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); People v. Chaitin, 94 A.D.2d 705, 462 N.Y.S.2d 61
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983); State v. Beatty, 64 N.C. App. 511, 308 S.E.2d 65 (1983); United States V.
Abadi, 706 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983); United States v. Mitlo, 557 F.
Supp. 520 (W.D. Penn.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); People v. American Medical Centers,
Ltd., 118 Mich. App. 135, 324 N.W.2d 782 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983); United States
v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982); People v. Montesano, 84 A.D.2d 369, 446 N.Y.S.2d 813
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982); People v. Einstein, 106 Ill. App. 3d 526, 435 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); Commonwealth v. Askin, 306 Pa. Super. 529, 452 A.2d 851 (1982), modified by, 502 Pa. 575,
467 A.2d 820 (1983); United States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034
(1981); State v. Kennedy, 105 Wis. 2d 625, 314 N.W.2d 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Mark, 94
Wash. 2d 520, 618 P.2d 73 (1980); United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1980); State v. Mar-
shall, 25 Wash. App. 240, 606 P.2d 278 (1980); United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir.
1980); United States v. Wilson, 490 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Mich. 1980), cert. denied, 639 F.2d 314
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(1981); United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Herberman, 583 F.2d
222 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Berdick, 555 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010
(1977); United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); State v.
Page, 32 N.C. App. 478, 232 S.E.2d 460 (1977); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1015 (1978), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 945 (1978); United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 820 (1976); United States v. Holt, 529 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cacioppo, 517
F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1975); People v. Slocum, 52 Cal. App. 3d 867, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975); People v. Cobbs, 53 Cal. App. 3d 937, 126 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); United States
v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974); United States v. Mantanky,
482 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973); State v. Fellman, 187 Neb. 767, 193
N.W.2d 775 (1972); United States v. Blazewicz, 459 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Katz,
455 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chakmakis, 449 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1971); People v.
Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 47 Cal. Rptr. 78, (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966).
216. Listed in reverse chronological order: United States v. Cegelka, 853 F.2d 627 (8th Cir.
1988); State v. Romero, 533 So. 2d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Asar, 136 A.D. 2d 712, 523
N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Commonwealth v. Stein, 363 Pa. Super. 410, 546 A.2d 36 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987); State v. Heath, 513 So. 2d 493 (La. Ct. App. 1987); United States v. Larm, 824
F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1057 (1988); State v. Quinn, 43 Wash. 896, 719 P.2d
936 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Sword, 68 Haw. 348, 713 P.2d 432 (1986); Sheriff of Clark
County v. Spagnola, 101 Nev. 508, 706 P.2d 840 (1985); People v. Reitman, 128 Misc. 2d 744, 492
N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1985); United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 905 (1985); State v. Dor, 145 Vt. 606, 496 A.2d 451 (1985); United States v. Alexander, 748
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); People v. Kendzia, 103 A.D.2d 999, 478
N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); People v. Lee, 134 Mich. App. 278, 351 N.W.2d 294 (1984);
State v. Griffon, 448 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1984); Ex Parte Hunte, 436 So. 2d 806 (Ala. 1983); State v.
Hughes, 433 So. 2d 88 (La. 1983); United States v. Huckaby, 698 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); People v. Alizadeh, 87 A.D.2d 418, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); State v. McDermitt, 406 So. 2d 195 (La. 1981); State v. Dean, 105 Wis. 2d 390, 314 N.W.2d
151 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981); United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1981); People v. Bovee, 92
Mich. App. 42, 285 N.W.2d 53 (1979); United States v. Edgewood Health Care Center, Inc., 608
F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979); People v. Weinfield, 65 A.D.2d 911, 410 N.Y.S.2d 472
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978); United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1978); United States v. Rousseau, 534 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d
1320 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828
(1974); United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974);
People v. Rossi, 11 A.D.2d 379, 230 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962); State v. Greco, 29 N.J. 94,
148 A.2d 164 (1959); Commonwealth v. Litman, 187 Pa. Super. 537, 144 A.2d 592 (1958).
217. Listed in reverse chronological order: United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676 (1st Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1080 (1988); United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1987);
United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339
(10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Strong,
702 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Drury, 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 943 (1983); United States v. Lebovitz, 506
F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982);
United States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1980); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132 (1981); United States v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 994 (1980); United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
966 (1980); Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); United States v. Schaffer,
599 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Del Valle, 587 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Reamer, 589 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980
(1979); United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978); United
States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); State v. Toscano, 74
N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977); State v. Poganski, 257 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1977); United States v.
Perkal, 530 F.2d 604 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976); United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d
563 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); United States v. Britton, 500 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Parkman, 488 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974);
United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974); United States
v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v.
Silvem, 494 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kaplan, 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973); United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972); United States
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v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971); People v. Scofield, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 95 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1971); United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1082 (1969);
Everitt v. United States, 306 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 920 (1963); People v.
Benson, 206 Cal. App. 2d 519, 23 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
806 (1963), overruled by People v. Perez, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934 (1965);
People v. Kayne, 268 Mich. 186, 255 N.W. 758 (1934).
218. Listed in reverse chronological order: People v. Brych, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1068, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Sorce v. State, 736 S.W.2d 851 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987); United States v.
Keller, 784 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 795
F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1986); People v. Varas, 110 A.D. 2d 646, 487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 210 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984); People v. Privitera, 74
Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, vacated, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 591 P.2d 919, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979); State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976); United States v. Maturo,
536 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Vecchiarello, 536 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd,
569 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1977); People v. Eckley, 33 Cal. App. 3d 91, 108 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973); People v. Chatfield, 272 Cal. App. 2d 141, 77 Cal. Rptr. 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 951 (1971); United States v. Taller, 394 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
839 (1968); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001
(1967); United States v. DeWelles, 345 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833 (1965); People
v. Chapman, 207 Cal. App. 2d 557, 24 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Marsh,
58 Cal. 2d 732, 376 P.2d 300, 26 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Cal. 1962); People v. Schmitt, 155 Cal. App. 2d 87,
317 P.2d 673 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); People v. Schroeder, 132 Cal. App. 2d 1, 281 P.2d 297 (Cal,
Dist. Ct. App. 1955); United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948); Baker v. United States,
115 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1941); United States. v. Lee, 107 F.2d 522
(7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 659 (1940); Barnhill v. United States, 96 F.2d 116 (10th Cir.
1938); West v. United States, 68 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1933); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140,
167 A. 344 (1933); Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928); Kar Ru Chemical Co. v.
United States, 264 F. 921 (9th Cir. 1920); United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1915); Moses
v. United States, 221 F. 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 629 (1915); Bruce v. United States, 202
F. 98 (8th Cir. 1912); Dyar v. United States, 186 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911); Hibbard v. United States,
172 F. 66 (7th Cir. 1909).
219. Listed in reverse chronological order: Greco v. State, 307 Md. 470, 515 A.2d 220 (Md. Ct.
App. 1986); United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1086 (1986); McKennie v. State, 439 So. 2d 706 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), rev'd, 439 So. 2d 713 (Ala.
1983); Commonwealth v. Minkin, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 436 N.E.2d 955, appeal denied, 386 Mass.
1104, 438 N.E.2d 75 (1982); United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1981); People v.
Notey, 423 N.Y.S.2d 947, 72 A.D.2d 279 (1980); State v. Hoffman, 82 N.J. 184, 412 A.2d 120
(1980); Frye v. State, 369 So.2d 892 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.
1979); United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Braunstein, 474 F.
Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1978); People v. Severino, 63 A.D.2d 1010, 406 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1978); United States
v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 373 Mass. 345, 367 N.E.2d 802
(1977), overruled by Commonwealth v. Crocker, 384 Mass. 353, 424 N.E.2d 524 (1981); United
States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1977); People v. Wolf, 59 A.D, 2d 547, 397 N.Y.S.2d 131
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977); State v. Rudd, 259 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978); People v. Christiano, 87 Misc. 2d 962, 386 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1976); People v. Loughrey, 149
N.J. Super. 264, 373 A.2d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d
771 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
220. Listed in reverse chronological order: People v. Warden, 141 A.D.2d 913, 529 N.Y.S.2d
230 (1988); United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1986); United States v. Lipkis, 770
F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Universal Trade & Indus., Inc., 695 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc., 650 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 652 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981); People v. Forham, 84
A.D.2d 792, 443 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1981); United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); United States v. Wein-
garden, 468 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979);
People v. Liberman, 94 Misc. 2d 737, 405 N.Y.S.2d 559 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978); United States v.
Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978); People v. Lerner, 90 Misc. 2d 513, 394 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977).
221. Listed in reverse chronological order: United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101 (6th Cir
1988); United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988);
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A. "Rx by Fraud"." Violations of Statutes Regulating Controlled Substances
To the extent fraud is a misrepresentation, omission, or concealment calcu-
lated to deceive, providers commit fraud when they acquire a controlled sub-
stance by falsely alleging it is for legitimate medical purposes, or when they
prescribe a controlled substance that is not for legitimate medical purposes.
This theory is the most widely used theory of fraud in prosecuting health care
providers.
United States v. Moore223 exemplifies this type of fraud.224 Moore, a physi-
cian, was convicted of knowingly distributing and dispensing a controlled sub-
stance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).225 The evidence showed that
Moore dispensed methadone, a drug that requires careful monitoring to prevent
addiction, in a manner contrary to generally accepted medical practices.226
United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1034 (1988);
United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 S. Ct. 1004 (1987); United
States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985); In re Wayne County Prosecutor, 121 Mich. App. 798, 329 N.W.2d 510
(1982); United States v. Furman, 507 F. Supp. 848 (D. Md.), rev'd, 672 F.2d 914 (1981); United
States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980); United States v.
Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978); People v. Rehman, 253
Cal. App. 2d 119, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968); People v. Bowman, 156
Cal. App. 2d 784, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Hughes v. United States, 231 F. 50 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 640 (1916).
222. Often multiple theories of fraud were used in the prosecution of one case. In such in-
stances, the case is included in only the category corresponding to the dominant theory discussed in
the opinion. However, any case that referred to the "unnecessary services" theory was included in
that category even though other theories appeared to dominate the opinion. There was insufficient
information in the following cases to determine the theory of fraud used (listed in chronological
order): State v. Fiorilla, 226 N.J. Super. 81, 543 A.2d 958 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); State v.
Lizzi, 199 Conn. 462, 508 A.2d 16 (1986); People v. Louie, 158 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1984); Romani v. State, 429 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Karwacki, 1
Haw. App. 157, 616 P.2d 226 (1980); United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Bernstein, 546 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1977); People v. Brown, 132 Cal. Rptr. 217, 61
Cal. App. 3d 476 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); United States v. Carey, 475 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Kraude, 467 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Smith v. Supe-
rior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 260, 85 Cal. Rptr 208 (1970).
223. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
224. OtLer examples of health care providers indicted for using a professional license to traffic in
controlled substances include: Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104 (1926); United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920); Webb v. United
States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919); United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
930 (1986); United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United States v. Voorhies, 663
F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982); United States v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d
889 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Carroll, 518 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1031 (1975); United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d
296 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955
(1974); United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484
(10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Warren, 453
F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813 (8th Cir.
1968); Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958); United
States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); People v. Greenwood,
139 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Co. Ct.), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 926, 132 N.E.2d 308 (1955); State v. Lawrence, 264 S.C.
3, 212 S.E.2d 52 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1025 (1975).
225. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124.
226. Id. at 126-27.
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[Moore] gave inadequate physical examinations or none at all. He ig-
nored the results of tests he did make. He [took no precautions against
methadone's] misuse and diversion. He did not regulate the dosage at
all, prescribing as much and as frequently as the patient demanded.
He did not charge for medical services rendered, but graduated his fee
according to the number of tablets desired. In practical effect, he acted
as a large-scale "pusher"-not as a physician. 22
7
In this instance, as with most defendants charged under this theory, the
provider was improperly distributing the controlled substance to his patients. In
a few cases prosecuted under this theory, however, the provider was improperly
prescribing controlled substances for his own consumption. 228
In Moore the Supreme Court put to rest a defense routinely raised to prose-
cutions under this theory. Most controlled substance statutes contain two levels
of penalties: lesser penalties for those individuals who are registered under the
statute and who fail to comply with the registration requirements, and stiffer
penalties for other violations, such as distribution. When prosecuted for offenses
that carry the stiffer penalties, registrants argued that they could be prosecuted
only for the offenses that carry the lesser penalties because these were the only
offenses specifically applicable to registrants. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, noting that the distribution statute reaches "any person" and that the
current statute had been passed to strengthen the prior statute that had already
been interpreted to apply to registrants. 229 By the time the Supreme Court re-
jected this argument in Moore it had been rejected in almost every federal circuit
court.
2 3 0
Most state courts have followed suit in interpreting controlled substance
statutes that have a two-track offense structure like the federal statute and have
held that registrants are not immune from prosecution under the general provi-
sions of the statute.231 The state courts that have allowed the character of the
violator to determine which offense shall apply have interpreted statutes that
provide essentially the same penalties for both offenses. 232
Many of the cases prosecuted under this theory are investigated by under-
cover officers posing as patients. 233 These officers generally testify as to the cur-
227. Id. at 142-43.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979);
United States v. Tommasello, 160 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1947); People v. Kurland, 33 Cal. App. 3d 197,
117 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1973); State v. Gilmore, 76 Wash. 2d 293, 456 P.2d 344 (1969).
229. Moore, 423 U.S. at 341-42.
230. Id. at 341 n.7.
231. See, e.g., State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 345 So. 2d 711
(Fla. 1977); People v. Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604, 251 N.W.2d 314 (1977), aff'd, 405 Mich. 570, 275
N.W.2d 484 (1979); State v. Vaccaro, 142 N.J. Super. 167, 361 A.2d 47 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 71 N.J. 518, 366 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292 (N.M. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853 (1981).
232. See, e.g., State v. Best, 292 N.C. 294, 233 S.E.2d 544 (1977); McLean v. State, 527 S.W.2d
76 (Tenn. 1975); Haney v. State 544 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187, 188 (6th Cir. 1975) (McAllister, J., dissent-
ing) (exploring some of the problems with undercover investigations in this context); United States v.
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 192 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); Best, 292 N.C. at 295-
97, 233 S.E.2d at 545-47; United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
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sory or nonexistent examinations they received from the provider prior to
receiving a prescription for the controlled substance234 and to the form of pay-
ment made to the provider (flat rate cash fee for each prescription). 235 The
defendants' statements to these undercover officers can be devastating evidence.
When one agent told the defendant-physician that he never used Ritalin (a con-
trolled substance), "but he just sold it," the defendant gave the officer prescrip-
tions for Ritalin and replied "everybody has to make a living."'236 Employees of
the provider can also provide detailed and substantial evidence that a provider is
in effect distributing drugs, not practicing medicine.237 In any of these cases,
medical expert testimony will be needed to prove that the controlled substances
dispensed could not be for legitimate medical purposes. 2 3 8 As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted, "expert testimony with respect to
recognized medical standards and methods of treating patients, such as those for
whom the prescriptions were furnished, [will be] admissible because of its bear-
ing upon the intent and purpose with which the prescriptions were issued."'2 39
As with any expert testimony about proper medical treatment, the expert
testimony in these cases should conclusively show that the prescriptions in ques-
tion were not in the usual course of a professional practice. 24° A series of cases
in the early twentieth century dealing with physicians who dispensed morphine
to drug addicts demonstrates this. Experts were equivocal in assessing the legiti-
mate medical purpose of prescriptions of morphine. This led to acquittals.
241
For example, in Linder v. United States242 the Supreme Court found that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that the prescription was not in good faith
despite expert testimony that the prescription was not medically indicated, and
reversed the conviction of Dr. Linder, a physician, for prescribing morphine and
cocaine to a drug addict.243 The court explained that:
The [drug addict-patients of the defendant] are diseased and proper
subjects for such treatment, and we cannot possibly conclude that a
physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other than medical pur-
poses solely because he has dispensed to one of them, in the ordinary
U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268, 269 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
955 (1974); United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296, 297 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Bartee, 479
F.2d 488, 485 (10th Cir. 1973).
234. Badia, 490 F.2d at 297; Jobe, 487 F.2d at 269; Bartee, 479 F.2d at 485.
235. United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1974).
236. Green, 511 F.2d at 1066.
237. See, e.g., id. at 1062, 1064-65.
238. See, e.g., id. at 1072-73; United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Best, 292 N.C. 294, 298-99, 233 S.E.2d 544, 547-48 (1977); State v. Lawrence, 264 S.C. 3,
14-16, 212 S.E.2d 52, 56-58 (1974) (approving part of expert testimony used but condemning testi-
mony that was expert's personal opinion as not relevant to the issues before the court), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1025 (1975).
239. Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589, 592 (10th Cir. 1934).
240. See id.
241. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 15 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936); cf Towbin v. United
States, 93 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1938) (evidence insufficient to prove prescriptions were not issued in
the usual course of a professional practice).
242. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
243. See id. at 18.
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course and in good faith, four small tablets of morphine or cocaine for
relief of conditions incident to addiction.244
The quantity of controlled substances dispensed and the degree of monitoring by
the physician seemed to be critical factors to the Linder court in assessing the
bona fide nature of the prescription.24
5
Most federal prosecutions utilizing this theory charge violations of the Con-
trolled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. sections 841,246 843247 and 846.248 The older
federal cases in which this theory was used were prosecuted under the Harrison
Anti-Narcotic Act.249 State prosecutions using this theory have alleged viola-
tions of state controlled substances statutes. 250 Because the drug industry is so
heavily regulated, any distribution offense by a provider will often involve addi-
tional criminal violations as the provider attempts to conceal criminal activity or
simply fails to accurately report actual activity. This is aptly shown in United
States v. Vamos2 5t in which Dr. Vamos was prosecuted for directing the crea-
tion of fictitious patient records in an attempt to account for the excessive
amounts of drugs distributed. 252 False documentation can be prosecuted as a
violation of 18 T.S.C. § 1341 (1982) if the mails were used to file the falsified
records, as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) if the statement is submitted to
Medicare or Medicaid, or as a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843 (1982), which makes
it an offense to "knowingly and intentionally ... furnish false or fraudulent
material information ... in any application, report, record, or other document
244. Id.
245. Id. at 18-22.
246. See, eg., United States v. Goldstein, 695 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983); United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Green, 511 F.2d
1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1974).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Leichtling, 684 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1201 (1983); United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036
(1987); United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); Larson
507 F.2d at 385.
249. 38 Stat. 785, ch 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914); see, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
703 (1943); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S.
189 (1921) (opinion sets forth the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, 38 Stat. 785, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785
(1914)); McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 250 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied., 350 U.S. 934
(1956).
250. See, e.g., State v. Vaccaro, 142 N.J. Super. 167, 171-72, 361 A.2d 47, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987) (N.J. REv. STAT. § 24: 21-19 (repealed 1987)), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 518, 366 A.2d
647 (1976); State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292, 295 (N.M. Ct. App.) (N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-31-1 to -40 (1978)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853 (1981); People v. Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604,
609, 251 N.W.2d 314, 319 (1977) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.1070(41) (repealed 1978)), aff'd, 405
Mich. 570, 275 N.W.2d 484 (1979); State v. Best, 292 N.C. 294, 305, 233 S.E,2d 544, 554 (1987)
(court reversed conviction; holding that prosecution is proper under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-108
(1985) but improper under N.C. GEN. STAT § 90-95(a)(1) (1985)).
251. 797 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425, 1434 (11th
Cir. 1984) (defendant-physician convicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(5) (1982) for failing to
maintain proper records of the controlled substances in his possession); State v. Vaccaro, 142 N.J
Super. 167, 172, 361 A.2d 47, 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (defendant convicted for failure to
properly keep records and maintain inventories of controlled dangerous substances, as well as dis-
pensing and selling controlled substances).
252. Vamos, 797 F.2d at 1148-49.
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required to be made, kept or filed under [the Controlled Substances Act]."'2 53
In summary, health care professionals who are licensed to prescribe or ac-
quire controlled substances commit fraud when they falsely represent informa-
tion necessary to acquire or prescribe the controlled substance. Generally the
fraud in cases prosecuted using this theory is straightforward and easy to prove.
Problems with these cases occur not because of the theory used but because of
traditional difficulties encountered with some of the types of evidence routinely
employed in these cases; that is, undercover operations, which sometimes raise
an entrapment defense; medical expert testimony, which is subject to attack be-
cause of the inexact nature of proper medicine; and insider witnesses, who may
also have criminal culpability. To overcome these problems a prosecutor must
prove a pattern of treatment for many patients where it clearly appears that the
medical care rendered is not legitimate but serves only as a front for distribution
of controlled substances.
B. Billing for Services Not Provided
Of the eight theories of fraud, billing for services not provided is one of the
easiest theories to charge, explain, and prove. This theory has the second high-
est rate of usage in the reported cases. 254 The success of this theory depends
upon the type of service at issue. Services detectable by physical examination
and services a patient would likely recall if they have been performed are best
suited for this theory. By the same token, if the delivery of the service cannot be
confirmed or if the service is so routine that a patient would be unlikely to recall
it, this theory should not be used.
United States v. Gordon 25 5 demonstrates that this theory works well when
the services, if performed, are detectable by subsequent examination. Defend-
ant, a podiatrist, was convicted of submitting claims to Medicare for services he
did not perform. The Government called as a witness a podiatry expert who
testified that his subsequent physical examination of defendent's patients indi-
cated that the services had not been performed. 25 6 United States v. Varoz 25 7
exemplifies a major pitfall with such expert testimony. In this case, a podiatry
expert testifying as a government witness stated that, in his opinion, certain serv-
ices were not performed on the patients in question.258 However, this expert
based his opinion on the lack of documentation in the file, not on a physical
examination of the patient. 25 9 The Tenth Circuit found such evidence insuffi-
cient and set aside the conviction.2 60 The court noted that sufficient expert testi-
mony to prove this theory should be based upon the expert's review of
253. 21 U.S.C. § 843 (1982).
254. See supra Table 1 accompanying notes 214-222.
255. 548 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1977).
256. Id. at 744.
257. 740 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1984).
258. Id. at 776.
259. Id. at 776-77.
260. Id.
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unambiguous physical evidence. 261
Subsequent physical evidence will also corroborate whether a service was in
fact provided when the service at issue involves a tangible item, such as durable
medical equipment. In United States v. Hershenow262 a pharmacist was con-
victed for billing for surgical equipment he never supplied. Evidence showed
that the equipment allegedly sold required the patient's presence to be fitted.263
Patients testified they had never been to the pharmacy to be fitted for equipment
and had never received the equipment.26
4
People v. American Medical Centers265 illustrates that this theory is also
easy to prove when the services at issue are especially intrusive and of a nature
that patients would tend to recall. In this case, defendant-physicians were con-
victed for billing Medicaid for "direct laryngoscopies" that had never been per-
formed. 266 A direct laryngoscopy is an examination of exterior and interior of
the larynx using an instrument that is inserted down a patient's throat.2 67 The
patients testified that they did not undergo this procedure.2 68
The majority of reported cases using this theory, however, involved intangi-
ble, fungible, or nonmemorable services. Visits to patients269 and disbursements
of medicine 270 are the most common examples. The nonrendering of these serv-
ices is hard to prove since they usually occur in such a large volume that recal-
ling whether one of many services was not rendered may be difficult for a
patient. 27 1 Even if the volume is not large, the patient may have been too ill
261. Id. at 778; see also Gordon, 548 F.2d at 744 (court held the evidence of a podiatry expert
was unambiguous when he examined defendant's patients, then testified that the patients never re-
ceived the services allegedly provided by defendant based upon his personal observations).
262. 680 F.2d 847 (Ist Cir. 1982). For other examples of cases in which the service allegedly
provided involved tangible items, see United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 245 (5th Cir. 1977)
(defendants who operated a company that sold and leased respiration equipment were convicted for
billing Medicare for equipment never supplied to patients), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978);
United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir.) (defendants, officers of a nonprofit health
services foundation were convicted for submitting claims to the State of Louisiana for allegedly
constructing mobile medical clinics that were never built), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977).
263. Hershenow, 680 F.2d at 862.
264. Id.
265. 118 Mich. App. 135, 324 N.W.2d 782 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983).
266. Id. at 139, 324 N.W.2d at 787.
267. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 931 (15th ed. 1985).
268. American Medical Centers, 118 Mich. App. at 149, 324 N.W.2d at 791; cf. State v. Cargille,
507 So. 2d 1254, 1260 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (although not explicitly stated by the court, proof of fraud
would likely require testimony from patients; procedure requiring stool specimen would have been
particularly memorable).
269. See, eg., United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578, 579 (1lth Cir. 1985); United States v.
Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 295 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); United States v. Jones, 587
F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cacioppo, 517 F.2d 22, 23 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319, 1321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974); United States v.
Matanky, 482 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973); United States v. Katz,
455 F.2d 496,497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972); United States v. Chakmakis, 449 F.2d
315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980); State v. Beatty, 64
N.C. App. 511, 512, 308 S.E.2d 65, 66, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d 354 (1983); State
v. Marshall, 25 Wash. App. 240, 242, 606 P.2d 278, 280 (1980).
271. See, e.g., Matanky, 482 F.2d 1321, 1323 (defendant-physician billed for visits allegedly
made to elderly patients two to three times per week over a two year period).
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during the treatment to testify, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the provider did
not provide a service as alleged. 272 Moreover, these types of services leave no
tangible evidence after the fact to indicate whether the service was provided.
The reported cases reveal various ways these problems are overcome. Often
the patient is able to confirm credibly that the visit was not made or medicine
not dispensed. 273 Corroboration of the patient's testimony generally is neces-
sary, however. Patient charts,274 witnesses such as the patient's relatives, 275
hospital staff276 or employees of the defendant, 277 evidence that the provider's
office hours and holidays conflict with dates services allegedly were rendered,278
and peer group comparisons showing that the number of services billed by a
defendant is incredible compared to similarly situated providers279 can corrobo-
rate patient testimony.
In federal actions brought under this theory of fraud defendants have been
charged with making false statements,280 conspiracy,2 81 mail fraud,2 82 Medicare
or Medicaid fraud,283 and RICO. 284 In state cases using this theory defendants
have been charged with larceny,2 85 Medicaid fraud,286 and obtaining money by
272. Id. at 1324-25 (credibility of patient-witnesses attacked because they were schizophrenic, or
suffered from alcoholism or "mental problems").
273. See, e.g., United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578, 581 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985); see also United
States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 295 (3d Cir.) (patient served as confidential informant for government
and, while wearing monitoring equipment, discussed with defendant the fact that defendant submit-
ted Medicaid claims that fa!sely inflated number of patient visits to defendant's office), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
274. Hilliard, 752 F.2d at 581 n.3.
275. United States v. Katz, 455 F.2d at 496, 498 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
276. Id.
277. People v. Scofield, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1023-24, 95 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407-08 (1971); State v.
Beatty, 64 N.C. App. 511, 515, 308 S.E.2d 65, 67, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d 354
(1983).
278. See, eg., United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Catena, 500 F.2d 1319, 1325 n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974).
279. United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027
(1985); United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1233-36, 1239-44 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974); cf. United States v. American Medical Centers, 118 Mich. App. 135, 142, 324
N.W.2d 782, 787 (1982) (peer group comparison introduced by the prosecution but not allowed into
evidence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982); see, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 550 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977). Other actions are brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). See, e.g.,
United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Blazewicz, 459 F.2d 442,
443 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chakmakis, 449 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1971). Finally, some
actions are prosecuted under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 408(c) (1982). See, e.g., United
States v. Holt, 529 F.2d 981, 982 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cacioppo, 517 F.2d 22, 23 (8th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Katz, 455 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
281. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. !979);
Beasley, 550 F.2d at 263.
282. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578, 579 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 295, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); United States v.
Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985).
283. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 1988) (previously 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h
(1982)); see, e.g., United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1057 (1988); United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Varoz, 740
F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977); Holt,
529 F.2d at 981, 982 n.1.
284. United States v. Worthington, 698 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1983).
285. See State v. Marshall, 25 Wash. App. 240, 241, 606 P.2d 278, 279 (1980).
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fraud.287 Billing for services not rendered is not a forgery offense. As noted by
the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Marshall,288 when a defendant
signs claims falsely alleging that services were performed, he is making a false
statement, not committing forgery.2 89
In summary, the "services not rendered" theory is easier to prove when
there is unambiguous, objective evidence that the health care provider did not
perform the disputed service. Such evidence exists when a service leaves physi-
cal manifestations, involves supplying a tangible item, or is so intrusive, painful,
or time-consuming that the patient would remember it. This theory is more
difficult to prove when the disputed services are fungible, performed in large
numbers, or administered to patients incapable of accurately recalling their
treatment. In these instances, which constitute the majority of the reported
prosecutions using this theory, the patients are rarely credible witnesses and doc-
umentary or testimonial corroboration that services were not rendered is
essential.
C. Misrepresenting the Nature of Services Provided
Misrepresenting the nature of services provided is one of the easiest theories
to prove as long as the prosecutor can confirm which services were actually
provided. Cases brought under this theory can be divided into two groups, each
highlighting a different aspect of the compensation scheme used by third-party
payers. The first group reflects the fact that medical insurance compensates for
some but not all services. The second group of cases reflects the fact that medi-
cal insurance compensates more highly for some services than for others.
In the first group of cases, the services rendered by the provider were not
compensable services under the patients' insurance coverage. There are a vari-
ety of cases in this group: a podiatrist who represented to Medicare that he
treated patients for complex and compensable podiatric ailments when in fact he
had merely trimmed toenails or perfomed other noncompensable services; 290 op-
tometrists who sold noncompensable sunglasses to patients but claimed they had
supplied compensable cataract eye-glasses; 29 1 physicians who represented that
they provided compensable injections for joint pain but actually supplied non-
compensable injections of routine vitamins or medicines; 292 a shoe store proprie-
tor who claimed he supplied compensable orthopedic shoes "to be attached to a
286. See, e.g., State v. Cargille, 507 So. 2d 1254, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Beatty, 64
N.C. App. 511, 513, 308 S.E.2d 65, 66, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d 354 (1983);
Commonwealth v. Wu, 343 Pa. Super. 108, 111, 494 A.2d 7, 8 (1985).
287. State v. Page, 32 N.C. App. 478, 480, 232 S.E.2d 460, 461, disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 643,
235 S.E.2d 64 (1977).
288. 25 Wash. App. 240, 606 P.2d 278 (1980).
289. Id. at 241-42, 606 P.2d at 279-80.
290. United States v. Rousseau, 534 F.2d 584, 585 (5th Cir. 1976).
291. United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 808-09 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217
(1985).
292. See, e.g., United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974).
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leg brace," but in fact supplied ordinary, noncompensable street shoes; 293 a po-
diatrist who represented that he treated patients during an office visit, but only
spoke to them over the telephone,294 a physician who billed Medicare for allergy
shots that he allegedly administered but that were actually administered by a
nurse.
295
In the second group of cases prosecuted under this theory the provider sup-
plied one type of compensable service but billed for a more expensive compensa-
ble service. In State v. Griffon29 6 a pharmacist was convicted for billing
Medicare for expensive brand-name drugs instead of the generic drugs he dis-
pensed.297 Other cases in this group include a medical laboratory that billed for
"manual" blood tests when "automated" blood tests were performed, 298 a physi-
cian who billed for visits with a single patient when the physician saw a number
of patients in the same visit,299 a psychiatrist who misrepresented the length of
psychiatric evaluations of patients, 300 and a nursing home administrator-owner
who misrepresented the level of care given to patients.3 0 1
State v. Dorn 302 presents a variation in which a pharmacist supplied com-
pensable drugs to Medicaid patients but charged the Medicaid program a higher
cost for these drugs than he charged other patients. 30 3 The Vermont Supreme
Court found that the Medicaid claims submitted by defendant for reimburse-
ment falsely certified that the reimbursement reflected the pharmacist's "usual
and customary charge" to the general public.30 4
The evidence used to prove fraud in either of the two groups of cases that
use the "misrepresenting the nature of services provided" theory is similar to the
evidence used to prove the "services not provided" theory. Under both theories,
plaintiffs may introduce patient testimony concerning services actually re-
293. United States v. Yosevitch, No. 83-1896 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 49 (3d
Cir. 1984).
294. Commonwealth v. Stein, 363 Pa. Super. 410, 412, 526 A.2d 411, 411 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds, - Pa. -, 546 A.2d 36 (1988).
295. United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1057
(1988).
296. 448 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1984).
297. Id. at 1289. For other cases in which the defendant billed for brand name drugs but dis-
pensed generic drugs, see United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984, 989 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
905 (1985); State v. Heath, 513 So. 2d 493, 495 (La. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Asar, 136 A.D.2d 712,
713, 523 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (1988); People v. Kendzia, 103 A.D.2d 999, 1000, 478 N.Y.S.2d 209,
210 (1984); cf. In re Rozas Gibson Pharmacy of Eunice, Inc., 382 So. 2d 929 (La. 1980) (pharmacy
had no expectation of privacy in its records; records could be subpoenaed during investigation of
pharmacist accused of billing Medicaid for brand name drugs instead of the generic drugs
dispensed).
298. See, eg., United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir.
1978).
299. People v. Lee, 134 Mich. App. 278, 283, 351 N.W.2d 294, 297 (1984).
300. State v. Dean, 105 Wis. 2d 390, 393, 314 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
301. United States v. Huckaby, 698 F.2d 915, 916 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070
(1983).
302. 145 Vt. 606, 496 A.2d 451 (1985).
303. Id. at 611, 496 A.2d at 453.
304. Id. at 612, 496 A.2d at 454.
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ceived, 30 5 documentary or testimonial corroboration of what services were pro-
vided, 306 evidence that the provider's office hours and schedule conflicted with
representations regarding when services were provided,30 7 and statements by the
defendant demonstrating knowledge of or intent to defraud. 30 8 As with the
"services not rendered" theory, testimony by expert witnesses who examined the
patient and found no evidence that the defendant provided the service in ques-
tion is helpful. 309 Because of one of the major problems encountered in using
this theory, experts have been used in these cases in an unusual way. Billing
codes the providers use to designate the services supplied are often confusing.
This can result in a credible defense by the provider that it did not intend to bill
incorrectly for services but simply misinterpreted or was confused by the billing
codes. 3 10 In response to this defense, the government has been allowed to intro-
duce expert testimony regarding the proper interpretation of billing codes. 3 11
In federal cases using this theory defendants have been charged with mak-
ing false statements, 3 12 mail fraud, 313 conspiracy,3 14 and Medicare or Medicaid
fraud.3 15 In state courts defendants have been charged with theft by fraud,3 16
305. See, eg., United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1157 (1974); State v. Griffon, 448 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. 1984); cf. Dorn, 145 Vt. at 614-15, 496
A.2d at 456 (patient testified she had been charged lower rate for drug than what defendant billed
Medicaid).
306. See Dorn, 145 Vt. at 611, 496 A.2d at 454.
307. See United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1980). But see People v. Lee, 134
Mich. App. 278, 290, 351 N.W.2d 294, 300 (1984) (court warned against relying exclusively on such
evidence).
308. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1984) (defendant directed
that urine specimens be discarded and not tested), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); United States
v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 810 (11th Cir. 1984) (defendant told employee that she did not want to hear
about illegal Medicare billings); United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434,
440 (2d Cir. 1978) (defendant directed that patients' names be omitted from laboratory print-outs);
Griffon, 448 So. 2d at 1292 (defendant ordered pharmacists to fill prescriptions with generic drugs
and bill for brand name drugs).
309. United States v. Rousseau, 534 F.2d 584, 585 (5th Cir. 1976); Russo, 480 F.2d at 1237.
310. See, eg., United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (Wiggins, J., dissenting)
(conviction should be reversed because of confusing regulations), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1057 (1988);
Sheriffv. Spagnola, 101 Nev. 508, 514, 706 P.2d 840, 844 (1985) (dismissals of indictments affirmed
on ground that Medicaid regulations were ambiguous); State v. Greco, 29 N.J. 94, 102, 148 A.2d
164, 169 (1959) (conviction of physician for misrepresenting his qualifications to become a Medicaid
provider reversed because applicable regulations confusing); People v. Alizadeh, 87 A.D.2d 418,
431-32, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425, 432-33 (1982) (conviction reversed in part because billing codes were
confusing and evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict); Commonwealth v. Stein, - Pa. -,
546 A.2d 36, 40 (1988) (dismissal of indictment affirmed because Medicaid regulations were
ambiguous).
311. See Gold, 743 F.2d at 817; Spagnola, 101 Nev. at 511-12, 706 P.2d at 842-43.
312. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 709 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979); United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645, 646-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974). Other
actions are brought under 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982). See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d
185, 190 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Gold, 743 F.2d at 805; United States v.
Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1978).
313. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see, e.g., Alexander, 748 F.2d at 185; United States v. Edgewood,
608 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d
1228, 1231 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974).
314. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); see, e.g., Gold, 743 F.2d at 805.
315. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 1988) (previously 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h
(1982)); see, e.g., United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
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obtaining money under false pretenses, 3 17 schemes to defraud Medicaid, 318
grand larceny, 319 offering a false instrument for filing, 320 and misbranding of
drugs.32 1
In summary, defendants charged for misrepresenting the nature of services
rendered fall into two groups. In one group of cases providers represented that
they provided compensable services when they did not. In the other group,
providers represented that they provided one type of compensable service when
they had provided a less remunerative but still compensable service.
This theory presents the prosecutor with several potential problems. Un-
like the cases charged under the "services not provided" theory, some services in
these cases actually were provided. If the services actually provided are not
significantly different from the services falsely alleged to have been provided, it is
difficult to prove intentional fraud. When the services are similar, patients have
difficulty differentiating between the alleged service and the actual service pro-
vided. Also, it may be difficult to obtain clear documentary proof in patient
charts or other provider records that clarify which service was provided. Lastly,
if the billing code or description of the actual service provided is similar to the
billing code for the service falsely alleged to have been provided, there could be
legitimate, or at least credible, confusion on the part of the provider. Complex
reimbursement regulations thus hamper prosecution under this theory. Of these
two types of cases charged under this theory, the first group, in which the pro-
vider billed for compensable services when noncompensable services were pro-
vided, is less subject to these potential problems. The reason for this is obvious:
the difference between the noncompensable service actually provided and the
compensable service billed generally will be greater than the difference between
two compensable services, both in terms of physical impact on patient care and
the billing code (there would be no billing code for a noncompensable service).
D. Auto Accident Scams
The fourth pattern of fraud that occurs in the health care field is the "auto
accident scam." These cases combine the "services not provided" and "misrep-
resenting the nature of services" theories. Because of the large number of these
cases and the customized approach these defendants take in committing fraud,
the "auto accident scam" warrants treatment as a separate theory of fraud. In
1057 (1988); United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984, 989 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985);
United States v. Huckaby, 698 F.2d 915, 916 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983);
United States v. Rousseau, 534 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1976).
316. State v. Dean, 105 Wis. 2d 390, 392, 314 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
317. Sheriff v. Spagnola, 101 Nev. 508, 509, 706 P.2d 840, 841 (1985); State v. Greco, 29 N.J. 94,
96, 148 A.2d 164, 167 (1959).
318. See, e.g., State v. Griffon, 448 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. 1984); State v. McDermitt, 406 So. 2d
195, 198 (La. 1981); People v. Lee, 134 Mich. App. 278, 280, 351 N.W.2d 294, 296 (1984); Com-
monwealth v. Stein, 363 Pa. Super. 410, 412, 526 A.2d 411, 412 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, -
Pa. -, 546 A.2d 36 (1988).
319. People v. Alizadeh, 87 A.D.2d 418, 419, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (1982).
320. People v. Asar, 136 A.D.2d 712, 714, 523 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (1988).
321. People v. Kendzia, 103 A.D.2d 999, 478 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1984).
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these cases, health care providers will be only one of many actors.322
Most of these cases involve automobile accidents, but other types of acci-
dents, real or fabricated, also have been used to generate false insurance
claims.323 United States v. Perez,324 exemplifies the auto accident scam. In this
state-wide fraud, "recruiters" solicited "hitters" whose function was to drive the
"hitter" automobile in each collision.325 The driver of the hitter automobile was
to be liable for causing the accident.3 26 Drivers and riders were solicited to
occupy the target automobile. 327 Pregnant women were heavily recruited for
the target automobiles because they "could claim pregnancy related injuries
which would be both hard to disprove and easily settleable with the insurance
carriers."3 28 According to a prearranged schedule, the hitter vehicle would
strike the target vehicle. 329 The occupants of the target vehicle, feigning inju-
ries, would be sent to a particular doctor who would generate a medical history
for treatment of nonexistent injuries. 330 These individuals would then visit a
participating lawyer who would demand payment from the appropriate insur-
ance company. 33 1 As shown by one such scheme in Florida, which generated
over one million dollars per year,332 this type of fraud can be lucrative for its
participants.
There are many cases similar to Perez in which a staged automobile acci-
dent is part of the scheme to defraud. 333 In a few instances undercover officers
fabricated accidents and then went for treatment to physicians who were under
suspicion of participating in fraudulent schemes. 334 In most of the reported
cases, however, actual automobile accidents occurred and the individuals in-
volved were referred to the defendant-physician who generated the false insur-
322. See, eg., United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 145 (1st Cir. 1987) (attorney, chiroprac-
tor, internist); United States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167, 168 (10th Cir. 1980) (attorneys, doctors, auto-
mobile repairmen); United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1062 (7th Cir. 1972) (physician and
attorney); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn. 1980) (attorney was only defendant but physi-
cian was implicated), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132 (1981).
323. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982) (cafe bartender, patrons,
physician, and an attorney charged as coconspirators in a scheme to fabricate an accident at Ba-
nana's Cafe in Dallas, involving patrons of the cafe who claimed to be injured when a ceiling fan fell
on their table).
324. 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974).
325. Id. at 55.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. United States v. Del Valle, 587 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
333. See, eg., United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Strong, 702 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Kaplan, 470 F.2d 100, 101 (7th Cir.
1972) (reversed because of government's failure to disclose pertinent information), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 966 (1973); Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208, 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (reversed because
of prosecutor's comments).
334. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d. 1339, 1340 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1984); People v. Benson, 206 Cal. App. 2d 519, 522, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 908, 910 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Minn.
1980), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963).
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ance claims.335 In some of these cases the accident victims never knew false
insurance claims were generated or submitted;336 in other cases the accident
victims began to participate in the scheme after the accident had occurred. 337
One characteristic common to all cases prosecuted under this theory is that
there are always a number of participants in the fraud. This can be advanta-
geous for the prosecution. As the number of participants increases, so does the
opportunity to acquire as witnesses insiders who offer complete and accurate
views of the fraud scheme and the participants. 338 In addition, the prosecution
can use the conspiracy charge when there are multiple participants. This charge
allows the government to group the tangentially involved participants with those
involved more heavily. Moreover, a charge of conspiracy facilitates the intro-
duction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence such as statements of
coconspirators.3 39
Although the involvement of a number of participants is advantageous to
the prosecution in the above respects, multiple participants also create problems.
The first problem encountered in most conspiracy cases with many participants
is how to define the conspiracy. The second problem concerns the credibility of
insiders who have become government witnesses. A third problem, proving
each defendant's knowledge, is presented by many cases in which multiple de-
fendants are charged.
Determining whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is
335. United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Hershe-
now, 680 F.2d 847, 850 (lst Cir. 1982); United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d 563, 565 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353, 354 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1082 (1969); People v. Benson, 206 Cal. App. 2d 519, 23 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1962), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 806 (1963).
336. See, e.g., United States v. Reamer, 589 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 440 U.S.
980 (1979); United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir. 1977).
337. See, e.g., United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944
(1978).
338. See, e.g., Krowen, 809 F.2d at 145 (chiropractor and internist testified to attorney's involve-
ment); United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (passengers and drivers in
staged car accidents testified to defendant-physician's involvement); United States v. Strong, 702
F.2d 97, 99 (6th Cir. 1983) (same); Hershenow, 680 F.2d at 862 (accident victims and former busi-
ness partner of pharmacist provided testimony linking the pharmacist to scheme); United States v.
Lebovitz, 669 F.2d 894, 899-900 (3d Cir.) (physician in another, uncharged scheme with defendant
allowed to testify pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982);
United States v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980) (physi-
cian-coconspirator testified to attorney's involvement); United States v. Reamer, 589 F.2d 769, 770
n.3 (4th Cir. 1978) (convicted physician testified to attorney's involvement), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
980 (1979); United States v. Del Valle, 587 F.2d 699, 704 (5th Cir.) (secretaries of attorney testified
as to how scheme operated), cerL denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771,
774 (8th Cir. 1977) (chiropractor and accident victims testified as to attorney's role), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Perkal, 530 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.) (attorney testified to
physician's involvement), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976); Reicin, 497 F.2d at 565 (physician who
participated in the scheme testified to attorney's involvement); United States v. Silvern, 494 F.2d
355, 357 (7th Cir. 1973) (codefendants, physician, and police officer testified to attorney's involve-
ment); United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1062 (7th Cir. 1972) (physician pled guilty and
testified to attorney's involvement).
339. "A conspiracy charge is a favorite weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal. Among its other
attributes, it allows the introduction of otherwise inadmissible testimony." United States v. Nichols,
695 F.2d 86, 89 (5th Cir. 1982).
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crucial because a variance in the number of conspiracies charged and proven
could result in a reversal of the conviction. As the Supreme Court explained in
Kotteakos v. United States,3 4° "[t]he problem is not merely one of variance be-
tween indictment and proof, '34 1 but involves the "right" of a criminal defendant
"not to be tried en masse for the conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses
committed by others." 342 The Court noted that special caution was needed in
assessing the prejudice caused by improper pleading of the conspiracy charge
because of "the greater looseness generally allowed for specifying the [conspir-
acy] offense and its details, for receiving proof, and generally in the conduct of
the [conspiracy] trial." 343
Determining the number of conspiracies in the automobile accident scam
cases is especially difficult. The many participants in the fraud often have never
met each other. The fraud involves various types of transactions, such as the
automobile accidents, the hospital or doctor's office visits, the conference with
the attorney, and the submission of false claims. The automobile accident scam
often spans a large geographical area and time period. All of these characteris-
tics complicate a determination of the appropriate scope of a conspiracy charge.
United States v. Perez344 exemplifies this difficulty. In Perez twenty-one defend-
ants were named in the indictment and over fifty-five people participated in a
state-wide scheme including thirty-five staged automobile collisions, hundreds of
doctors' visits, and thousands of false claims over a nine month time period.345
One issue raised on appeal was whether the scheme constituted one conspiracy,
as charged, or multiple conspiracies. Defendants argued that the evidence
proved multiple conspiracies and that the variance between the proof and the
charge was fatal and necessitated reversal. 346 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the evidence established one conspiracy. 347
The court rejected the traditional "spokes, wheels, hubs, rims or chains" ap-
proach, 348 and stated that although "there is no requirement that every defend-
ant must participate in every transaction in order to find a single conspiracy...
the prohibited activity ... [must] be committed in furtherance of a common
objective." '349
The court found a common objective of all participants to use the mails to
defraud insurance companies through the staging of automobile collisions.
3 50
340. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
341. Id. at 774.
342. Id. at 775.
343. Id. at 776.
344. 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973).
345. Id. at 62 n.19, 83-84; see also United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381, 1384 (5th Cir. 1979)
(scheme spanned 5 1/2 years, had 11 participants, and involved 33 car accidents), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353, 355 (7th Cir. 1968) (in accidents over a 2
1/2 years period, 9 different law firms and 13 insurance companies victimized), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1082 (1969).
346. Perez, 489 F.2d at 57.
347. Id. at 61.
348. Id. at 64.
349. Id. at 62.
350. Id. at 58.
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The court also held that all the participants had to know that multiple collisions
were part of the scheme because otherwise the scheme could not be profitable.351
The court rejected the defense's argument that the various ways in which the
conspiracy was conducted indicated the existence of multiple conspiracies. In-
stead, this variety indicated to the court an intentional effort by the organizers to
avoid detection.352 The Fifth Circuit's single conspiracy position in Perez is typ-
ical of the position taken by most courts that have considered the scope of the
automobile accident scam. 353
The second problem encountered in prosecuting automobile accident scams
occurs when other participants in the scam ("insiders") testify as government
witnesses. Insiders often have criminal culpability and, whether or not given
immunity, their credibility will be attacked and may be suspect in the eyes of the
jury and court.354 One prosecutor candidly explained to a jury the problems of
"insider" witnesses:
The employees in many cases are the best evidence and the worst evi-
dence. They are the best evidence because they ... were there....
They ... knew what was happening, not only to the patients but [also]
to the Medicare claims being submitted to the Government. They are
the worst witnesses because whatever else you say about these people,
no matter how honestly they testified ... from the stand, at the time
this was going on they either participated in it or they saw it going on
and did nothing to stop it.355
A third problem in using this theory of prosecution is encountered in any
case with multiple participants. The prosecution must prove that all partici-
pants had actual knowledge of the criminal activity. Participants may assert
that they were blindly led by the other participants. 356 As shown in United
States v. Drury,357 such a defense may have merit. After a bench trial, the court
acquitted defendant of conspiracy charges because the government had failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew of the fraud committed
351. Id. at 63-64.
352. Id. at 63.
353. Cf. United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381, 1384 (5th Cir. 1979) (government brought one
count of conspiracy relating to 33 different accident victims against 11 defendants), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 834 (3d Cir.) (all transactions part of one
scheme to defraud insurer), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978).
354. See, eg., United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1973) (codefendant im-
peached with contradictions in his testimony and disclosure of his guilty plea), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
989 (1974).
355. United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1122 n. 1(5th Cir. 1979). The jury convicted the
physician-defendant on 71 counts of Medicare fraud. Id. at 1121.
356. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86, 93 (5th Cir. 1982) (physician claimed to be
an innocent bystander who had no knowledge of the conspiracy); United States v. Witschner, 624
F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir.) (attorney blamed physician for the scheme), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980); Boscia, 573 F.2d at 834 (physician argued that he knew nothing of the staged accidents);
United States v. Perkal, 530 F.2d 604, 607-08 (4th Cir.) (physician blamed scheme on attorney), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976); United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir.) (attorney
blamed scheme on physician), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); United States v. Silvern, 494 F.2d
355, 360 (7th Cir. 1973) (in an interesting twist, defendant-attorney argued that his coconspirator's
testimony should not be credited because the coconspirator was not fully informed of the entire
scheme).
357. 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 943 (1983).
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by the other defendants. 358 In United States v. Shuford 359 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction of an attorney
who allegedly participated in an automobile accident scam. The court found
that the attorney had been prohibited from producing evidence showing he had
not known about the false medical bills submitted by a coconspirator. 360
Generally, however, a common pattern of accidents, treatments, or claims
will overcome such a claim of ignorance of illegality. For example, in United
States v. Perez361 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
jected defendant-physicians' claims that they were misled by their patients. 362
The court found such a defense incredible given the common characteristics of
the patients and the medical care rendered. The court stated, "The appellant
doctors were repeatedly visited by uninjured patients complaining of similar
neck and back related injuries sustained in rearend collisions in the same general
locale and repeatedly referred to them by the same lawyers. For these nonexis-
tent injuries minimal treatment was administered and inflated bills were
submitted. 363
Federal prosecutors have charged accident scam participants with mail
fraud 364 and conspiracy. 365 State prosecutors have pursued accident scam fraud
as a theft offense 366 or as presentation of a false insurance claim.3
67
In summary, the "automobile accident scam" is a well-developed fraud usu-
ally involving many participants over a large geographical area and extended
358. Id. at 64; cf. United States v. Dumas, 688 F.2d 84, 87-88 (10th Cir. 1982) (although this
case was prosecuted using the "Rx by fraud" theory, the reversal aptly demonstrates what occurs
when there is inadequate evidence of a defendant's awareness of the scope of an alleged conspiracy).
359. 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971).
360. Id. at 779-80.
361. 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974).
362. Id. at 77.
363. Id. at 73; see also United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 679 (1st Cir. 1987) (court rejected
attorney's claim that he did not know of the falsity of medical claims he submitted on behalf of
patients allegedly involved in car accidents), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1080 (1988); United States v.
Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 834 (3d Cir.) (court rejected claim by physician that he did not know accidents
and injuries were faked), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978).
364. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 145 (1st Cir.
1987); United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Strong, 702
F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 943 (1983); United States v. Perkal, 530 F.2d 604, 605 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Reicin, 497 F.2d 563, 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); United States v. Medansky,
486 F.2d 807, 808 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. Kaplan, 470
F.2d 100, 101 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973); United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d
1061, 1062 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353, 353 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1082 (1969).
365. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Strong, 102 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63,
64 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 943 (1983); United States v. Kaplan, 470 F.2d 100, 100-01
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973).
366. See Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208, 209 (Fla. 1979) (grand larceny and conspiracy);
State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn. 1980) (attempted theft and conspiracy to commit same),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132 (1981).
367. People v. Benson, 206 Cal. App. 2d 519, 520, 23 Cal. Rptr 908, 908 (1962) (conspiracy to
present a false or fraudulent insurance claim and presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963).
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time period. All such frauds proceed in a similar manner: after a legitimate or
staged automobile accident, false medical information is provided to generate
false insurance claims. This theory is one of the easier theories to prove because
of the straightforward nature of the fraud and the many participants in the
scheme. The conspiracy charge and its advantages to a prosecutor generally will
be available. Moreover, insider-witnesses are often available to describe the
fraud and provide valuable insights into the scam's operation. Insiders also can
describe the various defendants' knowledge of and participation in the fraud. To
the extent these insiders may have engaged in criminal activity themselves their
credibility will be diminished. Nevertheless, as long as a defendant's knowledge
of the fraud can be shown, either through circumstantial evidence as referred to
in Perez or through more direct evidence, this theory will be strong for the
prosecution.
E. "Quackery"." Misprepresenting Credentials or Remedies
Another theory for prosecuting fraud in the health care field focuses solely
on the misrepresentations made by the health care provider to patients or poten-
tial patients. Unlike the other theories discussed thus far, this theory identifies
the patient as the victim of the fraud. As one court explained:
[It is important to protect] people from the quacks who would deceive
them into thinking they are receiving medical relief when, in reality,
they are being deprived of their money without the remotest possibility
of cure. This type of quackery also [harms] people who may be or are
in dire need of competent aid by their either delaying or foregoing
proper treatment. These ill people think they are being cured, when, in
fact, they are receiving no real help. 368
These misrepresentations are of two types: misrepresentations of medical cre-
dentials, and misrepresentations of the prophylactic or curative value of prod-
ucts or treatment.
United States v. Vecchiarello369 and United States v. Maturo370 exemplify
the first type of misrepresentation. The defendants in these cases, one of whom
was a disbarred attorney, were convicted on fraud charges for falsely represent-
ing themselves to be properly trained and licensed physicians. 37 1 In United
States v. Smith 372 a physician falsely represented himself to be a specialist in
nervous diseases. Affirming his fraud conviction, the court of appeals noted that
defendant provided patients with false diagnoses of serious ailments to "induce
them to part with their money for the defendant's benefit." 37
3
368. State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602, 605-06 (Utah 1976).
369. 536 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1976), remanded and aff'd, 569 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
370. 536 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1976), remanded and aff'd, 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
371. United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656, 656-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For other cases in
which a lay person has held himself out to be a healing professional, see United States v. De Welles,
345 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.) (chiropractor), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833 (1965); United States v. Lott, 630
F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.) (nurse), aff'd, 795 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1986); People v. Varas, 110 A.D.2d 646,
487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1985) (physician); Hoffman, 558 P.2d at 603 (nurse).
372. 222 F. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
373. Id. at 166.
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The more prevalent method of fraud charged under this theory is the mis-
representation of the prophylactic or curative value of medicines, equipment, or
treatment. These cases are a testament to the ingenuity and gullibility of human
beings. One defendant was convicted for advertising and selling "oxypathors," a
device that purportedly "begets in reality a supplementary breathing through
the skins and membranes of the human body... ; increases the amount of
oxygen consumed by the body ... ; increas[es] vital combustion and the circula-
tion ... ; [and] causes the body to attract oxygen from the air."'3 74 Another
defendant was convicted on fraud charges for marketing "a wonder treatment
that restores flagging vital forces .... [It] restore[s] lost and depleted vigor ....
Men in their 60's, 70's, and 80's [have declared that it] has renewed their vigor,
awakened their glands and made them young again."'375 Several defendants
were convicted for fraudulently representing that they had a treatment that
would cure "piles, rupture, prostate, varicose veins and numerous other diseases
and ailments. '376 These same "physicians" detected cancer in their patients by
"palpation, feeling of it and guessing whether the patient had it or not."'3 77 An-
other defendant, convicted for misrepresenting that his clinics could cure cancer,
diagnosed cancer using a machine called a "digitron," which was operated as
follows:
The patient would hold onto a white square plate attached to the digi-
tron with two wires. The operator would hold a pendulum in his right
hand and swing it over the machine .... The digitron then purport-
edly diagnosed how much malignancy the patient had.... Sometime
before the end of the treatment, the patient would be told that the
digitron showed the malignancy level in his or her body to be zero.3 78
As part of this same course of treatment, some patients were told to rub their
feet with castor oil and put on white cotton socks in order to draw out dead
cancer cells. 379
To convict a defendant under a theory of "quackery," three elements must
be proved: (1) that representations as to the defendant's credentials or the pro-
phylactic or curative qualities of a treatment were made; (2) that the representa-
tions were false; and (3) that the defendant knew the representations were false
at the time they were made or acted with reckless indifference as to whether the
representations were false. 380
Proving the first element is not difficult. Although the reported cases gener-
ally do not discuss the manner in which misrepresentations of professional status
374. Moses v. United States, 221 F. 863, 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 629 (1915).
375. Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575, 576 (8th Cir. 1928).
376. Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1941).
377. Id. at 539.
378. United States v. Keller, 784 F.2d 1296, 1297 (8th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
379. Id; see also United States v. Taller, 394 F.2d 435, 436-37 (2d Cir.) ("calories don't count"
weight control program), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839 (1968); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d
423, 427 (2d Cir. 1966) ("wonder drug for fat people"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
380. See West v. United States, 68 F.2d 96, 96-97 (10th Cir. 1933); United States v. Stunz, 27
F.2d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 1928); United States v. Moses, 221 F. 863, 867 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238
U.S. 629 (1915).
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or skills are made, apparently the mere fact that individuals falsely represent
themselves to the public as healing professionals is sufficient to prove this ele-
ment.3 8 1 Proving that defendants misrepresented the prophylactic or curative
quality of a treatment is easy when the misrepresentations are explicit and verifi-
able. In every reported case this was true: the misrepresentations were made in
written literature or advertisements, 382 or were made orally to numerous
people. 383
Proving the remaining elements of the "quackery" theory, however, may be
more difficult. As one court noted: "The so-called quack remedy of to-day may
be hailed tomorrow as an absolute cure, and vice versa."' 384 Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that a remedy is a fraud is difficult if the evidence shows
merely a conflict of medical opinion. West v. United States385 illustrates this.
Finding the evidence of fraud to be insufficient, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction of West, a pharmacist found
by a jury to have committed mail fraud by falsely representing that a certain
solution would cure syphillis and other blood impurities. 386 The expert wit-
nesses called by the Government testified that in their opinion the solution was
not a cure for syphillis and was not currently recognized as a cure. These ex-
perts acknowledged, however, that this solution had been considered by the
medical profession to be a cure for syphillis as recently as twenty-three years
prior. In addition, medical publications and testimony by the codefendant-phy-
sician who used this solution on his patients established that the solution had
some therapeutic value.3 87 Thus, while expert testimony is essential to prove
this theory, such testimony should clearly and unequivocally demonstrate that
the treatment at issue has no redeeming curative value. The more bizarre and
unorthodox the alleged remedy, the easier it will be to show the falsity of the
representations about the remedy.
Proving the third element of "quackery," that the defendant was aware of
the falsity of the representations, is not difficult when defendants have misrepre-
sented their professional credentials. When defendants are charged with misrep-
resenting the curative ability of a treatment or equipment, however, proving
such knowledge can be more problematic. Similar to the second element, prov-
ing a defendant's knowledge that a cure is quackery is easier when the alleged
treatment is bizarre. Testimony by employees or patients of a defendant about
the defendant's tactics can help prove this knowledge of fraud. In United States
v. Andreadis388 defendant operated a drug company that produced and mar-
381. United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656, 656-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Hoff-
man, 558 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah 1976).
382. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 115 F.2d 533, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 692 (1941); Stunz, 27 F.2d at 577; Moses, 221 F. at 866.
383. See, e.g., Baker, 115 F.2d at 536; People v. Varas, 110 A.D.2d 646, 648, 487 N.Y.S.2d 577,
579 (1985).
384. Stunz, 27 F.2d at 578.
385. 68 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1933).
386. Id. at 97-98.
387. Id. at 97.
388. 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
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keted what he alleged to be a "wonder drug for fat people."'3 89 Individuals in
defendant's television advertisements offered personal testimony of substantial
weight loss while "eating the foods they normally ate and 'without dieting.' "390
These individuals testified at trial, however, that as the defendant well knew,
they lost large amounts of weight by drastically reducing their caloric intake.391
Insiders also can provide evidence of statements made by a defendant during the
quackery scheme that are conclusive evidence of the defendant's knowledge.392
In most federal cases prosecuted under this theory defendants are charged
with mail fraud, 393 although prosecutors have also used charges of conspir-
acy, 394 wire fraud, 395 misbranding of controlled substances,3 96 and making false
statements. 397 State prosecutions have relied upon statutes prohibiting the prac-
tice of medicine without a license.398
In summary, the "quackery" theory, which is the only theory that consist-
ently identifies the patient as the victim of a health care provider's fraud, has
been used for two types of misrepresentations: misrepresentations of profes-
sional credentials and, misrepresentations of the prophylactic or curative ability
of a course of treatment. To prevail on either use of this theory the prosecutor
must prove that the defendant knowingly misrepresented facts. This is not diffi-
cult when the the defendant has misrepresented his professional credentials. It
is more difficult when the alleged misrepresentation concerns the value of a
treatment. The ambiguous nature of medicine and our resulting inability to de-
termine categorically what is a proper practice of medicine makes it difficult to
prove that a treatment does not have some curative ability. Bizarre remedies
and representations, as well as testimony by employees and patients of a defend-
ant indicating the defendant's knowledge that its representations were false, will
help overcome these problems.
F. False Cost Reports
A sixth type of fraud committed by health care providers is the filing of
false cost reports. Nursing homes, hospitals, and certain other health care prov-
iders who participate in Medicare or Medicaid are required to file annual cost
389. Id. at 427.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 427 n.6, 429 n.8.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 380-83.
393. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Maturo, 536 F.2d 427, 427 (D.C. Cir.
1976); see also Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir.) (precursor to mail fraud statute),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1944).
394. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Taller, 394 F.2d 435, 437 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 839 (1968); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
395. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Keller, 784 F.2d 1296, 1297 (5th Cir.
1986); Andreadis, 366 F.2d at 423.
396. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(b) (1982); see, e.g., Andreadis, 366 F.2d at 423.
397. 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp 611, 612 (E.D.
Va. 1986).
398. People v. Varas, 110 A.D.2d 646,487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1985); State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602,
603 (Utah 1976).
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reports to obtain reimbursement for services rendered to Medicare -or Medicaid
patients.399 The amount due to the provider is based on a formula that incorpo-
rates the costs incurred by the provider in rendering patientcare.4° ° The pro-
vider is instructed that it will be reimbursed only on the basis of costs related to
patient care.4° 1 Providers have committed fraud in the cost reports in three
ways: (1) by including expenses that are not related to patient care; (2) by inflat-
ing expenses that are related to patient care; and (3) by failing to disclose the
related status of business entities with whom the provider is dealing.
United States v. Smith402 exemplifies the first of the above cost report
frauds. Defendant in Smith was President and Chairman of the Board of a non-
profit hospital. As a Medicare provider the hospital was required to submit an-
nual cost reports. Defendant included in the hospital's cost report expenses for
remodeling his personal residence, and payments totalling $67,000 to his nephew
for services not rendered. 4° 3 The cost report described these expenses as "com-
mercial" expenses,4° 4 "general hospital expenses,"'4 5 or expenses incurred for
"patient care."' 4° 6 In another case of this type, the President of a nursing home
was convicted for including as nursing home patient expenses the marina serv-
ices for his yacht and the repair costs for his residential swimming pool.4 °7
United States v. Collins4°8 exemplifies the second type of cost report fraud,
in which the provider inflates the patient care expenses. In Collins the owner
and operator of a nursing home submitted a cost report in which various ex-
penses, all related to patient care, were inflated by even amounts (such as $5,000
or $10,000) for each category of expenses. 40 9 The fraud in the cost report was
proven simply by comparing the expenses listed on the tax returns of the nursing
home to the expenses listed on the cost report.4 10 In most instances falsification
of patient expenses will not be so blatant, and comparison to underlying docu-
399. 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(a), (b) (1987); 2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 4 7414, 7420 (Dec. 1985). When the cost reporting forms are not available the deadline for
filing cost reports can be extended. See 4 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) t% 35,537, 35,562
(Aug. 1986); id. 35,068 (Jan. 1986); id. t 34,403 (Dec. 1984).
400. A summary of the type of costs properly included is contained at 1 Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 5852 (Jan. 1986).
401. 42 C.F.R. § 413.9(c)(3) (1987); 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 5852 (Jan. 1986).
402. 523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
403. Id. at 777-78.
404. Id. at 778.
405. Id. at 776.
406. Id. at 777 n.14.
407. United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also United States v. Celia,
568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978) (hospital administrator and officers convicted for representing that
political expenses and contributions to candidates for state office were hospital expenses related to
patient care); Commonwealth v. Minkin, 14 Mass. App. 911, 436 N.E.2d 955 (nursing home admin-
istrators convicted for including as nursing home expenses $26,000 for renovations to their family
summer home and the salaries of nursing home employees who served as maids and babysitters in
their private home), cert. denied, 386 Mass. 1104, 438 N.E.2d 75 (1982).
408. 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1979).
409. Id. at 168; see also McKennie v. State, 439 So. 2d 706 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (affirmed
conviction of defendant for filing a falsified claim for payment), rev'd on other grounds, 439 So. 2d
713 (Ala. 1983).
410. Collins, 596 F.2d at 167-68.
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mentation will be fequired to discover and prove the falsification. Resorting to
these underlying documents complicates a plaintiff's case but also strengthens
the proof of fraud. In United States v. Jones,411 for example, false "Plans of
Treatment" and nurses' reports had been generated to support the false claims
made to Medicare by a home nursing association. The evidence showed that
defendants, the owners and operators of the association, directed the creation of
these false documents. 412 These instructions helped prove defendants' criminal
intent and involvement.
Commonwealth v. Cerveny 413 is another example of fraudulent inflation of
expenses, but in a context other than a fraud designed to obtain immediate cost
reimbursement. In addition to establishing the amount a provider is reimbursed
at the end of a fiscal year, cost reports are used to derive the per patient per diem
rate at which a provider receives subsequent interim payments. Some of the
financial information requested on cost reports, therefore, is relevant only to the
calculation of the per diem rate. Defendant Cerveny and four corporations he
owned falsified some of this financial information to secure a higher per diem
rate. Under Cerveny's direction each nursing home falsely increased its "cash
on hand" when filing the annual cost reports for each nursing home. The effect
of this falsification was to increase the stated equity of each nursing home, which
in turn increased the per diem rate.414
The third type of cost report fraud prosecuted using this theory is based on
regulations that require providers to disclose on the cost report any related or-
ganization415 with which the provider is doing business. 416 When a provider
receives goods or services from an unrelated party, the provider is reimbursed
for its "reasonable" costs. 417 In contrast, when the provider purchases goods or
services from a related organization, it is reimbursed only for the cost of "com-
parable items." that could have been purchased elsewhere. 418 In United States v.
Alemany Rivera419 defendants were convicted in part for filing cost reports in
which they failed to reveal that the hospital at which they were employed was
purchasing equipment and furniture from an organization of which they were
officers and employees. 420 Because of this omission the hospital was reimbursed
at a higher rate than allowed. Affirming the district court's conviction, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pointed out that the evi-
dence must show that the parties were in fact related; otherwise there can be no
411. 587 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1979).
412. Id. at 804.
413. 373 Mass. 345, 367 N.E.2d 802 (1977).
414. Id. at 348-49, 367 N.E.2d at 805.
415. The term "related to the provider means that the provider to a significant extent is associ-
ated with or affiliated with or has control of or is controlled by the organization furnishing the
services, facilities, or supplies." 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(b)(1) (1987).
416. 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 5677 (Apr. 1988).
417. 42 C.F.R. § 413.1(b) (1987); 2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) I 7223-24 (Sept. 30,
1986); id. f 7225 (Jan. 21, 1988).
418. 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 5679 (Apr. 1988).
419. 781 F.2d 229 (lst Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1086 (1986).
420. Id. at 231.
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finding of criminal intent to deceive. In this instance the court found the evi-
dence of relatedness, and the interlocking of officers and employees, to be
"overwhelming." 421
United States v. Huber422 presents an imaginative way to use the false cost
report theory. Defendant, an owner and operator of a medical supply company,
was charged with causing six hospitals to submit cost reports containing fraudu-
lently inflated expenses.423 Without the hospitals' knowledge, defendant inflated
the costs of the supplies he sold to the hospitals424 and charged for fabricated
freight costs. 425 Believing these to be legitimate charges, the hospitals listed
them on their cost reports.4 26 At trial defendant offered a weak explanation:
"his purpose, if any, was only to defraud the hospitals, not the government."
42 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion as well as this use of the cost report theory of fraud.
42 8
Cost report cases present problems for the prosecution. One problem is
proving that the cost report actually included the improper expense. Generally,
this is an accounting issue and the accountant preparing the cost report will
need to testify as to how particular expenses are recorded in the expense pro-
vider's journal and carried forward to the cost report. 429 If the books, records,
or testimony needed to prove this fact are unavailable, it will not be possible to
pursue this theory.
Another problem with this theory is proving that the defendant, who sel-
dom personally records expenses in the corporate books or prepares the cost
report, was familiar enough with the accounting procedure utilized to know that
the improper expense was actually included as a proper expense in the cost re-
port. In United States v. Smith 430 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was confronted with this knowledge issue and explained what evi-
dence would suffice to prove it:
It is not necessary that [defendant] have known which line was incor-
rect when he approved the [cost report] forms, nor that he be able to
properly fill out the forms himself.... It suffices that he understood
the forms necessarily to include expenses which were not those of the
hospital, and that a percentage of the amount claimed would be reim-
bursed erroneously to the hospital from [the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare]. 4 31
Defendant's knowledge can be shown circumstantially. For example,
421. Id. at 233.
422. 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
423. Id. at 397.
424. Id. at 398.
425. Id. at 391.
426. Id. at 398.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 400.
429. Cf. United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1977) (controller of hospital testi-
fied to accounting entries resulting from instructions given to him by defendant-officer of hospital).
430. 523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
431. Id. at 780.
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knowledge has been proved with the following types of evidence: that the de-
fendant knew the general method by which the Medicare reimbursement pro-
gram worked;432 that the defendant approved all checks for the improper
expenses and these checks were taken to him for his approval with the respective
invoices; 433 that the defendant accepted delivery and endorsed many of the
checks payable for improper expenses; 434 that the defendant's exculpatory ex-
planations for how these expenses were handled were contradicted by the
facts;435 and that the defendant failed to supply his accountant with accurate
information or instructions.4 36 Proving that supporting documentation has been
falsified to help conceal the misrepresentation in the cost report may help
demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of fraud. For this to be successful there
must be credible evidence that the defendant directed or participated in the falsi-
fication. Finally, it should be noted that when employees of the defendant are
used to provide evidence of the defendant's knowledge, the prosecution may en-
counter the credibility problems noted above with respect to insiders.4 37
Another problem presented by this theory is how to plead the offense prop-
erly. As with the other theories discussed in this Article, any number of crimi-
nal statutes may be used to charge this fraud. When prosecuted in the federal
courts, defendants who have made fraudulent cost reports have been charged
with making false statements, 438 mail fraud,439 conspiracy, 440 transporting in
interstate commerce money obtained by fraud,44 RICO, 442 theft of government
property, 44 3 tax evasion,444 and filing false tax returns and aiding and abetting in
their preparation. 445 States have charged defendants with attempted larceny by
432. See, eg., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980); Smith, 523 F.2d at 774; Commonwealth v. Minkin, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 914, 436
N.E.2d 955, 958 (1982).
433. See, e.g., Smith, 523 F.2d at 775.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 409-12.
435. In Smith, for example, defendant claimed that the diaper service was a "fringe benefit." 523
F.2d at 777. He was, however, the only hospital employee receiving such a fringe benefit and the
expense was not charged to the fringe benefit account but to the hospital's "commercial" account.
Id. Furthermore, defendant claimed that the hospital funds he used for home improvement were a
loan from the hospital to him. Id. at 775. The hospital's financial records, however, failed to reveal
such a loan to defendant, although it did reflect when loans were made to other employees. Id.
436. United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1977); Minkin, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at
913-14, 436 N.E.2d at 958.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 354-65.
438. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982); see, ag., United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 231 (1st
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1086 (1986); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1979); Cella, 568 F.2d at 1277; Smith, 523
F.2d at 773; United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Braun-
stein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1978).
439. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see, e.g., Huber, 603 F.2d at 390; United States v. Collins, 596
F.2d 166, 167 (6th Cir. 1979); Cella, 568 F.2d at 1277; Simon, 510 F. Supp. at 233.
440. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); see, e.g., Huber, 603 F.2d at 390; Jones, 587 F.2d at 804; Celia, 568
F.2d at 1277; United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1977); Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. at 3.
441. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982); see, e.g., Huber, 603 F.2d at 390.
442. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982); see, e.g., Huber, 603 F.2d at 390.
443. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982); see, e.g., Celia, 568 F.2d at 1277.
444. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982); see, e.g., Celia, 568 F.2d at 1277; United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d
771, 773 (5th Cir. 1975).
445. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(l)-(2) (1987); see, e.g., Celia, 568 F.2d at 1277; Smith, 523 F.2d at 773.
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false pretense,44 6 Medicaid fraud,447 theft,448 conspiracy, 449 and falsifying busi-
ness records.450 Prosecution under any of these statutes may present problems of
multiplicity and duplicity. Multiplicity is charging a single offense in several
counts. Duplicity is joining in a single count two or more offenses.451 A mul-
tiplicitous indictment may be dismissed because it subjects a defendant to double
jeopardy.452 A duplicitous indictment may be dismissed because of the danger
that the jury would "find a defendant guilty on a count without having reached a
unanimous verdict on the commission of a particular offense." 453 Properly
pleading the offense may be difficult in fraud cases in which one document con-
tains multiple false statements;454 false cost reports are a prime example of this
difficulty. The general rule is that as long as different facts are needed to prove
each false statement, each false statement is a separate count.455 In most cost
report cases one cost report for one fiscal year is one count.456
A special problem regarding related organizations that may occur in prose-
cutions of cost report fraud is assessing the value of the health care services.
Even if the prosecutor is able to prove that the parties were related under the
applicable definitions and that this information was not disclosed on the cost
report, a jury is unlikely to convict the defendant unless the prosecutor also can
prove that the provider received unallowable funds by failing to disclose the
related status. The unallowable amount is the difference between "reasonable
cost" and "cost of comparable items." Because of the ambiguous and emotional
nature of health care services, it can be difficult to appraise "reasonable cost" as
well as the "cost of comparable items." Unlike appraisals of real or personal
property, an appraisal of the fair market value of a medical service is difficult to
determine. The appraiser must assess a highly technical field in which there are
few clear conclusions or certainties. The valuation necessarily will turn on a
subjective determination of the value of health, the quality of the service, and the
skill of the provider. When related party status is concealed, therefore, it is
difficult to assess "reasonable cost" or "cost of comparable items" and thus show
446. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 373 Mass. 345, 347, 367 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1977);
United States v. Minkin, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 911, 436 N.E.2d 955, 957 (1982); People v. Notey,
72 A.D.2d 279, 280, 423 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948 (1980).
447. See, e.g., Greco v. State, 307 Md. 470, 472, 515 A.2d 220, 221 (1986); Minkin, 14 Mass.
App. Ct. at 911, 436 N.E.2d at 955.
448. Greco, 307 Md. at 472, 515 A.2d at 221.
449. Notey, 72 A.D.2d at 279, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
450. Id.
451. United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966
(1977); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 142 (1982).
452. United States v. Conn, 716 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1983).
453. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d at 835; see United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); United States v. Aguilar, 756 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
454. 9 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-40.170 (1985); id. §§ 9-
42.220 to .221 (1984).
455. See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); United States v.
Schrenzel, 462 F.2d 765, 771 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984 (1972).
456. United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 231 (1st Cir. 1985); McKennie v. State, 439
So. 2d 706, 707 (Ala. 1982); Greco v. State, 65 Md. App. 56, 57, 499 A.2d 209, 211 (1985), aff'd, 307
Md. 470, 515 A.2d 220 (1986).
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some financial injury, which makes this third type of cost report fraud particu-
larly difficult to prove.
In conclusion, the "false cost report" theory is appropriate when a provider
files a cost report that contains false information. Three factual patterns of
fraud routinely occur in cost reports: (1) falsely representing that personal ex-
penses are expenses related to patient care; (2) exaggerating the amount of pa-
tient care expenses; and (3) failing to disclose the related party status of an entity
with whom the provider is doing business. The pleading problems noted in use
of this theory are insignificant compared to other problems such as following
complex and voluminous accounting entries for which the evidence may not be
available and proving the defendant's involvement in and knowledge of the
fraud. Because of these latter two problems this theory is one of the most diffi-
cult to prove and historically has been used very little.45 7
G. Illegal Remunerations
Unlike the other theories of fraud that can be prosecuted under a variety of
statutes, the theory of illegal remunerations can be prosecuted federally only
pursuant to the specific statutory authority of 42 U.S.C. section 1320a-7b. This
statute makes it an offense to
knowingly and willfully solicit[ ] or receive[ ] any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind-(A) in return for referring an individual
to a person for the furnishing... of any items or service .... or (B) in
return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recom-
mending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or
item.458
Section 1320a-7b also makes it an offense to
knowingly and willfully offer[] or pay[] any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or co-
vertly, in cash or in kind to any person-(A) to induce such person to
refer any individual to a person for the furnishing ... of an item or
service .... or (B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recom-
mend purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or
item.459
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit described the
harm that this statutory prohibition was designed to curtail: "[K]ickback
schemes can freeze competing suppliers from the system, can mask the possibil-
ity of government price reductions, can misdirect program funds, and, when
proportional, can erect strong temptations to order more drugs and supplies
than needed."'460
457. See supra Table 1 accompanying notes 214-22.
458. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988) (previously codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395nn(b)(1), 1396h(b)(l) (1982)).
459. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988) (previously codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395nn(b)(2), 1396(b)(2) (1982)).
460. United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 n.9 (7th Cir. 1980).
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The types of payments that have been held to be illegal remunerations in-
clude fees paid to physicians by medical laboratories to induce referrals of pa-
tient specimens, 46 1 payments made to hospital or nursing home personnel by
durable medical equipment companies to induce the purchase of equipment and
supplies, 462 and payments in addition to the allowable Medicaid rate made by
families of Medicaid patients to nursing home administrators to secure a place
for the patient in the nursing home.463
The facts of the cases prosecuted under this theory are rarely in dispute.
Investigated primarily by undercover officers, the transactions are often re-
corded by audio or video equipment.464 There is generally no question as to
whether the payments were solicited or accepted by the provider or whether the
referral was made. The difficulty with these cases is in determining whether the
payment at issue was illegal.
The earliest reported cases utilizing this theory dealt with a question of
statutory interpretation that was settled by the 1977 amendments to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395nn(b) and 1396h(b), which are now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. section
1320a-7b(b). The controversy concerned whether the payments admittedly
made to the providers were "kickbacks or bribes" within the meaning of the
statute. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits
narrowly construed the statutory language and reversed convictions on the
ground that the payments were not "kickbacks or bribes" within the statutory
prohibitions. 465 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits rejected this narrow construc-
tion and affirmed convictions, finding that the payments were within the statu-
tory prohibitions. 466 In 1977 the statutory language was amended. Prior to the
amendment these statutes prohibited, in pertinent part, soliciting, offering, or
receiving any "kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such items
or services." '467 After the 1977 amendment these statutes prohibited soliciting,
offering, or receiving "any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or re-
bate).., in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing... of
461. United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Tapert, 625
F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999,
1001 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); cf. United States v. Universal Trade & Indus., 695
F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 1983) (clinical laboratory run by defendant held stock in second corpora-
tion and was paid a percentage of the corporation's gross revenues as an incentive for clinic to refer
work to the corporation).
462. United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661, 662 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084
(1981); Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d at 174; United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. 1560, 1561 (D. Mass.
1986).
463. United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
464. See, eg., Universal Trade and Indus., 695 F.2d at 1152; United States v. Stewart Clinical
Laboratory, Inc., 652 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Labora-
tory, Inc., 650 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1981).
465. United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979); Zacher, 586 F.2d at 917.
466. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d at 176; United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111, 121 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (analyzing the statutory interpre-
tation issue), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d I 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1034 (1980).
467. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)(1), 1396h(b)(1) (1977) (emphasis added) (recodified as amended at
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 1988)).
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any item or service."'468 Although this broader language effectively resolved
some questions regarding the illegality of payments for referrals, it left unan-
swered other questions concerning the terms "remuneration," "referral," "indi-
vidual," and "service."
Questions arise concerning the term remuneration because the physician
making the referral may also supply services regarding the referral. If the remu-
neration is solely legitimate reimbursement for services provided, there is no
offense. Thus, the issue becomes whether the remuneration is legitimate reim-
bursement for services rendered, or is an illegitimate kickback.469 United States
v. Lipkis470 demonstrates this problem. In Lipkis a medical clinic received pay-
ments from a medical laboratory in the form of a percentage of the revenue
generated by the business referred to the laboratory by the clinic. The clinic
provided the laboratory with some services, "including collecting specimens,
spinning down blood, supplying forms and stickers, and carrying insurance. '47 1
Defendant argued that the remuneration received was reimbursement for these
services and not remuneration for the referral.472 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court assessed the fair market
value of the services provided by the clinic and found it to be "substantially less"
than the referral payments. The court stated there was "no question that [the
laboratory] was paying for the referrals as well as the described services." '473
This approach is consistent with that taken by the Third Circuit the same
year in United States v. Greber.474 In Greber the payments at issue were also, in
part, reimbursement for services rendered. Doctor Greber, president of the lab-
oratory that made the payments, argued that absent proof that the "only pur-
pose behind a fee was to improperly induce future services" there was no
violation of the statute.475 The Third Circuit disagreed, stating that "if one pur-
pose behind a fee was to improperly induce future referrals" the statute was
violated.4 76 In Greber the Government was able to prove that one purpose of
the payment was to induce referrals by presenting evidence that the payment
exceeded the value of the actual service rendered.477
The prosecution's problem with this approach is that it must prove the fair
market value of the service rendered. As noted, appraising the value of medical
services is difficult because of the unique character of health care. This appraisal
problem may complicate the task of proving that the remuneration exceeds the
fair market value of services provided and thus that these statutes have been
violated.
468. Id. (Supp. 11 1978) (emphasis added).
469. Clearly, the problem does not arise when a defendant admits that the remuneration is for
the referral. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980).
470. 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985).
471. Id. at 1449.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
475. Id. at 71.
476. Id. at 69.
477. Id. at 70.
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The second term in section 1320a-7b(b) that makes prosecution difficult is
referral. By prohibiting remunerations for referrals this statute is both too broad
and too narrow. It is too broad because, taken literally, the statute prohibits
legitimate activity. Hospitals have always given indirect remunerations for re-
ferrals by providing its physicians who have admitting privileges "perks" such as
free office space, discounts for hospital care rendered to the physician's family,
and the "cheap labor" of residents available at teaching hospitals who can sub-
stantially reduce the admitting physician's workload.4 78 In addition, taken liter-
ally, the ban on payments for referrals penalizes the behavior encouraged by cost
containment measures. The HMO demonstrates this. HMOs (as do many
group practices) have guidelines regarding referrals by its care providers. Many
of these guidelines seek to reduce unnecessary medical services. The provider
must comply with these guidelines as a condition of employment. Because the
provider is paid by the group practice, the provider's salary remunerates the
provider when his referral decision comports with these guidelines. Although
one would expect prosecutors to use judgment and reason in deciding which
remunerations for referrals cross the line of legality, it is not fair or appropriate
for a criminal statute to provide such little guidance to providers or prosecutors.
Overbreadth is not the only problem with a prohibition that focuses solely
on payments for "referrals." Such a prohibition is also too narrow to cover
abuses that may occur because of the incentive of Prospective Payment Systems
(PPS) to underprovide necessary services. In fact, Congress recognized the
inappropriately narrow scope of this statutory prohibition and extended it in
1986 to cover payments that serve as "an inducement to reduce or limit serv-
ices" to Medicare patients. 479 This latest amendment, however, is still too nar-
row. It provides only civil sanctions, not criminal. Criminal penalties should be
available for the egregious instances when payments are given or accepted for
intentionally limiting or reducing necessary services so as to maximize reim-
bursement. More importantly, this amendment by its terms does not prohibit
payments that induce abuses other than limiting or reducing services, such as
improper hospital admitting or transferring practices.480
The second problem with the 1986 amendment is that it is also too broad.
By failing to utilize sufficiently precise language it proscribes practices that PPS
478. See generally Comment, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments:
Their Impact on the Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY L.J. 691, 727-28 (1987) (referring to
some of the "perks" hospitals have traditionally given physicians).
479. Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9313(c)(1)(E), 100 Stat.
2003 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986)).
480. See infra text accompanying notes 569-75. For authorities addressing the potential for
abuse presented by Hospital Physician Incentive Plans, see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH, COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 86-103, 99TH CONG., 2D SESs. 3,
MEDICARE-PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY HOSPITALS COULD LEAD TO ABUSE (1986);
Note, Abusing the Patient: Medicare Fraud and Abuse in Hospital-Physician Incentive Plans, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 279 (1986). In the above Note the author states that hospital physician incentive
plans violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988)).
Note, supra, at 287. To the extent these plans induce the "referral" of patients, this conclusion is
correct. This view, however, is incorrect to the extent these plans encourage a particular medical
treatment of patients.
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appropriately encourages. PPS encourages reducing and limiting unnecessary
services. The 1986 amendment fails to distinguish between necessary and un-
necessary services, and by its terms prohibits payments that induce limiting and
reducing unnecessary services.481 Such a prohibition is inappropriate and,
surely, unintended.
The third aspect of section 1320a-7b(b) that makes prosecution difficult re-
sults from an unfortunate opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc. 482 the Ninth
Circuit made a distinction between the referral of an "individual" and the refer-
ral of a "service." Remuneration of the former is prohibited under one section
in the statute.483 Remuneration for the latter is prohibited under another sec-
tion.4 84 In Stewart the Ninth Circuit reversed convictions of medical laboratory
owners and operators because the court found a "fatal variance" between the
indictment and the proof at trial.485 There was no question that the defendants
offered remuneration as an inducement to a physician to refer laboratory busi-
ness to them. 486 According to the Ninth Circuit, the problem was that the in-
dictment charged an offense under 42 U.S.C. section 1396h(b)(2)(A), 487 which
proscribed paying a remuneration to induce any person to refer an individual,488
while the referral of the blood and urine specimens was a referral of "service,"
which should have been charged under section 1396h(b)(2)(B). 489
If followed by other circuits, this decision could have serious consequences
because many of the remuneration cases concern medical laboratories4 90 and
because in the medical laboratory context characterization of a referral as an
"individual" or a "service" will be difficult. For example, is it a referral of an
481. For an excellent discussion of the types of regulations that would help resolve this problem,
see Hyman & Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in a "Competitive" Health
Care Era, 19 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 1133, 1185-95 (1988).
482. 652 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981).
483. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1988) (formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)(2)
(A), 1396h(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1981)).
484. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1988) (formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)(2)
(B), 1396h(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1981)).
485. Stewart, 652 F.2d at 807.
486. Id. at 805.
487. Now codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1980).
488. Stewart, 652 F.2d at 806.
489. Id. at 806-07. Section 1396h(b)(2)(B) is now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(B)
(West Supp. 1988).
490. See Kickbacks in Clinical Laboratories: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1982) (testi-
mony of Charles P. Monroe, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI). Assistant
Director Monroe stated:
Convicted laboratory owners, who have cooperated with the Government, advise that they
had no desire to get business by paying kickbacks. They claim they made the payments
only because they felt they were economically forced to do so. Several convicted lab owners
report that the kickback payment was quite essential in obtaining physician's accounts. If
no kickback was paid, the doctor would take his business elsewhere.
Id.; see also Medicare & Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Finance, supra note 7, at
7 (statement of Oliver B. Revell, Assistant Director, Chief of Criminal Investigative Division, FBI)
("It became immediately apparent [to FBI agents conducting an undercover investigation] that kick-
backs and rebates were a way of life. Virtually every provider of ancillary services... made offers of
rebates and kickbacks .... ).
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individual or a service when a patient physically visits a laboratory for a blood
test rather than visiting a physician who takes a blood sample and sends it to a
laboratory? Is it significant how much of a patient goes to the laboratory (mean-
ing a bodily fluid specimen versus an amputated limb)? Does it matter if the
laboratory is a psychiatric/psychological laboratory instead of a pathology labo-
ratory? The almost infinite variety of medical laboratory services and methods
will always create uncertainty as to whether a referral is of a patient or of a
service.
The Ninth Circuit may have realized the futility of a highly technical re-
view of indictments charging this offense. Two years after Stewart it was con-
fronted with the converse of the Stewart facts. In United States v. Universal
Trade and Industries, Inc.4 9 1 defendants, a medical laboratory and its adminis-
trator, were convicted for paying remuneration for referrals of tests to the labo-
ratory. The indictment charged that the remunerations at issue were for
"services."'49 2 Defendants argued that there was a fatal variance between the
proof and the indictment because, according to the defendants, referrals were of
"individuals. '493 The Ninth Circuit did not explicitly overrule Stewart but de-
clined to rule on this issue. Instead the court stated that the only significant fact
was the remuneration for referral of laboratory tests; it did not matter whether
the tests were of an individual or a service.494 As the Ninth Circuit also noted,
however, if such a variance exists, it can be cured by descriptions of the offense
in the indictment, by pretrial discovery given by the prosecutor to defendant,
and by the testimony and documents produced at trial.4 9 5
Defendants in federal remuneration cases have been prosecuted almost ex-
clusively under federal Medicare and Medicaid statutes that prohibit remunera-
tions for referrals. 496 Defendants in state remuneration cases have been
prosecuted under statutes prohibiting bribery.49 7
In summary, the theory of fraud by illegal remunerations is created statuto-
rily. Its advantage for the prosecution is that it usually is not difficult to prove
what conduct occurred. There will be little credible dispute as to whether pay-
ments and referrals occurred. Cases prosecuted under this theory are especially
appropriate for undercover investigations because the provider customarily is
491. 695 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1983).
492. Id. at 1153.
493. Id. at 1152.
494. Id. at 1153-54.
495. Id.
496. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 1988) (previously 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h
(1982)); see, e.g., United States v. Universal Trade and Indus., 695 F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 652 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc., 650 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1981); State v. Perlstein, 632
F.2d 661, 662 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); United States v. Ruttenberg, 625
F.2d 173, 174 (7th Cir.); United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1034 (1980); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 1000 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991
(1979); United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048, 1050 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sadlier, 649 F.
Supp. 1560, 1561 (D. Mass. 1966); see also Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. at 1561 (prosecuting under 18
U.S.C. § 666, proscribing theft or bribary concerning programs receiving federal funds).
497. See People v. Warden, 141 A.D.2d 193, 529 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1988); People v. Lerner, 90
Misc. 2d 513, 394 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
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contacted by businesspersons he does not know. Thus, it is not difficult or time-
consuming for an undercover officer to establish sufficient rapport with the pro-
vider so that the provider feels comfortable enough to initiate illegal activity.
Rather, the difficulty presented by the remuneration cases lies in determining
whether the conduct at issue was criminal.
The statute itself creates this difficulty. The term remunerations is overly
broad, prohibiting legitimate and illegitimate payments. The term referrals is
also overly broad, literally prohibiting financial arrangements traditionally em-
ployed among providers as well as new financial behavior encouraged by Pro-
spective Payment Systems (PPS). The term referrals is also too narrow. It fails
to encompass all abuses that are encouraged by PPS. Although Congress has
attempted to close this gap with civil sanctions, the behavior prohibited in the
new legislation still fails to encompass all abuses encouraged by PPS. The third
deficiency in the statute, the distinction between individual and service, is minor
in comparison to these other problems and results more from one questionable
court opinion than from the statute itself. Nevertheless, when pleading an of-
fense under these statutes, prosecutors should take care to plead the proper of-
fense and to provide the defendant with discovery sufficient to render
nonprejudicial any error later found in pleading.
Because of the problems in the illegal remunerations statute, it fails to put
providers and law enforcement officials on notice as to what behavior is prohib-
ited. These statutory gaps also typify what occurs when criminal and civil stat-
utes fail to keep pace with the type of fraud committed. Problems in the statute
have had an effect on prosecution of illegal remunerations. Although illegal re-
munerations are widely acknowledged to be a pervasive problem, especially with
medical laboratories, 498 this theory of prosecution is one of the least used (used
in only 5.6% of the reported prosecutions) 499 and convictions obtained under it
have had a relatively high rate of reversal (twenty-three percent of convictions
obtained under this theory have been reversed).5 00° Because of the problems
noted, this theory of prosecution should be used only when the remuneration is
clearly for the referral and when the referral is not of a type traditionally em-
ployed or encouraged by private or governmental reimbursement systems.
H. Providing Unnecessary Or Substandard Health Services.
"Professional incompetency or malpractice is not ... a criminal offense."501
Providing unnecessary or substandard health services becomes fraudulent, how-
ever, when as a prerequisite to reimbursement, a provider knowingly misrepre-
sents that services rendered were necessary or competently provided.50 2 Of all
498. See supra note 490.
499. See supra Table I accompanying notes 214-22.
500. United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 652 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048, 1058 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912,
917 (2d Cir. 1978).
501. United States v. Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253, 263 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d 192 (6th Cir.
1978).
502. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
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the theories, this is the most difficult to prove and has been used the least, be-
cause, more than any of the other theories of fraud, it directly confronts the
ambiguities inherent in medical decisionmaking. Because this theory is widely
applicable, however, and because it allows patients to be identified as the victims
of a provider's fraud, it is potentially the most powerful theory the prosecution
can use.
1. The Historical Use of This Theory
The reported cases reveal two situations in which this theory has been used:
(1) to prove that misrepresentations as to the necessity of services were made;
and (2) to prove that misrepresentations as to the competency of services were
made. Proving the latter in a criminal case is the more difficult approach.
United States v. Talbott,50 3 one of the first reported cases to use this theory, is
also one of the few that explicitly used this second approach and found defend-
ants guilty of fraud for falsely representing that they provided competent health
services. Doctors Talbott and Taylor, both dentists, shared a practice in which
ninety-five percent of their patients were covered by Medicaid. After a bench
trial, the court found defendants guilty on mail fraud charges for providing sub-
standard care, such as administering root canals "without proper diagnostic X-
rays," 5 failing to treat "obvious cavities," and failing to extract teeth that
needed extraction. 50 5 The court also found that defendants had misrepresented
the necessity of the services rendered. Specifically, they represented that teeth
restorations and endodontic treatment were necessary when the teeth actually
had deteriorated to such an extent that patients could not benefit from the treat-
ment.50 6 The court based its finding of guilt on both types of fraud. Defendants
provided services that were "either medically unnecessary or, if necessary, per-
formed in such an unprofessional manner, with utter disregard for the patient's
well-being, as to be harmful and detrimental to continued good health." 50 7
Because of the difficulty of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that services
have been provided incompetently, this approach will be difficult to use in crimi-
nal prosecutions. The fact that only one reported case has used this approach, a
case in which misrepresentations of competency were only part of the fraud
found, attests to this difficulty. If attempted, therefore, this approach should be
used only in conjunction with proof that the provider committed other forms of
fraud as well.
With the exception of the Talbott case, cases prosecuted under this theory
have alleged that a provider committed fraud by representing that services ren-
490 (1988); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1481 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ziperstein,
601 F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980); People v. Rehman, 253 Cal.
App. 2d 119, 120, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65, 67-69, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1967); In re Wayne County
Prosecutor, 121 Mich. App. 798, 799, 329 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1982).
503. 460 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978).
504. Id. at 263.
505. Id. at 263-64.
506. Id. at 264.
507. Id. at 256.
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dered were necessary when they were not. An analysis of these cases indicates
that this variety of fraud consists of three elements, each of which must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the provider, or someone at its di-
rection, knowingly represented that the services billed were necessary; (2) that
the services were not necessary; and (3) that the provider knew the representa-
tions of necessity were false.
Few problems will arise in proving the first element, that a representation of
necessity was made. Most claim forms utilized by third-party payers require the
provider to "certify that the services [billed] ... were medically indicated and
necessary for the health of the patient. 508 Because of the explicit and unambig-
uous nature of this representation of necessity on the claim form and the long-
standing nature of this requirement, it will not be difficult to prove that the
provider knowingly represented that the services were necessary. Thus, provid-
ers will rarely assert that they erroneously or mistakenly represented that serv-
ices provided were necessary. By comparison, providers charged with fraud
under the third theory discussed in this Article, which dealt with misrepresenta-
tions as to the compensable nature of services, 50 9 often will claim that because
the regulations at issue are ambiguous, inconsistent, and changing, they did not
know exactly what representations were included in their claim forms.
The second element of this theory, proof that the services rendered were not
necessary, presents the biggest hurdle. The imprecise and subjective nature of
medicine makes it difficult to determine what is "necessary" treatment. As one
court opined in reversing the conviction of a physician charged under this the-
ory, "such a subjective term [as 'necessary services'] would not be compatible
with the need for precision in criminal statutes. '510 A plaintiff should not use
this theory, therefore, unless the necessity of the services at issue is not subject to
a credible difference of opinion. The factual scenarios in the reported cases are
illustrative of the type of cases appropriate for this theory: unnecessary adminis-
tration of "Argon Laser Trabeculoplasty," which places small burns on the "tra-
becular meshwork which is the 'drain' in the eye";5 11 an obstetrician who would
"rub and massage, in a sexual manner, the vaginal and anal areas, the breasts
and the buttocks of patients" as "medically indicated and necessary examina-
tions"; 512 dental patients who received up to nine root canals each on "badly
508. "Health Insurance Claim Form," Form HCFA-1500-C2 (1-84), Form OWCP-1500, Form
CHAMPUS-501, Form RRB-1500. The Medicare program and most Medicaid programs use the
above forms. Some states use additional forms that also contain a representation that services per-
formed were necessary. See, e.g., Alabama: "Alacaid-Medical Transportation Claim Form,"
MCD-17 (Rev. 1/87) EDS-13s; "Alacaid-Medicaid Dental Claim Form," MCD-5 (10/77) 380-
202; California: "Medi-Cal Outpatient Claim," 15-1 7/80; "Hospital Inpatient Claim," 16-1C 12/
82; "Patient Request for Long Term Care" 25-1 6/80; Maine: "Medicaid Recipient Benefits As-
signed to State of Maine by Law," BMS-006 (8-84); New Hampshire: "New Hampshire Medical
Assistance Program-Dental," 279-001 (11-86); North Carolina: "Request for Payment-North
Carolina Medical Assistance Program- Ambulance Service Claim," HNCA-O], 372-108; Washing-
ton: "Electronic Billing Agreement."
509. See supra text accompanying notes 290-321.
510. In re Wayne County Prosecutor, 121 Mich. App. 798, 801, 329 N.W.2d 510, 511 (1982).
511. United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1376 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259
(1988).
512. United States v. Casey, No. 88-48 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 1988).
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broken down... non-restorable" teeth; 513 patients who received unnecessary x-
rays, blood tests,5 14 cardiac electrocardiography,5 15 or surgery;5 16 and patients
who were drug addicts and were required to submit to extensive, intrusive, and
often dangerous medical tests, which generated income for the physician, if they
wanted the physician-defendant to prescribe their drug of choice.5 17 The pat-
tern detected from these cases is that the more painful, dangerous, or violative
the service in question is to the patient, the greater the likelihood of finding a
lack of necessity and the better suited the case is to this theory of fraud.
The third element of this theory, the defendant's knowledge that the serv-
ices were not necessary and thus that the representation of necessity was false,
can also be difficult to prove. Like the second element, defendant's knowledge
will be easier to prove when the procedure at issue is intrusive and obviously
unnecessary. Insider testimony from employees or colleagues of the provider,
which reveals the provider's statements and modus operandi, will also help prove
this knowledge. For example, employees and patients of one Medicaid clinic
testified as to the modus operandi of the clinic.518 On a typical day 100 patients
visited the clinic.5 19 Although the same tests were to be performed on each
patient, some patients avoided the tests by paying not to have them done since
all they wanted was a prescription for controlled substances. 5 20 Performance of
the medical exam lasted a few seconds, and nonphysicians determined which
drug would be prescribed.5 2 1 In another case in which the owners of medical
clinics were convicted, employees testified about the "Garfield Shuffle," Garfield
being the name of defendants' chain of clinics.5 2 2 "Patients were sent to one or
more doctors for unscheduled examinations which bore no relation to the pa-
tient's specific complaint .... Likewise, laboratory tests, such as x-rays and
blood analyses, as well as prescription drugs, were ordered for patients regard-
513. United States v. Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253, 261, 264 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d 192 (6th
Cir. 1978).
514. United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980).
515. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985). The
reported opinion in Greber mentions, but does not discuss, the conviction for providing unnecessary
services. However, Government's Sentencing Memorandum, Greber (No. 83-00414) (filed Sept. 12,
1984), summarizes the evidence introduced under this theory.
516. See People v. Rehman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
947 (1968). In Rehman one patient received a "D & C and cervical biopsy.., a uterine suspension,
an appendectomy, [and] an adhesionotomy by way of an exploratory laparotomy," none of which
was "necessary or indicated." Id. at 127, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 71. Another patient, age 10, almost
received an emergency appendectomy when he had only an impacted bowel. Id. at 131, 61 Cal. Rptr.
at 73.
517. United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1484 (6th Cir. 1986); see also United States v.
Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (7th Cir. 1987) (drug addicts required to submit to blood,
breath, and other tests before being given a prescription for codeine-based cough syrup), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1034 (1988).
518. Mahar, 801 F.2d at 1482-83.
519. Id. at 1483.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980).
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less of medical necessity. '523
Federal cases using this theory are prosecuted as mail fraud52 4 or conspir-
acy.52 5 State cases using this theory are prosecuted as Medicaid fraud5 26 or acts
injurious to the public health.52 7
2. The Potential Advantage of This Theory for the Prosecution
This theory has a potential advantage over all other theories because it al-
leges that the patient as well as the third-party payer is a victim of the provider's
fraud. In the "services not rendered," "misrepresenting the nature of services
provided," "improper remuneration, .... false cost report," and "auto accident
scam" theories, the insurer is identified as the victim of the fraud. With the "Rx
by fraud" theory, used in cases in which a provider facilitates the consumption
of controlled substances by falsely representing that a prescription is for a legiti-
mate medical purpose, any insurer that pays for the prescription is the financial
victim and, as with all illegal drug dealing, the general public is also a victim.
Drug addicts who are patients of such a provider arguably are also victims.
Generally, however, the addicts, unlike the patients who receive unnecessary
services, are knowing and enthusiastic participants in the fraud. Thus, there is
little strategic advantage to proving that such patients are victims of the pro-
vider's fraudulent prescriptive practices. The "quackery" theory has always
identified the patient as the victim of the fraud but the applicability of this the-
ory is limited, by definition, to outlandish procedures, treatments, or providers.
In contrast, the applicability of the unnecessary services theory is quite broad;
almost any medical procedure or service may be unnecessary in any given
situation.
Identifying the patient as a victim of a provider's fraud has a tremendous
tactical advantage for the criminal or civil plaintiff. As noted above, when the
victim of a fraud is a businessperson, insurance corporation, conglomerate, or
governmental entity, as is the case in most white collar crimes, the victim does
not generate much sympathy.52 8 Indeed, in prosecutions of health care provid-
ers the insurance company or governmental agency identified as the victim often
is detested by people who have had negative experiences with complex regula-
tions or health insurance bureaucrats. By contrast, patients who have received
inadequate, incompetent, or unnecessary medical services are genuinely sympa-
thetic victims.
Courts are reluctant to admit evidence of harm suffered by patients when
523. Id. at 285.
524. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1382-83 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Mahar, 801 F.2d at 1489-90; United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); Ziperstein, 601 F.2d at 295-96; United States
v. Furman, 507 F. Supp. 848, 849 (D. Md.), rev'd, 672 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1981) (mem.); United
States v. Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253, 255 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978).
525. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); see, e.g., Ziperstein, 601 F.2d at 284; Talbott, 460 F. Supp. at 266.
526. In re Wayne County Prosecutor, 121 Mich. App. 798, 799, 329 N.W.2d 510, 510 (1982).
527. People v. Rehman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 119, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65, 65 (1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 947 (1968).
528. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
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they are not identified as victims of the fraud. In People v. Alizadeh 529 a New
York appellate court reversed the conviction of an obstetrician, stating that it
disapproved of the Government's cross-examination of defendant. 530 The court
believed the prosecutor had improperly inquired into the operations of the obste-
trician's "clinic conditions and practices that constituted a danger to the health
of those who came to the clinic. ' 531 The court found this line of questioning
irrelevant to the issues in the case which, as defined by the Government's theo-
ries of prosecution, were whether defendant billed for services not provided and
misrepresented the nature of services which had been provided.532 Had the
prosecution also alleged a theory of fraud that identified the patients of Dr. Al-
izadeh as victims of his fraud, the powerful evidence of the poor quality of care
he provided would have been relevant and should have been admissible.
United States v. Campbell 5 3 3 also revealed courts' reluctance to admit evi-
dence of injuries patients sustain when patients are not included as victims in the
indictment. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that the testimony of two patients not included as victims in the indictment
was properly admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),5 34 it was a two-
to-one decision over a vigorous dissent by Judge Martin. The dissent had no
problem with the admission of evidence showing that patients were victims of
the provider's fraud when the patients were explicitly included in the indict-
ment. However, other courts may agree with Judge Martin's opinion that "the
trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the testimony of two former
patients of the defendant.., who were not listed in the indictment as defrauded
by the defendant. '5 35 The majority's determination that this testimony was
properly admissible turned on the fact that the prosecution used the "unneces-
sary services" theory. 536 The majority found the testimony of the two patients
relevant to the "issue of whether the defendant had knowingly engaged in a
scheme to defraud his patients and their insurers by charging for unnecessary
treatments."5 37 Had the government not chosen to use the'unnecessary services
theory, it is doubtful whether evidence proving these two patients were victims
of the fraud would have been admitted.
Because the theories of prosecution historically utilized have failed to iden-
tify the patient as a victim, few cases have been reported in which the evidence
admitted at trial revealed the harm suffered by patients because of a provider's
fraud. Congressional investigations of health care fraud, however, have been
unencumbered by legal theories that direct the focus of the investigation away
from the issue of care given to patients. Congressional hearings demonstrate
529. 87 A.D.2d 418, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1982).
530. Id. at 432, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 432, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
533. 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988).
534. Id. at 1380.
535. Id. at 1383 (Martin, J., dissenting).
536. Id. at 1380-81.
537. Id. at 1381.
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that providers defrauding third-party payers also often are delivering poor medi-
cal care to patients by the same course of conduct. The evidence in these hear-
ings is powerful. As one congressional staff member stated after serving
undercover as a Medicaid patient, "[P]atients were just being used. The pa-
tients-or more to the point, their medicaid numbers-were just the necessary
raw material for the production of profits. a538 One physician who served in a
Medicaid clinic testified, "I think the quality of care is appalling. It is the worst
medical care that I have ever seen in all of my experience working any-
where."'539 Senator John Heinz, who chaired many of the congressional hear-
ings, attested to findings of "poor care and inadequate treatment from serious
undiagnosed illnesses to extensive patient abuse in nursing homes and boarding
facilities," in addition to findings of fraud in medical insurance programs. 540
A few examples are illustrative. One Chicago reporter testified about his
experience when he went undercover as a janitor in a Chicago hospital. He
explained that he "found that nurses were doing the job of doctors. Nurses aides
were doing the job of registered nurses. And I, as a janitor, would do the job of
orderly, aide, and nurse." 541 This reporter told of one physician who "special-
ized in mass tonsillectomies," saw more than 100 patients per day, and billed
Medicaid $124,000 per year.542 This physician "herded [his patients] into his
office 'like cattle[,] ... lined them up, and [peered into] their throats ... for a
second or two' " before deciding the surgery was necessary.543 Entire families,
sometimes with five or six children, were given tonsillectomies after two-minute
examinations. 544 "A mother of six was told that all of her children must have
their tonsils out, and when she protested, the doctor told her she didn't love her
family if she didn't have their tonsils out."'545 The reporter told of one instance
when two sisters were operated on consecutively for both tonsils and hernias.
The first child, 8 years old, had been left in the recovery room with an
untrained aide while the surgery crew operated on the second child.
State law ... requires that a registered nurse be in the recovery room
.... and the vital signs must be monitored after surgery to insure that
the patient does not aspirate blood. The aide was unable to awaken the
child and she had to interrupt surgery to get help to force air down the
child's throat. Then the child was returned to her bed, the next opera-
tion concluded on the 6-year-old sister, and I, the janitor, was left to
538. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5, supra
note 7, at 544 (statement of Patricia G. Oriol, Chief Clerk, Senate Comm. on Aging).
539. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 6, supra
note 9, at 687 (statement of Nancy Kurke, M.D.).
540. Oversight, supra note 7, at 19.
541. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1,
supra note 12, at 68 (statement of William Gaines of the Chicago Tribune).
542. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1,
supra note 12, at 69 (statement of William Gaines of the Chicago Tribune).
543. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1,
supra note 12, at 68 (statement of William Gaines of the Chicago Tribune).
544. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1,
supra note 12, at 68 (statement of William Gaines of the Chicago Tribune).
545. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1,
supra note 12, at 68 (statement of William Gaines of the Chicago Tribune).
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watch the child in the recovery room.5 46
Senator Frank E. Moss, along with congressional staff members,547 served
undercover as a Medicaid patient to observe Medicaid fraud firsthand. He
found that providers who were defrauding Medicaid by billing for unnecessary
services were also providing poor medical care by rendering the unnecessary
services. Senator Moss and the other investigators, all healthy when they visited
the medicaid clinics, were given at each clinic blood and urine tests, x-rays, and
examinations by several types of providers, such as internists, ophthalmologists,
and chiropractors. 548 At one clinic Senator Moss received a thirty-needle al-
lergy test before even seeing the doctor, extensive blood and lab work, and was
given a handful of prescriptions to fill. He was told to return the next day for
more tests. 549
Misdiagnoses were common at the clinics. One congressional staff member
was told by the Medicaid ophthalmologist that she had symptoms of glaucoma
and needed a glaucoma test. This investigator refused the glaucoma test and,
upon examination by her own opthalmologist, learned that she had no symp-
toms of glaucoma.550 Another investigator was given a prescription for eye-
glasses although he had twenty-twenty vision. 551 At another clinic an
investigator filled a urine specimen bottle with green soap and water. The nurse
found the specimen to be normal then "emptied the contents into the sink and
then merely ran water over the bottle, rinsing it out only once with water, before
returning it to the shelf with the rest of the 'clean' bottles, ready to be used again
on some other unsuspecting patient. '5 5
2
One doctor who served in a Medicaid clinic gave an example of the poor
medical care she saw: "[The clinic has] one size of blood pressure cuff and,
unfortunately, that is good for taking blood pressure only on a normal sized arm
.... Many, many of our patients are obese and if you use a normal size cuff on
an obese arm you get what is called factitious hypertension. ' 553 This physician
saw patients who had been diagnosed as hypertensive by the other physician at
546. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 1,
supra note 12, at 69 (statement of William Gaines of the Chicago Tribune).
547. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5, supra
note 7, at 521, 543, 556 (statements by Sen. Frank E. Moss; Patricia G. Oriol, Chief Clerk, Senate
Comm. on Aging; James A. Roberts, Jr., Temporary Investigator, Senate Comm. on Aging).
548. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5, supra
note 7, at 521-22 (statements by Sen. Frank E. Moss; Patricia G. Oriol, Chief Clerk, Senate Comm.
on Aging; James A. Roberts, Jr., Temporary Investigator, Senate Comm. on Aging).
549. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5, supra
note 7, at 522 (statement by Sen. Frank E. Moss).
550. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt 5, supra
note 7, at 559-60 (statement by James A. Roberts, Jr., Temporary Investigator, Senate Comm. on
Aging).
551. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5, supra
note 7, at 547 (statement of Darrell R. McDew, Temporary Investigator, Senate Comm. on Aging).
552. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5, supra
note 7, at 565 (statement of James A. Roberts, Jr., Temporary Investigator, Senate Comm. on
Aging).
553. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 6, supra
note 9, at 689.
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this clinic. However, "90 percent of [these patients] were not hypertensive." '554
There was no doubt that these patients suffered from the erroneous diagnosis.
The physician explained, "They were taking very potent antihypertensive medi-
cations and some of them were symptomatic [because of these medications] to
the point of loss of balance, dizziness, and weakness. They were being treated
for a condition they didn't have simply because we didn't have a proper blood
pressure cuff.'' 5 5s This physician gave another example of the poor medical care
rendered in some Medicaid clinics:
One was a patient of 50 [years of age] who came in, who had been seen
by 6 other physicians [in the Medicaid clinic]. He asked for medica-
tion for pain in his face. I asked him why he had a pain in his face and
he was very surprised.
"You know, none of the other doctors asked me that."
What he had was the largest growth that I have ever seen-about
the size of an egg-that was literally choking him. I looked through
the chart and I said, "You know, I really don't understand this. Is it
really true that no one has looked in your mouth?"
He said, "Yes, that's right, they never looked in my mouth ....
They gave me medication but they never looked in my mouth."5' 56
Explaining why none of the Medicaid clinic physicians looked in the patient's
mouth, the physician said, "No one cared to know. It was not worth the trouble
to take the time to look in his mouth because you don't get paid for that, it is a
waste of time. Anything you do that you can't put down on an invoice is a waste
of time."557
These few anecdotes illustrate the important point that the fraudulent pro-
vider victimizes not only the insurer that pays for the unnecessary or wholly
inadequate services, but also the patient who endures the unnecessary, painful,
or dangerous procedures or who fails to receive necessary medical treatment
because of the provider's incompetence.
As noted, the major challenge in the prosecution of a white collar crime is
to choose a theory of prosecution that maximizes the chances for admission of
powerful evidence. Because the legal theories historically used to prosecute
health care providers have failed to identify the patients as fraud victims, the
powerful evidence that a provider delivered poor medical care has seldom been
used to its maximum advantage. A prosecutor able to identify a patient as a
victim of the fraud will present a more complete picture of the scope of the
provider's fraud and thus will have a stronger case.
554. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 6, supra
note 9, at 689.
555. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 6, supra
note 9, at 689.
556. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 6, supra
note 9, at 694.
557. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 6, supra
note 9, at 694.
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3. How to Allege and Prove that the Patient is a
Victim of a Provider's Fraud
People v. Rehman,558 the first reported case using this theory, demonstrates
the most straightforward way to prosecute providers who render unnecessary or
substandard services. This prosecution did not utilize a fraud theory at all. In-
stead, Dr. Rehman, an osteopathic physician, was prosecuted for violation of a
California penal statute that made it an offense "[t]o commit any act injurious to
the public health."55 9 The acts for which Dr. Rehman was convicted included
performing and attempting to perform unnecessary surgery,56° falsifying birth
certificates, 56 1 and allowing unskilled personnel, including a gas station attend-
ant,5 62 to administer anaesthesia, suture patients after surgery, and deliver
babies. 563
The broad language of the California statute made all acts of unnecessary
and substandard medical practice admissible. Although there is no comparable
federal statute and few comparable state statutes,564 existing statutory authority
and theories of fraud already approved by the courts enable prosecutors to iden-
tify and prove that patients are victims of a provider's fraud. Applying the ex-
isting mail fraud statute to the "unnecessary services" theory is an excellent
vehicle for doing so. By including "and its patients" in the portion of the mail
fraud charge that identifies the victims of the provider's fraud, and by including
the misrepresentations of necessity made by the provider to the patients in the
portion of the charge that specifies the misrepresentations made, an indictment
will sufficiently incorporate patients as victims of the fraud.565
Including patients as victims of the provider's fraud should not increase the
previously discussed problems encountered in using this theory. At first blush,
one may be concerned about the nature of the representation made by the pro-
vider to the patient. When representations are vague, implicit, or uncorrobo-
rated oral statements, proof of fraud becomes difficult. Questions will arise as to
the nature of the representation and whether the hearing party misunderstood
558. 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968).
559. Id. at 122, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
560. Id. at 127-28, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
561. Id. at 122 n.l, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 68 n.l.
562. Id. at 131, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
563. Id. at 122 n.1, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68 n.1.
564. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 421 (West 1983) (conspiracy statute making it unlawful
for two or more persons to "commit any act injurious to the public health").
565. The indictment in United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 259 (1988) charged:
[Tihe defendants... unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly devised and intended to devise a
scheme and artifice to defraud ... their patients, the Department of Health and Human
Services, a department of the United States, Nationwide, the State of Ohio and others, for
obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations,
and promises.
Campbell, No. CR 1 86-0126, indictment at 3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 1986). The indictment further
alleged that defendants made the following misrepresentations, among others: "The defendant...
did falsely represent to ... his patients that they had glaucoma;... that a surgical procedure called
argon laser trabeculoplasty would benefit a medical condition with respect to their eyes; ... [and]
that he had performed argon laser trabeculoplasty surgery on them ...." Id.
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the conversation. As noted, when the victim is the insurer, there is no question
that the provider explicitly represented that the services rendered were necessary
because the misrepresentation is stated on the claim form that the provider must
sign. 566 Similarly, proving the misrepresentation of necessity should not be diffi-
cult when the patient is included as victim. The patient often signs the claim
form sent to the third-party payer and thereby reviews the assertion of necessity
contained therein. Moreover, the patient often will sign consent forms that con-
tain representations that the services are necessary.5 67
It also is helpful to focus on the provider's fiduciary relationship to a pa-
tient. Courts have consistently held that a provider (especially a physician) has
a duty to disclose to patients all "information essential to give knowledgeable
consent to medical treatment. r5 68 Clearly, that treatment is not necessary is
"essential" information. It is well established that a defendant who conceals
information she has a duty to disclose is guilty of fraud. 569 Thus, a provider
who fails to tell a patient that a procedure is unnecessary is as guilty of fraud as
a provider who explicitly represents on a claim or consent form that a certain
treatment or medical procedure is needed.
Often the "unnecessary services" theory is used in conjunction with other,
more easily provable theories of fraud.570 By combining this theory with other
theories, a plaintiff can capitalize on the strategic advantage of this theory,
which makes human pain and suffering relevant, while also capitalizing on the
reliability of the other fraud theories. In addition, it is not necessary for the
defendant to be charged under this theory for it to be of use to the prosecution in
a criminal case. For example, in United States v. Balasco,5 7t in which defend-
ant-physician was convicted for accepting kickbacks, the court during sentenc-
ing expressly considered facts not introduced at trial that showed the practice of
poor medicine but no criminal offense. According to the court, detailed infor-
mation in the presentencing report indicated that "'Balasco has performed nu-
566. See supra note 508.
567. Common phrases in consent forms include: "The procedure(s) necessary to treat my condi-
tion (has, have) been explained to me by my said doctor.... " DCH Regional Medical Center Form
9810872; and "Your physician has advised you of your need to have this type of examination," DCH
Regional Medical Center Form 9871870(A). Other consent forms will address the reason and neces-
sity for the specific tests in question; for example, "In order to evaluate how well your heart, lungs
and blood vessels perform during exercise, your doctor has ordered a cardiac stress test .... "
568. See Nelson v. Gaunt, 125 Cal. App. 3d 623, 634, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (1981) (and cases
cited therein); accord Willard v. Hagemeister, 121 Cal. App. 3d 406, 418, 175 Cal. Rptr. 365, 372-73
(1981).
569. United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 926, (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512-13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
Both Bronston and Bohonus were overruled on other grounds by McNally v. United States, 107 S.
Ct. 2875 (1987). See Inger v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988).
570. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1381 (6th Cir.) (services not rendered
and unnecessary services), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d
1382, 1385 (7th Cir. 1987) (drug offenses and unnecessary services rendered); United States v. Ma-
bar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1490 (6th Cir. 1986) (drug offenses and unnecessary services); United States v.
Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir.) (kickback, services not provided, unnecessary services), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
571. No. 85-059 P (D.R.I. Apr. 4, 1986) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 831 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.
1987).
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merous pacemaker implantations on elderly patients whose medical conditions
did not justify the surgical procedure.' ",572 A sentencing court's consideration
of such information is appropriate because a trial court has authority during
sentencing to consider facts outside those introduced at trial.573 This important
possible use of identifying patients as victims should not be overlooked.
4. Conclusion
The "unnecessary services" theory historically has been used in two ways to
allege fraud: (1) fraud occurs when a provider collects reimbursement by inten-
tionally making claims that services were competently provided when they were
not; and (2) fraud occurs when a provider collects reimbursement by intention-
ally making claims that services provided were necessary when they were not.
Because it is so difficult to prove the first type of fraud under this thoery, such an
approach is not suitable by itself in criminal prosecutions. The reported cases
reveal that this approach has been used only once and in this case other theories
of fraud were also alleged and proved.
The second approach to this theory, that fraud occurs when a provider
falsely represents that services rendered were necessary, also is difficult to prove.
The first component of proof, that the provider knowingly represented that serv-
ices were necessary, is not difficult to establish because the representation is usu-
ally made in writing in a claim or consent form and because the necessity
requirement, unlike other reimbursement criteria, is clear, unambiguous, and
consistently imposed by all third-party payers. The second component, that the
services rendered were not necessary, is by far the most difficult element to prove
using this theory. Therefore, this theory should only be used when the services
provided were blatantly and uncontrovertedly unnecessary. Proof of the third
component, that the provider was aware of the unnecessary nature of the serv-
ices rendered and thus of the falsity of the representation of necessity, is facili-
tated when the nonnecessity is blatant and well recognized. Proof of the
provider's knowledge can also be shown through employees, colleagues, or pa-
tients of the provider who testify as to the provider's modus operandi or inculpa-
tory statements.
This theory has a potential advantage over the other theories historically
used to prosecute health care providers because it allows pleading and proving
that the patient is a victim of a provider's fraud. Strategically, such evidence is
advantageous to the prosecution, and factually it presents a more accurate por-
trayal of the scope and harm of the provider's fraud. Although prosecutions
using this theory have not always identified the patient as well as the insurer as a
victim of this fraud,574 few modifications in this theory, as already approved by
572. Transcript of Sentencing at 30, Balasco, No. 85-059 (Apr. 4, 1986) (sentencing order).
573. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358
U.S. 576, 584 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949); 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1982)
("[n]o limitation" will be placed on sentencing information). The information must, of course, be
accurate. United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
574. For example, the indictments charging Shannon N. Mahar, see United States v. Mahar, No.
84 CR 20438, indictment at 25-26 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 1984), and Richard G. Casey, see United
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numerous courts, are needed to do so.
Finally, it must be noted that although this theory can be a powerful tool
for the prosecution, it may be of historical interest only. If the third-party fee-
for-service reimbursement mechanism is completely phased out, there will be no
structural incentive to provide unnecessary services. The structural incentive of
the major new reimbursement mechanism, Prospective Payment Systems, is to
underprovide services. It remains to be seen whether this theory will be applica-
ble in actions alleging fraudulent reimbursement obtained by falsely reporting
that necessary services were provided.
I. Conclusion
Analysis of reported prosecutions of health care providers indicates that in
the last seventy-nine years, twenty-nine different prosecuting sovereignties have
used fifty different statutory authorities to convict twenty types of health care
providers. Only eight theories of fraud have been used in these prosecutions.
These theories are: (1) "Rx by fraud;" (2) "services not provided;" (3) "auto
accident scams;" (4) "misrepresenting the nature of services provided;" (5)
"quackery;" (6) "submitting false cost reports;" (7) "illegal remunerations;" and
(8) "unnecessary services." Of these, the first five are potentially the easiest to
prove while the last three are potentially the most difficult.
Five types of evidence have been used to prove these theories. Undercover
investigations have been used successfully in the "Rx by fraud" and "auto acci-
dent scam" cases. Medical expert testimony is needed to prove the "Rx by
fraud," "services not provided," "misrepresenting the nature of services pro-
vided," "quackery," and "unnecessary services" theories. Accounting expert
testimony may be needed to prove the "false cost report theory" and expert
testimony on reimbursement procedures may be needed to prove the "misrepre-
senting the nature of services provided" theory. Patients have regularly been
helpful witnesses in all but the "Rx by fraud," "false cost report," and "illegal
remuneration" theories, although documentary and testimonial corroboration of
these patient-witnesses is almost always necessary. Credible insiders can be val-
uable witnesses in proving any of the theories. Documentation, including claim
forms, reimbursement regulations, and patient charts, will be a part of proving
any of the theories.
Of the eight theories of fraud utilized, only the "quackery" theory has con-
sistently identified the patient as the victim of a provider's fraud. Because this
theory is limited to instances of quackery, it is not widely applicable. Although
the "unnecessary services" theory has been used only sporadically to identify the
patient as a victim of the provider's fraud, it can easily be modified to identify
States v. Casey, No. 88-48 CR(4), indictment at 3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1988), do not include the
patients as victims of the fraud. However, the indictment charging Doyle E. Campbell, see United
States v. Campbell, No. CR 1 86-0126, indictment at 3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 1986), includes patients
as victims of the fraud. The indictment of A. Alvin Greber, see United States v. Greber, No. 83.
00414, indictment at 6 (E.D. Pa.), charges that Greber devised "a scheme and artifice to defraud and
to obtain money from [Pennsylvania Blue Shield], the United States, and others."
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patients as victims on a more consistent basis. Such a modified theory, which
would be applicable to many factual situations, should be used whenever
possible.
IV. FUTURE PROSECUTIONS OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
The way you pay people influences the way they cheat. Health care provid-
ers are no exception. As noted in Part I, one reimbursement mechanism, third-
party fee-for-service, has dominated most of twentieth-century medicine. It is
likely that Prospective Payment Systems (PPS), introduced within the last dec-
ade, will dominate the remainder of the twentieth century and beyond. Both of
these reimbursement mechanisms affect the types of fraud discussed in Part III.
The fraud encouraged by third-party, fee-for-service reimbursement results
from the incentive in this mechanism to overutilize medical services. Thus, this
mechanism encourages billing for services not rendered 575 and providing unnec-
essary procedures. 57 6 Moreover, because it rewards providers who perform a
high volume of services, fee-for-service encourages remuneration for referrals.
By compensating providers on the basis of their reported costs, fee-for-service
encourages submission of false cost data.
PPS both encourages and discourages fraud. PPS and some of the other
new approaches to reimbursing providers will have some salutory effect in deter-
ring fraudulent behavior. Larger copayments and deductibles will encourage
patients to examine more carefully the representations made by providers to
third-party payers. Closer scrutiny by patients should help discourage the com-
mission of fraud and improve its detection. More importantly, to the extent
prospective reimbursement penalizes overutilization of services, PPS should dis-
courage the types of frauds motivated by the reward inherent in fee-for-service
for high utilization of services. 577 Thus, PPS will discourage three types of
fraud historically prosecuted: billing for services not rendered, automobile acci-
dent scams, and providing unnecessary services while falsely representing that
the services were necessary. Together these types of fraud represent thirty-one
percent of the reported prosecutions.
578
Despite these potential positive effects of PPS on fraudulent behavior, it
also supplies the incentive to engage in at least three types of fraudulent behav-
ior. First, some providers will fail to provide necessary services while represent-
ing that all necessary services have been provided. This type of fraud is the
converse of the "unnecessary services" theory.5 79 It is generally acknowledged
that PPS provides economic incentives to underprovide services.5 80 Recogniz-
575. See Oversight, supra note 7, at 115.
576. See, e.g., Fein, Social & Economic Attitudes Shaping American Health Policy, 58 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 349, 363, 376 (1980); Bovbjerg, supra note 23, at 969-70.
577. See supra text accompanying notes 575-76.
578. See supra Table 1 accompanying notes 214-22.
579. See supra text accompanying notes 501-73.
580. Healthcare Anti-Fraud Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1985) (statement of Michael Zimmerman, Associate
Director, Human Resources Division); Jost, supra note 29, at 590.
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ing this incentive, a number of checks and balances have been incorporated into
PPS to deter this behavior.581 Although it is hotly debated whether these checks
and balances will be sufficient, 582 the point is that the unscrupulous provider will
have an incentive to underprovide services and, in order to circumvent the
checks and balances, will commit fraud by falsifying or concealing information.
The second kind of fraud is encouraged by one of the most visible prospec-
tive payment systems, the DRGs. DRGs provide incentives for misrepresenting
the condition of a patient so as to maximize reimbursement. Because DRGs (as
well as any similar system that reimburses based upon the diagnosis of a patient)
reimburse a provider more for one type of diagnosis than for another, DRGs
may encourage false reporting of diagnoses. This would range from blatant
fabrication of a diagnosis to the less obvious "DRG Creep," which is assigning
to a patient a diagnosis for which there is a greater reimbursement than a more
appropriate, but less lucrative, diagnosis. In addition, because DRGs reimburse
a hospital based solely upon the patient's "principal diagnosis," 5 83 providers will
have an incentive to represent falsely, as the principal diagnosis, what is really a
more lucrative, secondary diagnosis. Concealing the existence of multiple diag-
noses will facilitate misrepresentations of the principal diagnosis. The principal
diagnosis rule may also encourage "unbundling." In the context of DRGs, un-
bundling refers to treating a patient with two independent diseases through mul-
tiple hospital admissions, each with a different diagnosis, when one admission
with multiple diagnoses would suffice. 584 Because DRGs exempt some types of
admissions (such as psychiatric and alcohol/drug unit),585 improper transfers of
patients within a hospital to these DRG exempt wards will be encouraged to
manipulate reimbursement favorably. False statements and concealment may be
necessary to prevent detection of these improper transfers. DRGs currently ap-
ply only to hospitals. The above medical decisions regarding diagnosis, date of
discharge, readmission, and transfer are made by physicians who are not bound
by DRGs. Herein lies the danger of hospital incentive plans 586 that transfer the
economic incentives of DRGs to physicians. This danger emphasizes the impor-
581. Peer Review Organizations, created in 1982, evaluate providers to determine if quality care,
including provision of all necessary services, has been rendered. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c to 1320c-3
(West Supp. 1988); see also 42 C.F.R. § 466.70(c) (1987) (setting the scope of review for PROs). The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 authorized civil penalties for certain providers that fail
"substantially to provide medically necessary items and services . . . if the failure has adversely
affected (or has substantial likelihood of adversely affecting) the individual." Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 4015, 101 Stat. 1330-61 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(g)(6) (West Supp. 1988)). This last
provision, though commendable, is too narrow to cover all potential failures to provide necessary
services. It does not apply to many providers, and it allows only for civil sanctions regardless of the
intent of the provider.
582. See Jost, supra note 29, at 526 n.5 (listing legislation passed to help ensure that quality care
is provided under Proposed Payment Systems); id. at 528-29 (explaining why none of these proce-
dures are adequate). But see Roper, supra note 174, at 184 (severely criticizing a Senate Committee
report stating that Medicare patients were receiving poorer quality of care under DRGs, and discuss-
ing the legislation and procedures implemented to monitor quality of care under DRGs).
583. 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(c)(1), (2) (1987).
584. W. ROE & J. GONG, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ON THE QUAL-
ITY OF CARE 34-35 (1986).
585. 42 C.F.R. § 412.25(a) (1987).
586. See supra note 480.
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tance of clearly distinguishing between legal and illegal behavior in any statutory
prohibitions of remunerations between providers. Before turning to the third
type of fraudulent behavior encouraged by PPS, it must be stressed that a pro-
vider does not commit fraud simply by choosing a more lucrative diagnosis over
another, admitting a patient to a hospital more than once, or transferring a pa-
tient within a hospital. Rather, the provider commits fraud when she supplies
false information or conceals material information to effectuate the economic
aims of these acts.
The third type of fraud encouraged by the structure of PPS, the submission
of false cost reports, is also encouraged by third-party fee-for-service reimburse-
ment. To pay hospitals pursuant to DRG reimbursement, the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services sets
an appropriate amount of reimbursement for each DRG based upon information
supplied by hospitals as to the costs of treating patients.5 8 7 The types of falsifi-
cations that may occur in these cost reports will include some of the same types
of falsifications committed under third-party fee-for-service, such as including
personal expenses as expenses of patient care, and inflating legitimate expenses.
However, the structure of DRGs will make more profitable new types of falsifi-
cation, such as falsely reporting the number of days patients spend in the hospi-
tal and including as DRG expenses other hospital expenses that are inapplicable
to DRG computations (such as capital expenditures, direct medical education
expenses, and costs of kidney acquisitions).588
The above discussion demonstrates that as reimbursement mechanisms
within the health care industry change, the types of fraud committed also will
change. Whereas third-party fee-for-service, by rewarding overutilization, en-
courages the "services not provided," "illegal remunerations," "false cost re-
port," and "unnecessary service" types of fraud, PPS, by rewarding
underutilization, discourages "services not provided," "auto accident scams,"
and "unnecessary services." PPS also will encourage new forms of the theories
of fraud discussed in Part III. The converse of the unnecessary services fraud
will occur under PPS when the unscrupulous provider fails to provide necessary
services and falsifies or conceals information to facilitate this failure. Misrepre-
sentations will occur, but instead will focus on those which affect DRG reim-
bursement. Remunerations designed to maximize reimbursement will continue
between providers. The legality of these remunerations remains to be seen. Sub-
mission of false cost reports will also continue under PPS, but the information
falsified will change to better manipulate new reimbursement criteria. Two of
the theories of fraud historically used will likely be unaffected by changes in
reimbursement: the appetite for drugs will ensure that the "Rx by fraud" theory
remains viable, and naive and desperate patients will keep the "quackery" the-
ory alive. In short, although the specific types of fraud may change, structural
incentives for fraud will continue to exist.
In addition to the new structural incentives for fraud provided by PPS,
587. 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.60-.63 (1987).
588. Id. § 412.2(d).
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recent socioeconomic changes will also encourage fraudulent behavior. The
growing commercialization of health care is one such change.589 Sociological
studies have shown that as a profession becomes more commercialized and so-
cialized to the behavior of profit-seeking, fraud increases.5 90 An additional so-
cioeconomic change that will affect fraudulent behavior is the increase in the
number of health care providers, 591 coupled with the current efforts to decrease,
or at least stabilize, national health care expenditures. This change means there
will be fewer dollars to be split among an increasing number of providers. As
providers seek to maintain what they perceive as appropriate target incomes, the
unscrupulous provider is more likely to succumb to fraud.
5 92
These bleak projections of the future structural and socioeconomic incen-
tives for fraudulent behavior by health care providers suggest four points. First,
fraudulent behavior by health care providers will continue, if not increase. Sec-
ond, criminal fraud by health care providers will probably be harder to prove.
Two of the frauds encouraged by PPS, concealing the failure to provide neces-
sary services and manipulating DRG reimbursement by falsifying patient medi-
cal information, require a showing that grossly improper medical treatment was
knowingly administered. Proof of such facts beyond a reasonable doubt is very
difficult. The other two offenses likely to occur under PPS, remunerations be-
tween providers and submission of false cost reports, also present major difficul-
ties for the prosecution. The long-standing custom of providers giving direct
and indirect remuneration to other providers and the problems of constructing
statutes prohibiting remuneration raise serious questions as to the legality of any
given remuneration. The evidentiary problems discussed above in proving inten-
589. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
590. See Quinney, Occupational Structure and Criminal Behavior: Prescription Violation by Re-
tail Pharmacists, 11 SOCIAL PROBS. 179 (1963). Quinney conducted a study in which he divided
pharmacists into those who had a "business orientation" toward their jobs and those who had a
"professional orientation" toward their jobs. He then studied the prescription violations (usually
misdemeanor offenses in the respective jurisdictions studied) by the pharmacists. Quinney found
that 75% of the pharmacists who had a business orientation committed prescription violations while
none of the pharmacists with a professional orientation committed prescription violations. Id. at 183
(Table 1).
Another sociologist, J.E. Conklin, has identified six market conditions conducive to business
crimes: (1) seller concentration; (2) buyer concentration; (3) product differentiation ("in distinguish-
ing its product from competing products in the consumer's mind, a company may engage in fraudu-
lent or deceptive advertising to create false distinctions"); (4) entry barriers; (5) price elasticity of
demand (when an increase in price will result in little reduction in demand); and (6) a slow growth
rate of demand. J. CONKLIN, supra note 122, at 51-52.
All of these conditions exist in the health field, at least to some extent. Because of licensing
requirements, entry barriers have existed in health care since the early twentieth century. As third-
party payers began to dominate payment, buyer concentration developed. Consequently, the de-
mand for health care services has increased consistently even though the price for these services has
risen steadily. As public policy makers attempt to slow the growth of health care expenditures,
competition between providers initially should increase. This competition will likely induce many
individual health care providers to merge into health care conglomerates, resulting in seller concen-
tration. Finally, advertisements on radio, television, and billboards readily demonstrate the attempts
by health care providers to sell and differentiate their services.
591. See supra text accompanying note 105.
592. Brown, supra note 96, at 162 ("target incomes" are "those incomes [physicians] believe they
have a right to achieve as a consequence of years spent in acquiring expertise").
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tional submission of a false cost report 59 3 will be exacerbated by the tremendous
volume of new regulations governing cost reporting under PPS.
Third, given the difficulty in proving criminal fraud, civil remedies will be-
come even more important enforcement weapons. Aggressive civil actions, ex-
pulsion from Medicare and Medicaid, and revocation of professional licenses
should accompany any criminal action. If criminal action is inappropriate or
ineffective, these sanctions can be extremely effective substitutes.
Fourth, the patient will continue to be a victim of the unscrupulous pro-
vider's efforts to fraudulently maximize reimbursement. The examples in this
Article demonstrate that patients have been victims of fraud in the third-party
fee-for-service reimbursement system, and will continue to be victims in a pro-
spective reimbursement system that rewards under-utilization of medical
services.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not fair or accurate to suggest that all health care providers will de-
fraud third-party payers or patients. Some attempts to take advantage of reim-
bursement mechanisms are not fraudulent but are aggressive, creative, and legal
business tactics in an increasingly competitive industry. Other activity that ap-
pears fraudulent is not; such as genuine error committed in a good faith attempt
to comply with complex regulations. If neither of these situations applies, how-
ever, the fraudulent health care provider should be pursued tenaciously and re-
lentlessly in the criminal, civil, and administrative forums. This will require an
appreciation of the socioeconomic developments in health care and the difficul-
ties of proving this fraud. The selection of an optimal theory of the case is im-
perative for overcoming these difficulties. Although the optimal theory was
articulated in one of the first reported prosecutions of a health care provider,
594
it has been ignored too often since. This theory, which focuses on the patient as
a victim of the fraudulent provider, allows proof of a sad truth: the health care
provider, by virtue of expertise and status, is able to commit fraud by frightening
the ill and trusting patient into parting with money, or more. It is likely that as
PPS or other reimbursement mechanisms develop, some changes will be needed
in this theory to make it directly applicable to frauds committed under the new
reimbursement schemes. There is little chance, however, that this theory will
lose its vitality. To the unscrupulous provider, the patient will always be "the
raw material for profits." '5
95
593. See supra text accompanying notes 430-37.
594. United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
595. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, Pt. 5, supra
note 7, at 544 (statement of Patricia G. Oriol, Chief Clerk, Senate Comm. on Aging).
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